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August 26, 2016

Via Federal Express

Honorable John L. Phillips
NORTH COUNTY COURTHOUSE
3188 PGA Boulevard, Room 1414
Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410

Re: Estate of Simon L. Bernstein; Case No.: 502012CP004391XXXXNB (IH)

Dear Judge Phillips:

With regard to *Trustee's Motion to Approve Retention of Counsel and, to Appoint Ted S. Bernstein as Administrator Ad Litem to Defend Claim against Estate by William Stansbury*, set for hearing on **September 1, 2016 at 8:30 a.m.**, enclosed please find the following documentation:


1. Notice of Hearing;
2. Trustee's Motion to Approve Retention of Counsel and, to Appoint Ted S. Bernstein as Administrator Ad Litem to Defend Claim against Estate by William Stansbury;
3. Objection to Trustee's Motion to Appoint Ted Bernstein as Administrator Ad Litem to Defend Claim Against Estate by William Stansbury; and,
4. Case law, Florida Statutes and Probate Code cited in the above-listed Objection:
 - A. *Funchess v. Gulf Stream Apartments of Broward County, Inc.*, 611 So.2d 43 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993);
 - B. *Arzuman v. Estate of Prince Bander BIN Saud Bin, etc.*, 879 So.2d 675 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004);
 - C. *Montgomery v. Cribb*, 484 So.2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986);
 - D. *Estate of Bell v. Johnson*, 573 So.2d 57 (Fla. 1st DCA, 1990)
 - E. §731.201(23), Fla. Stat. (2013);
 - F. §733.602(1), Fla. Stat. (2013); and,
 - G. Fla. Prob. R. 5.440.

Honorable John L. Phillips
Re: In Re: Estate of Simon L. Bernstein
Case No. 502012CP004391XXXXNB (IH)
August 26, 2016
Page 2 of 2

Thank you for your consideration of this matter.

Respectfully submitted,
PETER M. FEAMAN, P.A.

By: _____


Peter M. Feaman

PMF/tr

Enclosures

cc: Alan Rose, Esq. (via email w/enclosures)
Brian O'Connell, Esq. (via email w/enclosures)
Gary R. Shendell, Esq. (via email w/enclosures)
Diana Lewis, Esq. (via email w/enclosures)
Eliot Bernstein (via email w/enclosures)
Jeffrey Friedstein and Lisa Friedstein (via email w/enclosures)
Pamela Beth Simon (via email w/enclosures)

1

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND
FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA.

IN RE:

CASE NO. 502012CP004391XXXXNBIH

ESTATE OF SIMON L. BERNSTEIN,
_____ /

NOTICE OF HEARING
Uniform Motion Calendar

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the undersigned has called up for a hearing on the following:

DATE: Thursday, September 1, 2016

TIME: 8:30 a.m.

JUDGE: Honorable John L. Phillips

PLACE: Palm Beach North County Courthouse, 3188 PGA Blvd., Courtroom 3, Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410

MATTER(S) TO BE HEARD:

TRUSTEE'S MOTION TO APPROVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN TED S. BERNSTEIN, TRUSTEE, AND BRIAN O'CONNELL, AS PR OF THE ESTATE OF SIMON BERNSTEIN, REGARDING THE ESTATE'S PERSONAL PROPERTY SOLD WITH TRUST'S REAL ESTATE

TRUSTEE'S MOTION TO APPROVE RETENTION OF COUNSEL AND, TO APPOINT TED S. BERNSTEIN AS ADMINISTRATOR *AD LITEM* TO DEFEND CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE BY WILLIAM STANSBURY

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been furnished to parties listed on attached Service List by: Facsimile U.S. Mail; U.S. Mail; E-mail Electronic Transmission; FedEx; Hand Delivery this 23rd day of August, 2016.

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By: /s/ Alan B. Rose
Alan B. Rose (Fla. Bar No. 961825)

SERVICE LIST - CASE NO. 502012CP004391XXXXNBIJH

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"If you are a person with a disability who needs any accommodation in order to participate in this proceeding, you are entitled, at no cost to you, to the provision of certain assistance. Please contact Germaine English, Americans with Disabilities Act Coordinator, Palm Beach County Courthouse, 205 North Dixie Highway, West Palm Beach, Florida 33401; telephone number (561) 355-4380 at least 7 days before your scheduled court appearance, or immediately upon receiving this notification if the time before the scheduled appearance is less than 7 days; if you are hearing or voice impaired, call 711."

SPANISH

Si usted es una persona minusvalida que necesita algun acomodamiento para poder participar en este procedimiento, usted tiene derecho, sin tener gastos propios, a que se le provea cierta ayuda. Tenga la amabilidad de ponerse en contacto con Germaine English, 205 N. Dixie Highway, West Palm Beach, Florida, 33401; teléfono numero (561) 355-4380, por lo menos 7 dias antes de la cita fijada para su comparecencia en los tribunales, o inmediatamente despues de recibir esta notificacion si el tiempo antes de la comparecencia que se ha programado es menos de 7 dias; si usted tiene discapacitacion del oido o de la voz, llame al 711.

CREOLE

Si ou sè youn moun ki enfim, ki bézwen akomodasyon pou w ka patisipe nan powosedi sa, ou kalifye san ou pa gen okenn lajan pou w peye, gen pwovizyon pou jwen kek ed. Tanpri kontakte Germaine English, koodonate pwogram Lwa pou ameriken ki Enfim yo nan Tribinal Konte Palm Beach la ki nan, 205 North Dixie Highway, West Palm Beach, Florida 33401; téléfonn li se (561) 355-4380 nan 7 jou anvan dat ou gen randevou pou paret nan tribinal la, oubyen imedyatman apre ou fin resevwa konvokasyon an si le ou gen pou w paret nan tribinal la mwens ke 7 jou; si ou gen pwoblem pou w tande oubyen pale, rele 711.

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND
FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA.

CASE NO. 502012CP004391XXXXNB-IH
Probate – Judge John L. Phillips

IN RE:

ESTATE OF SIMON L. BERNSTEIN,

_____ /

**TRUSTEE'S MOTION TO APPROVE RETENTION OF COUNSEL AND, TO APPOINT
TED S. BERNSTEIN AS ADMINISTRATOR AD LITEM TO DEFEND CLAIM
AGAINST ESTATE BY WILLIAM STANSBURY**

Ted S. Bernstein, Successor Trustee of the Simon Bernstein Amended and Restated Trust Agreement dated July 25, 2012 ("Simon's Trustee"), moves the Court to approve the retention of the law firm Mrachek, Fitzgerald, Rose, Konopka, Thomas & Weiss, P.A. ("Mrachek-Law") as counsel to defend the Estate in an independent action brought by William Stansbury, and to appoint Ted Bernstein as Administrator Ad Litem to defend the claim against the estate by William Stansbury and states:

1. Claimant, William Stansbury, has sued the Estate of Simon Bernstein for more than \$2.5 million, a claim which vastly exceeds the value of all of the current assets and potential recoveries by the Estate in third party litigation. The Estate attempted to resolve Stansbury's claim in good faith at mediation, but was unable to reach agreement with Stansbury during the mediation and does not believe it is likely that the claim can be settled. In light of that, the Estate must vigorously defend the claim.

2. Stansbury's claim relates to his business relationship with the decedent, Simon Bernstein, through an entity known as Life Insurance Concepts, Inc. ("LIC"). That entity was a closely-held corporation owned primarily by Simon Bernstein and Ted Bernstein, with Stansbury

at one time owning 10% of non-voting stock. LIC was operated and managed by Simon Bernstein and Ted Bernstein, who had sole voting rights, and served on the Board of Directors.

3. Stansbury's claim arises from his employment by and ownership interest in LIC. Before Simon died, Stansbury sued Simon Bernstein, Ted Bernstein, LIC, and various subsidiaries of LIC, asserting a variety of claims. The Complaint was filed on July 30, 2012. Simon Bernstein died 45 days after the Complaint was filed, before any responsive pleading or motion to dismiss was filed. A suggestion of death was filed.

4. LIC actively defended and litigated against Stansbury's claim, and pursued a counterclaim against Stansbury, under the direction of Ted Bernstein. During this litigation, Ted Bernstein was the primary client contact for the defense of the claim for approximately two years before Stansbury settled his differences with LIC. Along the way, Stansbury also asserted a claim against The Shirley Bernstein Trust, which Ted Bernstein as Trustee defended.

5. LIC and the other defendants initially hired Greenberg Traurig. In April, 2013, LIC and Ted Bernstein retained Mrachek-Law, which formally appeared on April 12, 2013. Shortly thereafter, Stansbury served summonses on the co-PRs of Simon's Estate, and the Estate retained Mark Manceri as its counsel.

6. Alan Rose of Mrachek-Law served as lead counsel for LIC, Ted Bernstein, and The Shirley Bernstein Trust, and coordinated the defense work with the co-PRs and Mr. Manceri, taking the lead role in the discovery, depositions, and court hearings. Specifically, for more than a year until the claims against LIC, Ted Bernstein, and Shirley Bernstein Trust were settled, Mrachek-Law handled the production of substantial business records; interviewed witnesses; coordinated the defense strategy with Ted Bernstein and counsel for the Estate; and worked with LIC's accountants

and professionals in preparing the defense of the claims. As a result of that work, Mrachek-Law is familiar with the facts, circumstances, and events, and is prepared to represent this Estate if hired.

7. As a result of his involvement as a founder and a shareholder of LIC, and his participation in this litigation for approximately two years, Ted Bernstein is fully familiar with the issues in the case, the nature of the claims, the relevant documents, and has firsthand knowledge of certain of the facts. As Successor Trustee of the Simon Bernstein Trust, Ted Bernstein has a substantial and direct interest in seeing that the claim of Stansbury is properly defended and ultimately defeated. He has conferred with the beneficiaries of The Simon Bernstein Trust, including the Guardian *Ad Litem*, and all are in favor of Ted Bernstein directing the defense of the claim through the Mrachek-Law firm.

8. In contrast, and through no fault of his own, Brian O'Connell, successor PR of the estate has more limited knowledge of the factual and legal underpinnings of Stansbury's claim and LIC. Neither Mr. O'Connell nor his law firm has ever done work for Simon Bernstein (while alive) or LIC; they never worked for, at or with LIC; they never met Simon Bernstein; and they have no firsthand personal knowledge of any facts relevant to the case.

9. Accordingly, and having conferred with the Trustee and the beneficiaries of the Trust, Mr. O'Connell has agreed to have Mrachek-Law retained to represent the Estate in the Stansbury litigation so long as the Court appoints Ted Bernstein as Administrator *Ad Litem* to stand as the Estate's representative in defending and protecting the estate's interests in the Stansbury litigation. Although the estate will be responsible for the reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred by Mrachek-Law in defending the claim (as it would regardless of which law firm was retained), Ted Bernstein has agreed to serve as Administrator *Ad Litem* for no additional fee. In other words, there

will be no fee for the time Ted Bernstein expends working on the defense of the independent action by Stansbury against the estate, whereas there might be some additional expense incurred were Brian O'Connell forced to assume that role. The reasonable fees and costs relating to the defense of Simon's claim, and the eventual pursuit of attorneys' fees awards against Stansbury, will be paid by the Estate.

10. Thus, this plan will result in some significant savings to the Estate due to (a) Mrachek-Law's prior knowledge and involvement; and (b) Ted Bernstein's prior knowledge and involvement, and his willingness to serve for no additional fee.

11. For the foregoing reasons, Ted Bernstein believes it is in the best interests of the estate to retain the Mrachek-Law firm, rather than some other law firm which has no prior knowledge or involvement in this matter. The Trustee believes the granting of this motion will result in an overall reduced cost to defend the claim; will employ attorneys skilled in commercial litigation who happen to be very familiar already with the facts, circumstances, events, and documents relating to Stansbury's claim. As indicated above, the Trustee has conferred with not only Mr. O'Connell, but each of the beneficiaries of the Trust, which is the sole beneficiary of the estate, and all are in agreement.

WHEREFORE, Ted S. Bernstein respectfully requests that this Court enter an order approving the retention of Mrachek-Law to defend the Stansbury independent action and appointing Ted S. Bernstein as Administration *Ad Litem* to oversee the estate's defense.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been furnished to parties listed on attached

Service List by: Facsimile **and** U.S. Mail; U.S. Mail; E-mail Electronic Transmission;
FedEx; Hand Delivery this 5th day of August, 2016.

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3

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR
PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA

IN RE:

Case No. 50 2012 CP 004391 NB

ESTATE OF SIMON
BERNSTEIN,
Deceased.

_____ /

**OBJECTION TO TRUSTEE'S MOTION TO APPOINT
TED S. BERNSTEIN AS ADMINISTRATOR *AD LITEM*
TO DEFEND CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE BY WILLIAM STANSBURY**

COMES NOW Interested Person, William Stansbury, by and through his undersigned counsel and objects to Trustee's Motion to Appoint Ted S. Bernstein as Administrator *Ad Litem* to Defend His Claim Against Estate of Simon L. Bernstein, and as grounds therefor would show unto the Court as follows:

I. Stansbury has standing to assert this Objection.

Florida law provides that an administrator ad litem is akin to a personal representative, with the same duties of neutrality and fidelity as a personal representative. *See Funchess v. Gulf Stream Apartments of Broward County, Inc.*, 611 So.2d 43 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). When removal of a Personal Representative is at issue, Fla. Prob. R. 5.440 specifically provides that, "... **any interested person, by petition**, may commence a proceeding to remove a personal representative. ..." (emphasis added.) By logical extension an "interested person" would also have standing to object to the appointment of a particular individual as an administrator ad litem.

The provisions of §731.201(23), Fla. Stat. (2013) define an "interested person" as:

(23) "Interested person" means any person who may reasonably be expected to be affected by the outcome of the particular proceeding involved..."

Stansbury has filed a claim against the Estate of Simon Bernstein (the "Estate") and has sued the Estate in a separate lawsuit styled *William E. Stansbury v. Ted Bernstein, et al*, Case. No. 50 2012 CA 013933 MB AA, Palm Beach County, Florida. Stansbury, as a claimant of the Estate, has an interest in ensuring that the individual appointed by the court to serve as administrator ad litem, if any is appointed at all, will be free of conflicts of interest and will act without bias and in the best interests of the claimants, creditors and devisees of the Estate.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal has recognized that a claimant to an estate is an "interested person" and has standing in a proceeding to approve the personal representative's final accounting and petition for discharge. See, *Arzumán v. Estate of Prince Bander BIN Saud Bin. etc.*, 879 So.2d 675 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). See also, *Montgomery v. Cribb*, 484 So.2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (Wrongful death claimant was entitled to notice of hearing as an "interested person" under the probate code even though case was dismissed by trial court and disputed settlement was on appeal.) Stansbury is therefore an "interested person" as to the outcome of this proceeding which will determine whether Ted Bernstein should be appointed administrator ad litem.

II. Ted Bernstein has Conflicts of Interest with the Estate which should preclude him from serving as Administrator Ad Litem. Ted Bernstein is a Plaintiff in a pending action where the Simon Bernstein Estate is a Defendant.

At the time of Simon Bernstein's ("Simon") death, it was determined that there was a life insurance policy issued by Heritage Mutual Insurance Company ("Heritage") insuring his life. Simon was listed on the company records as the owner of the policy. Heritage represented that the death benefit was approximately \$1.7 million. Heritage records also indicated that on November 27, 1995 there was a beneficiary change for the policy to read: LaSalle National Trust N.A., primary beneficiary and Simon Bernstein Ins. Trust dated 6/21/1995, contingent beneficiary. It was determined by Heritage that the primary beneficiary (LaSalle) no longer had

an interest in the death benefit and the contingent beneficiary would be paid the proceeds. At the time of Simon Bernstein's death the trust document establishing this alleged trust was not and, to date, has not been found.

Supposedly the beneficiaries of the Insurance Trust were Ted Bernstein and his siblings, Lisa Sue Friedstein, Pamela Beth Simon, Jill Iantoni and Eliot Bernstein (the "Bernstein Children"). Whether or not they were, in fact, beneficiaries was just an "educated guess" by attorney Robert Spallina, who was counsel to the Bernstein Children. See e-mail correspondence from Spallina to the Bernstein Children dated October 23, 2012, attached as **Exhibit "1."** If the Insurance Trust is no longer in existence, is lost, or if the insurance proceeds are not properly payable to this alleged trust, the proceeds would be payable to the Simon Bernstein Estate under Florida law.

Because no trust document could be found, Heritage refused to pay the claim for the life insurance proceeds to anyone without a court order. The Insurance Trust then sued Heritage in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois (the case was removed to Federal Court), styled *Simon Bernstein Irrevocable Insurance Trust Dtd. 6/21/95 v. Heritage Union Life Insurance Company*, Case No. 13 CV 3643, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (the "Insurance Litigation"). A copy of the Amended Complaint (the "Complaint") is attached as **Exhibit "2."** In paragraph 2 of the Complaint, the Plaintiff, the Insurance Trust, although apparently still lost, and requiring an "educated guess" to ascertain its beneficiaries, nonetheless also alleges that Ted Bernstein is the "trustee" of the Insurance Trust. No trust document exists establishing the continued existence of the Insurance Trust, let alone that Ted is the Trustee. As a result, the representation in the Complaint that he is the trustee of the missing trust appears false.

More importantly, Ted Bernstein, as the putative “trustee” of the purported insurance trust and Plaintiff in the Illinois Action, is actively pursuing litigation that is contrary to the best interests of the Estate which he now seeks to represent as Administrator Ad Litem. The Estate intervened in the Insurance Litigation to assert that it, not the Bernstein Children, is the proper beneficiary of the life insurance proceeds. (Interestingly, Ted Bernstein opposed the intervention of the Estate.) As such, the Estate is an adverse party to the Insurance Trust for which Ted Bernstein is identified as trustee. The Estate is now a Defendant where Ted Bernstein is a Plaintiff. Thus, Ted Bernstein is actively and directly litigating against the very Estate for which he now seeks to serve as a fiduciary. His Motion to be appointed Administrator Ad Litem should be denied on this basis alone.

It is also important for the Court to note that Ted Bernstein is the Successor Trustee of the Simon Bernstein Amended and Restated Trust Agreement Dated 7/25/2012 (the “Residuary Trust”). The Residuary Trust is the residuary legatee of the Estate, and its beneficiaries are the grandchildren of Simon Bernstein. As a result of Ted Bernstein’s prosecution of the Insurance Litigation, Ted is, on the one hand, seeking to deprive the Estate of \$1.7 million in life insurance proceeds, while at the same time he serves as Successor Trustee of the Residuary Trust which will be deprived of the life insurance proceeds if he, Ted, succeeds in the Insurance Litigation. The conflict of interest is obvious and should disqualify Ted Bernstein from serving in any fiduciary capacity in the Estate.

Section 733.602(1), Fla. Stat. (2013), expressly provides that “. . . A personal representative (which in this case would mean an administrator ad litem) shall use the authority conferred by this code, the authority in the will, if any, and the authority of any order of the court, **for the best interests of interested persons, including creditors.**” (emphasis added.) While the ultimate outcome of the adjudication of the issues surrounding the Heritage life

insurance proceeds is as yet unknown, what is clear is that Ted Bernstein has advocated, and continues to advocate a position that is contrary to the best interests of the Estate and its beneficiaries. These two conflicting and contrary positions between the interests of Ted Bernstein as a Plaintiff in the Insurance Litigation versus his duty as an Administrator Ad Litem to act in the best interests of the Estate, including the claimants, creditors and beneficiaries, renders Ted Bernstein unfit to serve as fiduciary. *See Estate of Bell v. Johnson*, 573 So.2d 57 (Fla. 1st DCA, 1990) (conflict between personal representative, in that capacity, and as power of attorney, necessitated removal as personal representative).

Finally, Ted Bernstein seeks to serve as Administrator Ad Litem to oversee the litigation between Stansbury and the Estate arising out of Stansbury's employment relationship with companies of which Ted Bernstein and Simon Bernstein were principle owners. Ted Bernstein is a key witness, if not the most important witness in the case, other than perhaps Stansbury. Ted Bernstein is conflicted in that, on the one hand, he seeks to serve as a fiduciary with respect to the management of the Stansbury litigation, but, on the other hand, as a key witness in the case, his testimony could contribute to an adverse result against the Estate, depending upon how the testimony is received by the trier of fact. This inherent conflict of interest should also serve to disqualify Ted Bernstein.

III. It was Simon Bernstein's intent, both expressed and implied, that Ted Bernstein not serve in a fiduciary capacity in his Estate.

The appointment of Ted Bernstein as Administrator Ad Litem for the Estate of Simon Bernstein conflicts with both the expressed intent and implied intent of the deceased, Simon Bernstein.

--- The 2008 Testamentary Documents ---

In 2008, Simon Bernstein prepared and executed his Last Will and Testament and his Revocable Trust. The designated Personal Representative under his 2008 Last Will and Testament was his wife, Shirley Bernstein and William Stansbury as Co-Personal Representatives, or either of them alone if the other was unable to serve. In his 2008 Trust, he designated himself as Trustee, and in the event a successor trustee was necessary, Shirley Bernstein and William Stansbury were appointed as Successor Co-Trustees, or either of them if the other was unable to serve. In the 2008 trust document, he specifically excluded Ted Bernstein by indicating that he was to be considered as having pre-deceased him:

Notwithstanding the foregoing [the definitions of "Children" and "Lineal Descendants"], as I have adequately provided for them during my lifetime, for purposes of the dispositions made under this Trust, my children TUD S. BERNSTEIN ("**TED**") and PAMELA B. SIMON ("**PAM**") and their respective lineal descendants shall be deemed to have predeceased the survivor of my spouse and me.

See, Simon L. Bernstein Trust Agreement dated May 20, 2008, Article III, Section E(1), page 7.

--- The 2012 Last Will and Testament ---

In 2012, Simon Bernstein revised and re-executed his Last Will and Testament (the "2012 Will") and amended his 2008 Trust (the "2012 Trust").

Even though Simon Bernstein could have appointed Ted Bernstein as his Personal Representative or as his Alternate Personal Representative under the 2012 Will, again he specifically chose not to. Rather, Simon Bernstein appointed Donald Tescher and Robert Spallina as Co-Personal Representatives of his Estate. When they were forced to resign, this Court appointed a Curator, Benjamin Brown, Esq. Even though Ted Bernstein filed a Motion to have himself appointed Curator or Administrator Ad Litem, the Court, through Judge Colin, denied his motion. *See* Order of Judge Colin dated February 19, 2014, **Exhibit "3"** attached.

Thereafter, when Curator Benjamin Brown passed away and a Successor Personal Representative was appointed, the Court again chose not to appoint Ted Bernstein, but instead appointed Brian O'Connell, Esq. who presently serves as Personal Representative. It is interesting that in this motion presently before the Court, the Movant is not the Personal Representative, Brian O'Connell, but rather Ted Bernstein, the Successor Trustee to the Trust.

--- The 2012 Trust ---

In 2012, Simon Bernstein also amended his Revocable Trust. Simon again specifically excluded Ted Bernstein, and he stated in even stronger language that Ted Bernstein should be considered as having predeceased him for all purposes of the Trust:

Notwithstanding the foregoing [the definitions of "Children" and "Lineal Descendants"], for all purposes of this Trust and dispositions made hereunder, my children, TED S. BERNSTEIN, PAMELA B. SIMON, ELIOT BERNSTEIN, JILL LANTONI and LISA FRIEDSTEIN, shall be deemed to have predeceased me as I have adequately provided for them during my lifetime.

Simon L. Bernstein Amended and Restated Trust Agreement dated July 25, 2012, Article III, Section E(1), page 6. (emphasis added)

A copy of the Trust is attached hereto as **Exhibit "4."** Obviously, Simon Bernstein did not want Ted Bernstein to ever serve in a fiduciary capacity in connection with his Estate and Trust matters.

IV. Ted Bernstein has failed to provide a Trust accounting to the trust beneficiaries as required by statute.


On or about January 14, 2014 Ted S. Bernstein became Successor Trustee of the Simon L. Bernstein Amended and Restated Trust Agreement dated July 25, 2012. He was appointed by the previously disgraced Trustees, Donald Tescher and Robert Spallina. Despite having been the Successor Trustee since January of 2014, Ted S. Bernstein has never prepared and submitted and accounting to the beneficiaries. This violates his general duty to inform and account to the

beneficiaries as required by Section 736.0183, Fla. Stat., and specifically his duty to provide at least an annual accounting as mandated by Section 736.0183(1)(d), Fla. Stat.

WHEREFORE, for all of the foregoing reasons, to wit:

1. Ted Bernstein has a conflict of interest with the Estate;
2. Simon Bernstein's expressed intent;
3. Ted Bernstein's failure to account as a Successor Trustee;

Interested Person to the Estate of Simon Bernstein, William Stansbury, requests this Honorable Court to deny the Motion of Ted Bernstein to be appointed Administrator Ad Litem.


Peter M. Feaman


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing has been forwarded via e-mail service through the Florida E-portal system to: Alan Rose, Esq., MRACHEK, FITZGERALD ROSE, 505 So. Flagler Drive, Suite 600, West Palm Beach, FL 33401, arose@pm-law.com and mchandler@pm-law.com; Diana Lewis, Esq., ADA & Mediations Services, LLC, 2765 Tecumseh Dr., West Palm Beach, FL 33409, dzlewis@aol.com; Eliot Bernstein, 2753 NW 34th Street, Boca Raton, FL 33434, iviewit@iviewit.tv; Gary R. Shendell, Esq., Shendell & Pollock, P.L., 2700 N. Military Trail, suite 150, Boca Raton, FL 33431, gary@shendellpollock.com; Brian O'Connell, Esq., Ciklin Lubitz Martens & O'Connell, 515 North Flagler Drive, 20th Floor, West Palm Beach, FL 33401, boconnell@ciklinlubitz.com; John P. Morrissey, Esq., 330 Clematis Street, Suite 213, West Palm Beach, FL 33401, john@jmorrisseylaw.com; Lisa Friedstein, 2142 Churchill Lane, Highland Park, IL 60035,

Lisa@friedsteins.com; Jill Iantoni, 2101 Magnolia Lane, Highland Park, IL 60035,
jilliantoni@gmail.com, on this 22nd day of August, 2016.

PETER M. FEAMAN, P.A.
3695 W. Boynton Beach Blvd., Suite 9
Boynton Beach, FL 33436
Tel: 561-734-5552
Fax: 561-734-5554
Service: service@feamanlaw.com
mkoskey@feamanlaw.com

By: _____


Peter M. Feaman

Florida Bar No. 0260347

Eliot Bernstein

Subject: FW: Call with Robert Spallina tomorrow/Wednesday at 2pm EST

From: Robert Spallina [mailto:rspallina@tescherspallina.com]
Sent: Tuesday, October 23, 2012 2:34 PM
To: Jill Iantoni; Eliot Bernstein; Ted Bernstein; Ted Bernstein; Pamela Simon; Lisa Friedstein
Subject: RE: Call with Robert Spallina tomorrow/Wednesday at 2pm EST

As discussed, I need the EIN application and will process the claim. Your father was the owner of the policy and we will need to prepare releases given the fact that we do not have the trust instrument and are making an educated guess that the beneficiaries are the five of you as a result of your mother predeceasing Si. Luckily we have a friendly carrier and they are willing to process the claim without a copy of the trust instrument. A call regarding this is not necessary. We have things under control and will get the claim processed expeditiously after we receive the form.

Thank you for your help.

Robert L. Spallina, Esq.
TESCHER & SPALLINA, P.A.
4855 Technology Way, Suite 720
Boca Raton, Florida 33431
Telephone: 561-997-7008
Facsimile: 561-997-7308
E-mail: rspallina@tescherspallina.com

If you would like to learn more about TESCHER & SPALLINA, P.A., please visit our website at www.tescherspallina.com

The information contained in this message is legally privileged and confidential information intended only for the use of the individual or entity named above. IF THE READER OF THIS MESSAGE IS NOT THE INTENDED RECIPIENT, YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION OR COPYING OF THIS COMMUNICATION IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED. If you have received this communication in error, please immediately notify us by e-mail or telephone. Thank you.



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

SIMON BERNSTEIN IRREVOCABLE)
INSURANCE TRUST DTD 6/21/95,)
by Ted S. Bernstein, its Trustee, Ted)
Bernstein, an individual,)
Pamela B. Simon, an individual,)
Jill Iantoni, an individual and Lisa S.)
Friedstein, an individual.)

Plaintiff,)

v.)

HERITAGE UNION LIFE INSURANCE)
COMPANY,)

Defendant,)

-----)
HERITAGE UNION LIFE INSURANCE)
COMPANY)

Counter-Plaintiff)

v.)

SIMON BERNSTEIN IRREVOCABLE)
TRUST DTD 6/21/95)

Counter-Defendant)

and,)

FIRST ARLINGTON NATIONAL BANK)
as Trustee of S.B. Lexington, Inc. Employee)
Death Benefit Trust, UNITED BANK OF)
ILLINOIS, BANK OF AMERICA,)
Successor in interest to LaSalle National)
Trust, N.A., SIMON BERNSTEIN TRUST,)
N.A., TED BERNSTEIN, individually and)
as purported Trustee of the Simon Bernstein)

Case No. 13 cv 3643
Honorable Amy J. St. Eve
Magistrate Mary M. Rowland



Irrevocable Insurance Trust Dtd 6/21/95,
and ELIOT BERNSTEIN)

Third-Party Defendants.)

ELIOT IVAN BERNSTEIN,)

Cross-Plaintiff)

v.)

TED BERNSTEIN, individually and)
as alleged Trustee of the Simon Bernstein)
Irrevocable Insurance Trust Dtd, 6/21/95)

Cross-Defendant)

and,)

PAMELA B. SIMON, DAVID B. SIMON,)
both Professionally and Personally)
ADAM SIMON, both Professionally and)
Personally, THE SIMON LAW FIRM,)
TESCHER & SPALLINA, P.A.,)
DONALD TESCHER, both Professionally)
and Personally, ROBERT SPALLINA,)
both Professionally and Personally,)
LISA FRIEDSTEIN, JILL IANTONI)
S.B. LEXINGTON, INC. EMPLOYEE)
DEATH BENEFIT TRUST, S.T.P.)
ENTERPRISES, INC. S.B. LEXINGTON,)
INC., NATIONAL SERVICE)
ASSOCIATION (OF FLORIDA),)
NATIONAL SERVICE ASSOCIATION)
(OF ILLINOIS) AND JOHN AND JANE)
DOES)

Third-Party Defendants.)

PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

NOW COMES Plaintiffs, SIMON BERNSTEIN IRREVOCABLE INSURANCE TRUST dtd 6/21/95, and TED BERNSTEIN, as Trustee, (collectively referred to as "BERNSTEIN TRUST"), TED BERNSTEIN, individually, PAMELA B. SIMON, individually, JILL IANTONI, individually, and LISA FRIEDSTEIN, individually, by their attorney, Adam M. Simon, and complaining of Defendant, HERITAGE UNION LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, ("HERITAGE") states as follows:

BACKGROUND

1. At all relevant times, the BERNSTEIN TRUST was a common law irrevocable life insurance trust established in Chicago, Illinois, by the settlor, Simon L. Bernstein, ("Simon Bernstein" or "insured") and was formed pursuant to the laws of the state of Illinois.
2. At all relevant times, the BERNSTEIN TRUST was a beneficiary of a life insurance policy insuring the life of Simon Bernstein, and issued by Capitol Bankers Life Insurance Company as policy number 1009208 (the "Policy").
3. Simon Bernstein's spouse, Shirley Bernstein, was named as the initial Trustee of the BERNSTEIN TRUST. Shirley Bernstein passed away on December 8, 2010, predeceasing Simon Bernstein.
4. The successor trustee, as set forth in the BERNSTEIN TRUST agreement is Ted Bernstein.
5. The beneficiaries of the BERNSTEIN TRUST as named in the BERNSTEIN TRUST Agreement are the children of Simon Bernstein.

6. Simon Bernstein passed away on September 13, 2012, and is survived by five adult children whose names are Ted Bernstein, Pamela Simon, Eliot Bernstein, Jill Iantoni, and Lisa Friedstein. By this amendment, Ted Bernstein, Pamela Simon, Jill Iantoni and Lisa Friedstein are being added as co-Plaintiffs in their individual capacities.

7. Four out five of the adult children of Simon Bernstein, whom hold eighty percent of the beneficial interest of the BERNSTEIN TRUST have consented to having Ted Bernstein, as Trustee of the BERNSTEIN TRUST, prosecute the claims of the BERNSTEIN TRUST as to the Policy proceeds at issue.

8. Eliot Bernstein, the sole non-consenting adult child of Simon Bernstein, holds the remaining twenty percent of the beneficial interest in the BERNSTEIN TRUST, and is representing his own interests and has chosen to pursue his own purported claims, pro se, in this matter.

9. The Policy was originally purchased by the S.B. Lexington, Inc. 501(c)(9) VEBA Trust (the "VEBA") from Capitol Bankers Life Insurance Company ("CBLIC") and was delivered to the original owner in Chicago, Illinois on or about December 27, 1982.

10. At the time of the purchase of the Policy, S.B. Lexington, Inc., was an Illinois corporation owned, in whole or part, and controlled by Simon Bernstein.

11. At the time of purchase of the Policy, S.B. Lexington, Inc. was an insurance brokerage licensed in the state of Illinois, and Simon Bernstein was both a principal and an employee of S.B. Lexington, Inc.

12. At the time of issuance and delivery of the Policy, CBLIC was an insurance company licensed and doing business in the State of Illinois.

13. HERITAGE subsequently assumed the Policy from CBLIC and thus became the successor to CBLIC as "Insurer" under the Policy and remained the insurer including at the time of Simon Bernstein's death.

14. In 1995, the VEBA, by and through LaSalle National Trust, N.A., as Trustee of the VEBA, executed a beneficiary change form naming LaSalle National Trust, N.A., as Trustee, as primary beneficiary of the Policy, and the BERNSTEIN TRUST as the contingent beneficiary.

15. On or about August 26, 1995, Simon Bernstein, in his capacity as member or auxiliary member of the VEBA, signed a VEBA Plan and Trust Beneficiary Designation form designating the BERNSTEIN TRUST as the "person(s) to receive at my death the Death Benefit stipulated in the S.B. Lexington, Inc. Employee Death Benefit and Trust and the Adoption Form adopted by the Employer".

16. The August 26, 1995 VEBA Plan and Trust Beneficiary Designation form signed by Simon Bernstein evidenced Simon Bernstein's intent that the beneficiary of the Policy proceeds was to be the BERNSTEIN TRUST.

17. S.B. Lexington, Inc. and the VEBA were voluntarily dissolved on or about April 3, 1998.

18. On or about the time of the dissolution of the VEBA in 1998, the Policy ownership was assigned and transferred from the VEBA to Simon Bernstein, individually.

19. From the time of Simon Bernstein's designation of the BERNSTEIN TRUST as the intended beneficiary of the Policy proceeds on August 26, 1995, no document was submitted by Simon Bernstein (or any other Policy owner) to the Insurer which evidenced any change in his intent that the BERNSTEIN TRUST was to receive the Policy proceeds upon his death.

20. At the time of his death, Simon Bernstein was the owner of the Policy, and the BERNSTEIN TRUST was the sole surviving beneficiary of the Policy.

21. The insured under the Policy, Simon Bernstein, passed away on September 13, 2012, and on that date the Policy remained in force.

22. Following Simon Bernstein's death, the BERNSTEIN TRUST, by and through its counsel in Palm Beach County, FL, submitted a death claim to HERITAGE under the Policy including the insured's death certificate and other documentation.

COUNT I

BREACH OF CONTRACT

23. Plaintiff, the BERNSTEIN TRUST, restates and realleges the allegations contained in ¶1-¶22 as if fully set forth as ¶23 of Count I.

24. The Policy, by its terms, obligates HERITAGE to pay the death benefits to the beneficiary of the Policy upon HERITAGE'S receipt of due proof of the insured's death.

25. HERITAGE breached its obligations under the Policy by refusing and failing to pay the Policy proceeds to the BERNSTEIN TRUST as beneficiary of the Policy despite HERITAGE'S receipt of due proof of the insured's death.

26. Despite the BERNSTEIN TRUST'S repeated demands and its initiation of a breach of contract claim, HERITAGE did not pay out the death benefits on the Policy to the BERNSTEIN TRUST instead it filed an action in interpleader and deposited the Policy proceeds with the Registry of the Court.

27. As a direct result of HERITAGE's refusal and failure to pay the Policy proceeds to the BERNSTEIN TRUST pursuant to the Policy, Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount equal to the death benefits of the Policy plus interest, an amount which exceeds \$1,000,000.00.

WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF, the BERNSTEIN TRUST prays for a judgment to be entered in its favor and against Defendant, HERITAGE, for the amount of the Policy proceeds on deposit with the Registry of the Court (an amount in excess of \$1,000,000.00) plus costs and reasonable attorneys' fees together with such further relief as this court may deem just and proper.

COUNT II

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

28. Plaintiff, the BERNSTEIN TRUST, restates and realleges the allegations contained in ¶1-¶27 above as ¶28 of Count II and pleads in the alternative for a Declaratory Judgment.

29. On or about June 21, 1995, David Simon, an attorney and Simon Bernstein's son-in-law, met with Simon Bernstein before Simon Bernstein went to the law offices of Hopkins and Sutter in Chicago, Illinois to finalize and execute the BERNSTEIN TRUST Agreement.

30. After the meeting at Hopkins and Sutter, David B. Simon reviewed the final version of the BERNSTEIN TRUST Agreement and personally saw the final version of the BERNSTEIN TRUST Agreement containing Simon Bernstein's signature.

31. The final version of the BERNSTEIN TRUST Agreement named the children of Simon Bernstein as beneficiaries of the BERNSTEIN TRUST, and unsigned drafts of the BERNSTEIN TRUST Agreement confirm the same.

32. The final version of the BERNSTEIN TRUST Agreement named Shirley Bernstein, as Trustee, and named Ted Bernstein as, successor Trustee.

33. As set forth above, at the time of death of Simon Bernstein, the BERNSTEIN TRUST was the sole surviving beneficiary of the Policy.

34. Following the death of Simon Bernstein, neither an executed original of the BERNSTEIN TRUST Agreement nor an executed copy could be located by Simon Bernstein's family members.

35. Neither an executed original nor an executed copy of the BERNSTEIN TRUST Agreement has been located after diligent searches conducted as follows:

- i) Ted Bernstein and other Bernstein family members of Simon Bernstein's home and business office;
- ii) the law offices of Tescher and Spallina, Simon Bernstein's counsel in Palm Beach County, Florida,
- iii) the offices of Foley and Lardner (successor to Hopkins and Sutter) in Chicago, IL; and
- iv) the offices of The Simon Law Firm.

36. As set forth above, Plaintiffs have provided HERITAGE with due proof of the death of Simon Bernstein which occurred on September 13, 2012.

WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF, the BERNSTEIN TRUST prays for an Order entering a declaratory judgment as follows:

- a) declaring that the original BERNSTEIN TRUST was lost and after a diligent search cannot be located;
- b) declaring that the BERNSTEIN TRUST Agreement was executed and established by Simon Bernstein on or about June 21, 1995;
- c) declaring that the beneficiaries of the BERNSTEIN TRUST are the five children of Simon Bernstein;

- d) declaring that Ted Bernstein, is authorized to act as Trustee of the BERNSTEIN TRUST because the initial trustee, Shirley Bernstein, predeceased Simon Bernstein;
- e) declaring that the BERNSTEIN TRUST is the sole surviving beneficiary of the Policy;
- f) declaring that the BERNSTEIN TRUST is entitled to the proceeds placed on deposit by HERITAGE with the Registry of the Court;
- g) ordering the Registry of the Court to release all of the proceeds on deposit to the BERNSTEIN TRUST; and
- h) for such other relief as this court may deem just and proper.

COUNT III

RESULTING TRUST

37. Plaintiffs restate and reallege the allegations contained in ¶1-¶36 of Count II as ¶37 of Count III and plead, in the alternative, for imposition of a Resulting Trust.

38. Pleading in the alternative, the executed original of the BERNSTEIN TRUST Agreement has been lost and after a diligent search as detailed above by the executors, trustee and attorneys of Simon Bernstein's estate and by Ted Bernstein, and others, its whereabouts remain unknown.

39. Plaintiffs have presented HERITAGE with due proof of Simon Bernstein's death, and Plaintiff has provided unexecuted drafts of the BERNSTEIN TRUST Agreement to HERITAGE.

40. Plaintiffs have also provided HERITAGE with other evidence of the BERNSTEIN TRUST'S existence including a document signed by Simon Bernstein that designated the BERNSTEIN TRUST as the ultimate beneficiary of the Policy proceeds upon his death.

41. At all relevant times and beginning on or about June 21, 1995, Simon Bernstein expressed his intent that (i) the BERNSTEIN TRUST was to be the ultimate beneficiary of the life insurance proceeds; and (ii) the beneficiaries of the BERNSTEIN TRUST were to be the children of Simon Bernstein.

42. Upon the death of Simon Bernstein, the right to the Policy proceeds immediately vested in the beneficiary of the Policy.

43. At the time of Simon Bernstein's death, the beneficiary of the Policy was the BERNSTEIN TRUST.

44. If an express trust cannot be established, then this court must enforce Simon Bernstein's intent that the BERNSTEIN TRUST be the beneficiary of the Policy; and therefore upon the death of Simon Bernstein the rights to the Policy proceeds immediately vested in a resulting trust in favor of the five children of Simon Bernstein.

45. Upon information and belief, Bank of America, N.A., as successor Trustee of the VEBA to LaSalle National Trust, N.A., has disclaimed any interest in the Policy.

46. In any case, the VEBA terminated in 1998 simultaneously with the dissolution of S.B. Lexington, Inc.

47. The primary beneficiary of the Policy named at the time of Simon Bernstein's death was LaSalle National Trust, N.A. as "Trustee" of the VEBA.

48. LaSalle National Trust, N.A., was the last acting Trustee of the VEBA and was named beneficiary of the Policy in its capacity as Trustee of the VEBA.

49. As set forth above, the VEBA no longer exists, and the ex-Trustee of the dissolved trust, and upon information and belief, Bank Of America, N.A., as successor to LaSalle National Trust, N.A. has disclaimed any interest in the Policy.

50. As set forth herein, Plaintiff has established that it is immediately entitled to the life insurance proceeds HERITAGE deposited with the Registry of the Court.

51. Alternatively, by virtue of the facts alleged herein, HERITAGE held the Policy proceeds in a resulting trust for the benefit of the children of Simon Bernstein and since HERITAGE deposited the Policy proceeds the Registry, the Registry now holds the Policy proceeds in a resulting trust for the benefit of the children of Simon Bernstein.

WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS pray for an Order as follows:

- a) finding that the Registry of the Court holds the Policy Proceeds in a Resulting Trust for the benefit of the five children of Simon Bernstein, Ted Bernstein, Pamela Simon, Eliot Ivan Bernstein, Jill Iantoni and Lisa Friedstein; and
- b) ordering the Registry of the Court to release all the proceeds on deposit to the Bernstein Trust or alternatively as follows: 1) twenty percent to Ted Bernstein; 2) twenty percent to Pam Simon; 3) twenty percent to Eliot Ivan Bernstein; 4) twenty percent to Jill Iantoni; 5) twenty percent to Lisa Friedstein
- c) and for such other relief as this court may deem just and proper.

By: s/Adam M. Simon
Adam M. Simon (#6205304)
303 E. Wacker Drive, Suite 210
Chicago, IL 60601
Phone: 313-819-0730
Fax: 312-819-0773
E-Mail: asimon@chicagolaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Third-Party
Defendants
*Simon L. Bernstein Irrevocable Insurance Trust
Dtd 6/21/95; Ted Bernstein as Trustee, and
individually, Pamela Simon, Lisa Friedstein
and Jill Iantoni*

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR
PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA

IN RE:

Case No.: 50 2012 CP 004391 SB
JUDGE MARTIN COLIN

ESTATE OF SIMON
BERNSTEIN,

Deceased.

Division: IY

**ORDER ON MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT
OF CURATOR OR ADMINISTRATOR AD LITEM**

THIS MATTER came before this Court on Tuesday, February 18, 2014, upon the Motion for Appointment of Curator or Administrator Ad Litem, filed by Ted S. Bernstein, and the Court, having heard argument of counsel, and considered the evidence, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

DENIED, for the reasons
stated on the record.

DONE and ORDERED in Delray Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida, this 19 day of
February, 2014.



CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

Copies to:

Alan Rose, Esq., PAGE, MRACHEK 505 So. Flagler Drive, Suite 600, West Palm Beach, FL 33401;
John J. Pankauski, Esq., PANKAUSKI LAW FIRM, 120 South Olive Avenue, Suite 701, West Palm Beach, FL 33401;
Peter M. Feaman, Esq., PETER M. FEAMAN, P.A., 3615 Boynton Beach Blvd., Boynton Beach, Florida 33436.



7/25/2012

SIMON L. BERNSTEIN
AMENDED AND RESTATED TRUST AGREEMENT

Prepared by:

Tescher & Spallina, P.A.
4855 Technology Way, Suite 720, Boca Raton, Florida 33431
(561) 997-7008
www.tescherspallina.com



LAW OFFICES
TESCHER & SPALLINA, P.A.

SIMON L. BERNSTEIN

AMENDED AND RESTATED TRUST AGREEMENT

This Amended and Restated Trust Agreement is dated this 26 day of July, 2012, and is between SIMON L. BERNSTEIN, of Palm Beach County, Florida referred to in the first person, as settlor, and SIMON L. BERNSTEIN, of Palm Beach County, Florida and SIMON L. BERNSTEIN's successors, as trustee (referred to as the "Trustee," which term more particularly refers to all individuals and entities serving as trustee of a trust created hereunder during the time of such service, whether alone or as co-trustees, and whether originally serving or as a successor trustee).

WHEREAS, on May 20, 2008, I created and funded the SIMON L. BERNSTEIN TRUST AGREEMENT (the "Trust Agreement," which reference includes any subsequent amendments of said trust agreement);

WHEREAS, Paragraph A. of Article I. of said Trust Agreement provides, inter alia, that during my lifetime I shall have the right at any time and from time to time by an instrument, in writing, delivered to the Trustee to amend or revoke said Trust Agreement, in whole or in part.

NOW, THEREFORE, I hereby amend and restate the Trust Agreement in its entirety and the Trustee accepts and agrees to perform its duties and obligations in accordance with the following amended provisions. Notwithstanding any deficiencies in execution or other issues in regard to whether any prior version of this Trust Agreement was a valid and binding agreement or otherwise created an effective trust, this amended and restated agreement shall constitute a valid, binding and effective trust agreement and shall amend and succeed all prior versions described above or otherwise predating this amended and restated Trust Agreement.

ARTICLE I. DURING MY LIFE AND UPON MY DEATH

A. **Rights Reserved.** I reserve the right (a) to add property to this trust during my life or on my death, by my Will or otherwise; (b) to withdraw property held hereunder; and (c) by separate written instrument delivered to the Trustee, to revoke this Agreement in whole or in part and otherwise modify or amend this Agreement.

B. **Payments During My Life.** If income producing property is held in the trust during my life, the Trustee shall pay the net income of the trust to me or as I may direct. However, during any periods while I am Disabled, the Trustee shall pay to me or on my behalf such amounts of the net income and principal of the trust as is proper for my Welfare. Any income not so paid shall be added to principal.

SIMON L. BERNSTEIN
AMENDED AND RESTATED TRUST AGREEMENT

LAW OFFICES
TESCHER & SPALLINA, P.A.




C. Upon My Death. Upon my death the Trustee shall collect and add to the trust all amounts due to the trust under any insurance policy on my life or under any death benefit plan and all property added to the trust by my Will or otherwise. After paying or providing for the payment from the augmented trust of all current charges and any amounts payable under the later paragraph captioned "Death Costs," the Trustee shall hold the trust according to the following provisions.

ARTICLE II. AFTER MY DEATH

A. Disposition of Tangible Personal Property. If any non-business tangible personal property other than cash (including, but not limited to, my personal effects, jewelry, collections, household furnishings, and equipment, and automobiles) is held in the trust at the time of my death, such items shall be promptly distributed by the Trustee of the trust to such person or persons, including my estate, as to the item or items or proportion specified, as I may appoint, and to the extent that any such items are not disposed of by such appointment, such items shall be disposed of by the Trustee of the trust in exactly the same manner as such items would have been disposed of under the terms and provisions of my Will (including any Codicil thereto, or what the Trustee in good faith believes to be such Will and Codicil) had such items been included in my probate estate. Any such items which are not effectively disposed of pursuant to the preceding sentence shall pass with the other trust assets.

B. Disposition of Trust Upon My Death. Upon my death, the remaining assets in this trust shall be divided among and held in separate Trusts for my then living grandchildren. Each of my grandchildren for whom a separate trust is held hereunder shall hereinafter be referred to as a "*beneficiary*" with the separate Trusts to be administered as provided in Subparagraph 11.C.

C. Trusts for Beneficiaries. The Trustee shall pay to the beneficiary and the beneficiary's children, such amounts of the net income and principal of such beneficiary's trust as is proper for the Welfare of such individuals. Any income not so paid shall be added to principal each year. After a beneficiary has reached any one or more of the following birthdays, the beneficiary may withdraw the principal of his or her separate trust at any time or times, not to exceed in the aggregate 1/3 in value after the beneficiary's 25th birthday, 1/2 in value (after deducting any amount previously subject to withdrawal but not actually withdrawn) after the beneficiary's 30th birthday, and the balance after the beneficiary's 35th birthday, provided that the withdrawal powers described in this sentence shall not apply to any grandchild of mine as beneficiary of a separate trust. The value of each trust shall be its value as of the first exercise of each withdrawal right, plus the value of any subsequent addition as of the date of addition. The right of withdrawal shall be a privilege which may be exercised only voluntarily and shall not include an involuntary exercise. If a beneficiary dies with assets remaining in his or her separate trust, upon the beneficiary's death the beneficiary may appoint his or her trust to or for the benefit of one or more of any of my lineal descendants (excluding from said class, however, such beneficiary and such beneficiary's creditors, estate, and creditors of such beneficiary's estate). Any part of his or her trust such beneficiary does not effectively appoint shall upon his or her death be divided among and held in separate Trusts for the following persons:



1. for his or her lineal descendants then living, *per stirpes*; or
2. if he or she leaves no lineal descendant then living, *per stirpes* for the lineal descendants then living of his or her nearest ancestor (among me and my lineal descendants) with a lineal descendant then living.

A trust for a lineal descendant of mine shall be held under this paragraph, or if a trust is then so held, shall be added to such trust.

D. Termination of Small Trust. If at any time after my death in the opinion of the Trustee a separate trust holds assets of a value of less than \$50,000.00 and is too small to justify the expense of its retention, and termination of such trust is in the best interests of its current income beneficiary, the Trustee in its discretion may terminate such trust and pay it to said beneficiary.

E. Contingent Gift. If at any time property of these Trusts is not disposed of under the other provisions of this Agreement, it shall be paid, as a gift made hereunder, to such persons and in such shares as such property would be distributed if I had then owned such property and had then died solvent, unmarried and intestate domiciled in the State of Florida, according to the laws of inheritance of the State of Florida then in effect.

F. Protective Provision. No beneficiary of any trust herein created shall have any right or power to anticipate, transfer, pledge, sell, alienate, assign or encumber in any way his or her interest in the income or principal of such trust. Furthermore, no creditor shall have the right to attach, lien, seize or levy upon the interest of a beneficiary in this trust (other than myself) and such interest shall not be liable for or subject to the debts, liabilities or obligations of any such beneficiary or any claims against such beneficiary (whether voluntarily or involuntarily created), and the Trustee shall pay directly to or for the use or benefit of such beneficiary all income and principal to which such beneficiary is entitled, notwithstanding that such beneficiary has executed a pledge, assignment, encumbrance or in any other manner alienated or transferred his or her beneficial interest in the trust to another. This paragraph shall not preclude the effective exercise of any power of appointment granted herein or the exercise of any disclaimer.

G. Maximum Duration. Regardless of anything in this Agreement to the contrary, no trust interest herein created shall continue beyond three hundred sixty (360) years after the date of creation of this Agreement, nor shall any power of appointment be exercised in such manner so as to delay vesting of any trust beyond such period. Immediately prior to the expiration of such period, all such trusts then in existence shall terminate, and the assets thereof shall be distributed outright and in fee to then beneficiaries of the current income and in the proportions in which such persons are the beneficiaries, and if such proportions cannot be ascertained, then equally among such beneficiaries.

ARTICLE III. GENERAL

SIMON L. BERNSTEIN
AMENDED AND RESTATED TRUST AGREEMENT

-3-

LAW OFFICES
TESCHER & SPALLINA, P.A.
201 W. PALM BEACH BLVD., SUITE 200, PALM BEACH, FL 33480



A. **Disability.** Subject to the following Subparagraph captioned "Subchapter S Stock," while any beneficiary is Disabled, the Trustee shall pay to him or her only such portion of the income to which he or she is otherwise entitled as is proper for his or her Welfare, and any income not so paid shall be added to the principal from which derived. While any beneficiary is Disabled, income or principal payable to him or her may, in the discretion of the Trustee, be paid directly to him or her, without the intervention of a guardian, directly to his or her creditors or others for his or her sole benefit or to an adult person or an eligible institution (including the Trustee) selected by the Trustee as custodian for a minor beneficiary under the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act or similar law. The receipt of such payee is a complete release to the Trustee.

B. **Timing of Income Distributions.** The Trustee shall make required payments of income at least quarterly.

C. **Substance Abuse.**

1. **In General.** If the Trustee reasonably believes that a beneficiary (other than myself) of any trust:

a. routinely or frequently uses or consumes any illegal substance so as to be physically or psychologically dependent upon that substance, or

b. is clinically dependent upon the use or consumption of alcohol or any other legal drug or chemical substance that is not prescribed by a board certified medical doctor or psychiatrist in a current program of treatment supervised by such doctor or psychiatrist,

and if the Trustee reasonably believes that as a result the beneficiary is unable to care for himself or herself, or is unable to manage his or her financial affairs, all mandatory distributions (including distributions upon termination of the trust) to the beneficiary, all of the beneficiary's withdrawal rights, and all of the beneficiary's rights to participate in decisions concerning the removal and appointment of Trustees will be suspended. In that event, the following provisions of this Subparagraph III.C will apply.

2. **Testing.** The Trustee may request the beneficiary to submit to one or more examinations (including laboratory tests of bodily fluids) determined to be appropriate by a board certified medical doctor and to consent to full disclosure to the Trustee of the results of all such examinations. The Trustee shall maintain strict confidentiality of those results and shall not disclose those results to any person other than the beneficiary without the prior written permission of the beneficiary. The Trustee may totally or partially suspend all distributions otherwise required or permitted to be made to that beneficiary until the beneficiary consents to the examination and disclosure to the Trustee.

3. **Treatment.** If, in the opinion of the examining doctor, the examination indicates current or recent use of a drug or substance as described above, the examining doctor will determine an appropriate method of treatment for the beneficiary (for example, counseling or treatment on an



in-patient basis in a rehabilitation facility) that is acceptable to the Trustee. If the beneficiary consents to the treatment, the Trustee shall pay the costs of treatment directly to the provider of those services from the distributions suspended under this Subparagraph III.C.

4. Resumption of Distributions. The Trustee may resume other distributions to the beneficiary (and the beneficiary's other suspended rights will be restored) when, in the case of use or consumption of an illegal substance, examinations indicate no such use for 12 months and, in all cases, when the Trustee in its discretion determines that the beneficiary is able to care for himself or herself and is able to manage his or her financial affairs.

5. Disposition of Suspended Amounts. When other distributions to the beneficiary are resumed, the remaining balance, if any, of distributions that were suspended may be distributed to the beneficiary at that time. If the beneficiary dies before distribution of those suspended amounts, the Trustee shall distribute the balance of the suspended amounts to the persons who would be the alternate takers of that beneficiary's share (or takers through the exercise of a power of appointment) as otherwise provided in this Trust Agreement.

6. Exoneration. No Trustee (or any doctor retained by the Trustee) will be responsible or liable to anyone for a beneficiary's actions or welfare. The Trustee has no duty to inquire whether a beneficiary uses drugs or other substances as described in this Subparagraph III.C. The Trustee (and any doctor retained by the Trustee) is to be indemnified from the trust estate and held harmless from any liability of any nature in exercising its judgment and authority under this Subparagraph III.C, including any failure to request a beneficiary to submit to medical examination, and including a decision to distribute suspended amounts to a beneficiary.

7. Tax Savings Provision. Despite the provisions of this Subparagraph III.C, the Trustee cannot suspend any mandatory distributions or withdrawal rights that are required for that trust to become or remain a Qualified Subchapter S Trust (unless the Trustee elects for the trust to be an Electing Small Business Trust), or to qualify for any federal transfer tax exemption, deduction, or exclusion allowable with respect to that trust.

D. Income on Death of Beneficiary. Subject to the later paragraph captioned "Subchapter S Stock," and except as otherwise explicitly provided herein, upon the death of any beneficiary, all accrued or undistributed income of such deceased beneficiary's trust shall pass with the principal of his or her trust but shall remain income for trust accounting purposes.

E. Definitions. In this Agreement,

1. Children, Lineal Descendants. The terms "*child*," "*children*," "*grandchild*," "*grandchildren*" and "*lineal descendant*" mean only persons whose relationship to the ancestor designated is created entirely by or through (a) legitimate births occurring during the marriage of the joint biological parents to each other, (b) children born of female lineal descendants, and (c) children and their lineal descendants arising from surrogate births and/or third party donors when (i) the child is



raised from or near the time of birth by a married couple (other than a same sex married couple) through the pendency of such marriage, (ii) one of such couple is the designated ancestor, and (iii) to the best knowledge of the Trustee both members of such couple participated in the decision to have such child. No such child or lineal descendant loses his or her status as such through adoption by another person. Notwithstanding the foregoing, for all purposes of this Trust and the dispositions made hereunder, my children, TED S. BERNSTEIN, PAMELA B. SIMON, ELIOT BERNSTEIN, JILL IANTONI and LISA S. FRIEDSTEIN, shall be deemed to have predeceased me as I have adequately provided for them during my lifetime.

2. Code. "Code" means the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and in referring to any particular provision of the Code, includes a reference to any equivalent or successor provision of a successor federal tax law.

3. Disabled. "Disabled" or being under "Disability" means, as to any applicable individual: (1) being under the age of 21 years, (2) having been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction as mentally or physically incompetent or unable to manage his or her own property or personal affairs (or a substantially similar finding under applicable state or national law), or (3) being unable to properly manage his or her personal or financial affairs, or a trust estate hereunder as to a Trustee hereunder, because of a mental or physical impairment (whether temporary or permanent in nature). A written certificate executed by an individual's attending physician or attending psychiatrist confirming that person's impairment will be sufficient evidence of Disability under item (3) above, and all persons may rely conclusively on such a certificate.

4. Education. The term "education" herein means vocational, primary, secondary, preparatory, theological, college and professional education, including post-graduate courses of study, at educational institutions or elsewhere, and expenses relating directly thereto, including tuition, books and supplies, room and board, and travel from and to home during school vacations. It is intended that the Trustee liberally construe and interpret references to "education," so that the beneficiaries entitled to distributions hereunder for education obtain the best possible education commensurate with their abilities and desires.

5. Needs and Welfare Distributions. Payments to be made for a person's "Needs" means payments necessary for such person's health (including lifetime residential or nursing home care), education, maintenance and support. Payments to be made for a person's "Welfare" means discretionary payments by the Trustee, from time to time, for such person's Needs and also for such person's advancement in life (including assistance in the purchase of a home or establishment or development of any business or professional enterprise which the Trustee believes to be reasonably sound), happiness and general well-being. However, the Trustee, based upon information reasonably available to it, shall make such payments for a person's Needs or Welfare only to the extent such person's income, and funds available from others obligated to supply funds for such purposes (including, without limitation, pursuant to child support orders and agreements), are insufficient in its opinion for such purposes, and shall take into account such person's accustomed manner of living, age, health, marital status and any other factor it considers important. Income or principal to be paid for a person's Needs or Welfare may be paid to

such individual or applied by the Trustee directly for the benefit of such person. The Trustee may make a distribution or application authorized for a person's Needs or Welfare even if such distribution or application substantially depletes or exhausts such person's trust, without any duty upon the Trustee to retain it for future use or for other persons who might otherwise benefit from such trust.

6. Per Stirpes. In a division "*per stirpes*" each generation shall be represented and counted whether or not it has a living member.

7. Related or Subordinate Party. A "*Related or Subordinate Party*" to a trust describes a beneficiary of the subject trust or a related or subordinate party to a beneficiary of the trust as the terms "related or subordinate party" are defined under Code Section 672(c).

8. Spouse. A person's "*spouse*" includes only a spouse then married to and living as husband and wife with him or her, or a spouse who was married to and living as husband and wife with him or her at his or her death. The following rules apply to each person who is a beneficiary or a permissible appointee under this Trust Agreement and who is married to a descendant of mine. Such a person will cease to be a beneficiary and will be excluded from the class of permissible appointees upon:

a. the legal termination of the marriage to my descendant (whether before or after my death), or

b. the death of my descendant if a dissolution of marriage proceeding was pending when he or she died.

The trust will be administered as if that person had died upon the happening of the terminating event described above.

9. Gender, Number. Where appropriate, words of any gender include all genders and the singular and plural are interchangeable.

F. Powers of Appointment. Property subject to a power of appointment shall be paid to, or retained by the Trustee or paid to any trustee under any will or trust agreement for the benefit of, such one or more permissible appointees, in such amounts and proportions, granting such interests, powers and powers of appointment, and upon such conditions including spendthrift provisions as the holder of such power (i) in the case of a power exercisable upon the death of such holder, appoints in his or her will or in a trust agreement revocable by him or her until his or her death, or (ii) in the case of a power exercisable during the life of such holder, appoints in a written instrument signed by such holder, two witnesses and a notary public, but in either case only if such will, trust agreement, or instrument specifically refers to such power.

G. Limitations on Powers of Trustee. Regardless of anything herein to the contrary, no Trustee shall make or participate in making any distribution of income or principal of a trust to or for the benefit of a beneficiary which would directly or indirectly discharge any legal obligation of such



Trustee or a donor of such trust (as an individual, and other than myself as donor) to support such beneficiary; and no Trustee (other than myself) shall make or participate in making any discretionary distribution of income or principal to or for the benefit of himself or herself other than for his or her Needs, including by reason of a determination to terminate a trust described herein. For example, if a Trustee (other than myself) has the power to distribute income or principal to himself or herself for his or her own Welfare, such Trustee (the "restricted Trustee") shall only have the power to make or participate in making a distribution of income or principal to the restricted Trustee for the restricted Trustee's Needs, although any co-Trustee who is not also a restricted Trustee may make or participate in making a distribution of income or principal to the restricted Trustee for such restricted Trustee's Welfare without the participation or consent of said restricted Trustee.

H. Presumption of Survivorship. If any person shall be required to survive another person in order to take any interest under this Agreement, the former person shall be deemed to have predeceased the latter person, if such persons die under circumstances which make it difficult or impracticable to determine which one died first.

I. Governing Law. This Agreement is governed by the law of the State of Florida.

J. Other Beneficiary Designations. Except as otherwise explicitly and with particularity provided herein, (a) no provision of this trust shall revoke or modify any beneficiary designation of mine made by me and not revoked by me prior to my death under any individual retirement account, other retirement plan or account, or annuity or insurance contract, (b) I hereby reaffirm any such beneficiary designation such that any assets held in such account, plan, or contract shall pass in accordance with such designation, and (c) regardless of anything herein to the contrary, any of such assets which would otherwise pass pursuant to this trust due to the beneficiary designation not having met the requirements for a valid testamentary disposition under applicable law or otherwise shall be paid as a gift made hereunder to the persons and in the manner provided in such designation which is incorporated herein by this reference.

K. Release of Medical Information.

1. Disability of Beneficiary. Upon the written request of a Trustee (with or without the concurrence of co-Trustees) issued to any current income or principal beneficiary (including discretionary beneficiaries and myself if a beneficiary) for whom a determination of Disability is relevant to the administration of a trust hereunder and for whom a Trustee (with or without the concurrence of co-Trustees) desires to make such a determination, such beneficiary shall issue to all Trustees (who shall be identified thereon both by name to the extent known and by class description) a valid authorization under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 and any other applicable or successor law authorizing all health care providers and all medical sources of such requested beneficiary to release protected health information of the requested beneficiary to all Trustees that is relevant to the determination of the Disability of the requested beneficiary as Disability is defined hereunder. The period of each such valid authorization shall be for six months (or the earlier death of the requested



beneficiary). If such beneficiary (or his or her legal representative if such beneficiary is a minor or legally disabled) refuses within thirty days of receipt of the request to provide a valid authorization, or at any time revokes an authorization within its term, the Trustee shall treat such beneficiary as Disabled hereunder until such valid authorization is delivered.

2. Disability of Trustee. Upon the request to a Trustee that is an individual by (a) a co-Trustee, or if none, (b) the person or entity next designated to serve as a successor Trustee not under legal incapacity, or if none, (c) any adult current income or principal beneficiary not under legal incapacity, or in any event and at any time (d) a court of competent jurisdiction, such Trustee shall issue to such person and all persons, courts of competent jurisdiction, and entities (who shall be identified thereon both by name to the extent known and by class description), with authority hereunder to determine such requested Trustee's Disability, a valid authorization under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 and any other applicable or successor law authorizing all health care providers and all medical sources of such requested Trustee to release protected health information of the requested Trustee to such persons, courts and entities, that is relevant to the determination of the Disability of the requested Trustee as Disability is defined hereunder. The period of each such valid authorization shall be for six months (or the earlier death or resignation of the requested Trustee). If such requested Trustee refuses within thirty days of receipt of the request to deliver a valid authorization, or at any time revokes an authorization within its term, such requested Trustee shall thereupon be treated as having resigned as Trustee hereunder.

3. Ability to Amend or Revoke. The foregoing provisions of this paragraph shall not constitute a restriction on myself to amend or revoke the terms of this trust instrument under paragraph 1A hereof, provided I otherwise have legal capacity to do so.

4. Authorization to Issue Certificate. All required authorizations under this paragraph shall include the power of a physician or psychiatrist to issue a written certificate to the appropriate persons or entities as provided in Subparagraph III.E.3 hereof.

ARTICLE IV. FIDUCIARIES

A. Powers of the Trustee. During my life except while I am Disabled, the Trustee shall exercise all powers provided by law and the following powers, other than the power to retain assets, only with my written approval. While I am Disabled and after my death, the Trustee shall exercise said powers without approval, provided that the Trustee shall exercise all powers in a fiduciary capacity.

1. Investments. To sell or exchange at public or private sale and on credit or otherwise, with or without security, and to lease for any term or perpetually, any property, real and personal, at any time forming a part of the trust estate (the "estate"); to grant and exercise options to buy or sell; to invest or reinvest in real or personal property of every kind, description and location; and to receive and retain any such property whether originally a part of any trust herein created or subsequently acquired, even if the Trustee is personally interested in such property, and without liability for any



decline in the value thereof; all without limitation by any statutes or judicial decisions whenever enacted or announced, regulating investments or requiring diversification of investments, it being my intention to give the broadest investment powers and discretion to the Trustee. Any bank, trust company, or other corporate trustee serving hereunder as Trustee is authorized to invest in its own common trust funds.

2. Special Investments. The Trustee is expressly authorized (but not directed) to retain, make, hold, and dispose of investments not regarded as traditional for trusts, including interests or investments in privately held business and investment entities and enterprises, including without limitation stock in closely held corporations, limited partnership interests, joint venture interests, mutual funds, business trust interests, and limited liability company membership interests, notwithstanding (a) any applicable prudent investor rule or variation thereof, (b) common law or statutory diversification requirements (it being my intent that no such duty to diversify shall exist) (c) a lack of current cash flow therefrom, (d) the presence of any risk or speculative elements as compared to other available investments (it being my intent that the Trustee have sole and absolute discretion in determining what constitutes acceptable risk and what constitutes proper investment strategy), (e) lack of a reasonable rate of return, (f) risks to the preservation of principal, (g) violation of a Trustee's duty of impartiality as to different beneficiaries (it being my intent that no such duty exists for this purpose), and (h) similar limitations on investment under this Agreement or under law pertaining to investments that may or should be made by a Trustee (including without limitation the provisions of Fla. Stats. §518.11 and successor provisions thereto that would characterize such investments as forbidden, imprudent, improper or unlawful). The Trustee shall not be responsible to any trust created hereunder or the beneficiaries thereof for any loss resulting from any such authorized investment, including without limitation loss engendered by the higher risk element of that particular entity, investment, or enterprise, the failure to invest in more conservative investments, the failure to diversify trust assets, the prudent investor rule or variant thereof. Notwithstanding any provisions for distributions to beneficiaries hereunder, if the Trustee determines that the future potential investment return from any illiquid or closely held investment asset warrants the retention of that investment asset or that sufficient value could not be obtained from the sale or other disposition of an illiquid or closely held investment asset, the Trustee is authorized to retain that asset and if necessary reduce the distributions to beneficiaries due to lack of sufficient liquid or marketable assets. However, the preceding provisions of this Subparagraph shall not be exercised in a manner as to jeopardize the availability of the estate tax marital deduction for assets passing to or held in the a trust for my surviving spouse or that would otherwise qualify for the estate tax marital deduction but for such provisions, shall not override any express powers hereunder of my surviving spouse to demand conversion of unproductive property to productive property, or reduce any income distributions otherwise required hereunder for a trust held for the benefit of my surviving spouse or a "qualified subchapter S trust" as that term is defined in Code Section 1361(d)(3).

3. Distributions. To make any division or distribution pro rata or non-pro rata, in cash or in kind, and to allocate undivided interests in property and dissimilar property (without regard to its tax basis) to different shares.

4. Management. To manage, develop, improve, partition or change the character of an asset or interest in property at any time; and to make ordinary and extraordinary repairs, replacements, alterations and improvements, structural or otherwise.

5. Borrowing. To borrow money from anyone on commercially reasonable terms, including entities owned in whole or in part by the trust, a Trustee, beneficiaries and other persons who may have a direct or indirect interest in a Trust; and to mortgage, margin, encumber and pledge real and personal property of a trust as security for the payment thereof, without incurring any personal liability thereon and to do so for a term within or extending beyond the terms of the trust and to renew, modify or extend existing borrowing on similar or different terms and with the same or different security without incurring any personal liability; and such borrowing from a Trustee may be with or without interest, and may be secured with a lien on trust assets.

6. Lending. To extend, modify or waive the terms of any obligation, bond or mortgage at any time forming a part of a trust and to foreclose any such mortgage; accept a conveyance of encumbered property, and take title to the property securing it by deed in lieu of foreclosure or otherwise and to satisfy or not satisfy the indebtedness securing said property; to protect or redeem any such property from forfeiture for nonpayment of taxes or other lien; generally, to exercise as to such bond, obligation or mortgage all powers that an absolute owner might exercise; and to loan funds to beneficiaries at commercially reasonable rates, terms and conditions.

7. Abandonment of Property. To abandon any property or asset when it is valueless or so encumbered or in such condition that it is of no benefit to a trust. To abstain from the payment of taxes, liens, rents, assessments, or repairs on such property and/or permit such property to be lost by tax sale, foreclosure or other proceeding or by conveyance for nominal or no consideration to anyone including a charity or by escheat to a state; all without personal liability incurred therefor.

8. Real Property Matters. To subdivide, develop or partition real estate; to purchase or sell real property and to enter into contracts to do the same; to dedicate the same to public use; to make or obtain the location of any plats; to adjust boundaries; to adjust differences in valuations on exchange or partition by giving or receiving consideration; and, to grant easements with or without consideration as the fiduciaries may determine; and to demolish any building, structures, walls and improvements, or to erect new buildings, structures, walls and improvements and to insure against fire and other risks; and to protect and conserve, or to lease, or to encumber, or otherwise to manage and dispose of real property to the extent such power is not otherwise granted herein or otherwise restricted herein.


9. Claims. To enforce, compromise, adjust, arbitrate, release or otherwise settle or pay any claims or demands by or against a trust.

10. Business Entities. To deal with any business entity or enterprise even if a Trustee is or may be a fiduciary of or own interests in said business entity or enterprise, whether operated in the form of a corporation, partnership, business trust, limited liability company, joint venture, sole



proprietorship, or other form (all of which business entities and enterprises are referred to herein as "*Business Entities*"). I vest the Trustee with the following powers and authority in regard to Business Entities:

- a. To retain and continue to operate a Business Entity for such period as the Trustee deems advisable;
- b. To control, direct and manage the Business Entities. In this connection, the Trustee, in its sole discretion, shall determine the manner and extent of its active participation in the operation and may delegate all or any part of its power to supervise and operate to such person or persons as the Trustee may select, including any associate, partner, officer or employee of the Business Entity;
- c. To hire and discharge officers and employees, fix their compensation and define their duties; and similarly to employ, compensate and discharge agents, attorneys, consultants, accountants, and such other representatives as the Trustee may deem appropriate; including the right to employ any beneficiary or fiduciary in any of the foregoing capacities;
- d. To invest funds in the Business Entities, to pledge other assets of a trust as security for loans made to the Business Entities, and to lend funds from a trust to the Business Entities;
- e. To organize one or more Business Entities under the laws of this or any other state or country and to transfer thereto all or any part of the Business Entities or other property of a trust, and to receive in exchange such stocks, bonds, partnership and member interests, and such other securities or interests as the Trustee may deem advisable;
- f. To treat Business Entities as separate from a trust. In a Trustee's accounting to any beneficiary, the Trustee shall only be required to report the earnings and condition of the Business Entities in accordance with standard business accounting practice;
- g. To retain in Business Entities such net earnings for working capital and other purposes of the Business Entities as the Trustee may deem advisable in conformity with sound business practice;
- h. To sell or liquidate all or any part of the Business Entities at such time and price and upon such terms and conditions (including credit) as the Trustee may determine. My Trustee is specifically authorized and empowered to make such sale to any person, including any partner, officer, or employee of the Business Entities, a fiduciary, or to any beneficiary; and
- i. To guaranty the obligations of the Business Entities, or pledge assets of a trust to secure such a guaranty.



11. Principal and Income. To allocate items of income or expense between income and principal as permitted or provided by the laws of the State of Florida but without limiting the availability of the estate tax marital deduction, provided, unless otherwise provided in this instrument, the Trustee shall establish out of income and credit to principal reasonable reserves for depreciation, obsolescence and depletion, determined to be equitable and fair in accordance with some recognized reasonable and preferably uncomplicated trust accounting principle and; provided, further that the Trustee shall not be required to provide a rate of return on unproductive property unless otherwise provided in this instrument.

12. Life Insurance. With respect to any life insurance policies constituting an asset of a trust, to pay premiums; to apply dividends in reduction of such premiums; to borrow against the cash values thereof; to convert such policies into other forms of insurance, including paid-up insurance; to exercise any settlement options provided in any such policies; to receive the proceeds of any policy upon its maturity and to administer such proceeds as a part of the principal of the Trust; and in general, to exercise all other options, benefits, rights and privileges under such policies.

13. Continuing Power. To continue to have or exercise, after the termination of a trust, in whole or in part, and until final distribution thereof, all title, power, discretions, rights and duties conferred or imposed upon the Trustee by law or by this Agreement or during the existence of the trust.

14. Exoneration. To provide for the exoneration of the Trustee from any personal liability on account of any arrangement or contract entered into in a fiduciary capacity.


15. Agreements. To comply with, amend, modify or rescind any agreement made during my lifetime, including those regarding the disposition, management or continuation of any closely held unincorporated business, corporation, partnership or joint venture, and including the power to complete contracts to purchase and sell real estate.

16. Voting. To vote and give proxies, with power of substitution to vote, stocks, bonds and other securities, or not to vote a security.

17. Combination of Shares. To hold the several shares of a trust or several Trusts as a common fund, dividing the income proportionately among them, to assign undivided interests to the several shares or Trusts, and to make joint investments of the funds belonging to them. For such purposes and insofar as may be practicable, the Trustee, to the extent that division of the trust estate is directed hereby, may administer the trust estate physically undivided until actual division thereof becomes necessary to make distributions. The Trustee may hold, manage, invest and account for whole or fractional trust shares as a single estate, making the division thereof by appropriate entries in the books of account only, and may allocate to each whole or fractional trust share its proportionate part of all receipts and expenses; provided, however, this carrying of several Trusts as a single estate shall not defer the vesting in possession of any whole or fractional share of a trust for the beneficiaries thereof at the times specified herein.



18. Reimbursement. To reimburse itself from a trust for reasonable expenses incurred in the administration thereof.
19. Reliance Upon Communication. To rely, in acting under a trust, upon any letter, notice, certificate, report, statement, document or other paper, or upon any telephone, telegraph, cable, wireless or radio message, if believed by the Trustee to be genuine, and to be signed, sealed, acknowledged, presented, sent, delivered or given by or on behalf of the proper person, firm or corporation, without incurring liability for any action or inaction based thereon.
20. Assumptions. To assume, in the absence of written notice to the contrary from the person or persons concerned, that a fact or an event, by reason of which an interest or estate under a trust shall commence or terminate, does not exist or has not occurred, without incurring liability for any action or inaction based upon such assumption.
21. Service as Custodian. To serve as successor custodian for any beneficiary of any gifts that I may have made under any Transfer to Minors Act, if at the time of my death no custodian is named in the instrument creating the gift.
22. Removal of Assets. The Trustee may remove from the domiciliary state during the entire duration of a trust or for such lesser period as it may deem advisable, any cash, securities or other property at any time in its hands whether principal or not, and to take and keep the same outside the domiciliary state and at such place or places within or outside the borders of the United States as it may determine, without in any event being chargeable for any loss or depreciation to the trust which may result therefrom.
23. Change of Situs. The situs and/or applicable law of any trust created hereunder may be transferred to such other place as the Trustee may deem to be for the best interests of the trust estate. In so doing, the Trustee may resign and appoint a successor Trustee, but may remove such successor Trustee so appointed and appoint others. Each successor Trustee may delegate any and all fiduciary powers, discretionary and ministerial, to the appointing Trustee as its agent.
24. Fiduciary Outside Domiciliary State. In the event the Trustee shall not be able and willing to act as Trustee with respect to any property located outside the domiciliary state, the Trustee, without order of court, may appoint another individual or corporation (including any employee or agent of any appointing Trustee) to act as Trustee with respect to such property. Such appointed Trustee shall have all of the powers and discretions with respect to such property as are herein given to the appointing Trustee with respect to the remaining trust assets. The appointing Trustee may remove such appointed Trustee and appoint another upon ten (10) days notice in writing. All income from such property, and if such property is sold, exchanged or otherwise disposed of, the proceeds thereof, shall be remitted to the appointing Trustee, to be held and administered by it as Trustee hereunder. Such appointed Trustee may employ the appointing Trustee as agent in the administration of such property. No surety shall be required on the bond of the Trustee or agent acting under the provisions of this



paragraph. No periodic court accounting shall be required of such appointed Trustee, it being my intention to excuse any statutory accounting which may ordinarily be required.

25. Additions. To receive and accept additions to the Trusts in cash or in kind from donors, executors, administrators, Trustee or attorneys in fact, including additions of my property by the Trustee or others as my attorneys in fact.

26. Title and Possession. To have title to and possession of all real or personal property held in the Trusts, and to register or hold title to such property in its own name or in the name of its nominee, without disclosing its fiduciary capacity, or in bearer form.

27. Dealing with Estates. To use principal of the Trusts to make loans to my estate, with or without interest, and to make purchases from my estate.

28. Agents. To employ persons, including attorneys, auditors, investment advisers, and agents, even if they are the Trustee or associated with the Trustee, to advise or assist the Trustee in the performance of its administrative duties and to pay compensation and costs incurred in connection with such employment from the assets of the Trust; to act without independent investigation upon their recommendations; and, instead of acting personally, to employ one or more agents to perform any act of administration, whether or not discretionary.

29. Tax Elections. To file tax returns, and to exercise all tax-related elections and options at its discretion, without compensating adjustments or reimbursements between any of the Trusts or any of the trust accounts or any beneficiaries.

B. Resignation. A Trustee may resign with or without cause, by giving no less than 30 days advance written notice, specifying the effective date of such resignation, to its successor Trustee and to the persons required and in the manner provided under Fla.Stats. §§736.0705(1)(a) and 736.0109. As to any required recipient, deficiencies in fulfilling the foregoing resignation requirements may be waived in a writing signed by such recipient. Upon the resignation of a Trustee, such Trustee shall be entitled to reimbursement from the trust for all reasonable expenses incurred in the settlement of accounts and in the transfer of assets to his or her successor.

C. Appointment of Successor Trustee.

1. Appointment. Upon a Trustee's resignation, or if a Trustee becomes Disabled or for any reason ceases to serve as Trustee, I may appoint any person or persons as successor Trustee, and in default of such appointment by me, ROBERT L. SPALLINA and DONALD R. TESCHER shall serve together as successor co-Trustees, or either of them alone as Trustee if either of them is unable to serve. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if a named Trustee is not a U.S. citizen or resident at the time of commencement of his term as Trustee, such Trustee should give due consideration to declining to serve to avoid potential adverse U.S. income tax consequences by reason of the characterization of a trust



hereunder as a foreign trust under the Code, but shall not be construed to have any duty to so decline if such Trustee desires to serve.

2. Specific Trusts. Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this Subparagraph IV.C, subsequent to my death I specifically appoint the following person or persons as Trustee of the following Trusts under the following described circumstances provided that the foregoing appointments shall apply when and to the extent that no effective appointment is made below:

a. Trustee of Separate Trusts for My Grandchildren. Each grandchild of mine shall serve as co-Trustee with the immediate parent of such grandchild which parent is also a child of mine as to all separate trusts under which such grandchild is the sole current mandatory or discretionary income beneficiary upon attaining the age of twenty-five (25) years, and shall serve as sole Trustee of such trusts upon attaining the age of thirty-five (35) years. While serving alone as Trustee, a grandchild of mine may designate a co-Trustee that is not a Related or Subordinate Party to serve with such grandchild and such grandchild may remove and/or replace such co-Trustee with another that is not a Related or Subordinate Party from time to time.

b. Trustee of Separate Trusts for My Lineal Descendants Other Than My Grandchildren. In regard to a separate trust held for a lineal descendant of mine other than a grandchild of mine which lineal descendant is the sole current mandatory or discretionary income beneficiary, each such lineal descendant shall serve as co-Trustee, or sole Trustee if the preceding described Trustees cease or are unable to serve or to continue to serve, of his or her separate trust upon attaining age twenty-five (25) years. While serving alone as Trustee, a lineal descendant of mine other than a grandchild of mine may designate a co-Trustee to serve with such lineal descendant and such lineal descendant may remove and/or replace such co-Trustee with another from time to time.

3. Successor Trustees Not Provided For. Whenever a successor Trustee or co-Trustee is required and no successor or other functioning mechanism for succession is provided for under the terms of this Trust Agreement, the last serving Trustee or the last person or entity designated to serve as Trustee of the applicable trust may appoint his or her successor, and if none is so appointed, the following persons shall appoint a successor Trustee (who may be one of the persons making the appointment):

- a. The remaining Trustees, if any; otherwise,
- b. A majority of the permissible current mandatory or discretionary income beneficiaries, including the natural or legal guardians of any beneficiaries who are Disabled.

A successor Trustee appointed under this subparagraph shall not be a Related or Subordinate Party of the trust. The appointment will be by a written document executed by such person in the presence of two witnesses and acknowledged before a notary public delivered to the appointed Trustee and to me if I am living and not Disabled or in a valid last Will. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a designation under this Subparagraph of a successor trustee to a corporate or entity trustee shall be limited to a corporate or

entity trustee authorized to serve as such under Florida law with assets under trust management of no less than one billion dollars.

4. Power to Remove Trustee. Subsequent to my death, the age 35 or older permissible current mandatory or discretionary income beneficiaries from time to time of any trust established hereunder shall have the power to unanimously remove a Trustee of such trust at any time with or without cause, other than a named Trustee or successor Trustee designated hereunder, or a Trustee appointed by me during my lifetime or under my Will or otherwise at the time of my death, with the successor Trustee to be determined in accordance with the foregoing provisions.

D. Method of Appointment of Trustee. Any such appointment of a successor Trustee by a person shall be made in a written instrument executed by such person in the presence of two witnesses and acknowledged before a notary public which is delivered to such appointed Trustee during the lifetime of the person making such appointment, or any such appointment of a successor Trustee by a person may be made under the last Will of such person.

E. Limitations on Removal and Replacement Power. Any power to remove and/or replace a trustee hereunder that is granted to an individual (including such power when reserved to me) is personal to that individual and may not be exercised by a guardian, power of attorney holder, or other legal representative or agent.

F. Successor Fiduciaries. No Trustee is responsible for, nor has any duty to inquire into, the administration, acts or omissions of any executor, administrator, Personal Representative, or trustee or attorney-in-fact adding property to these Trusts, or of any predecessor Trustee. Each successor Trustee has all the powers, privileges, immunities, rights and title (without the execution of any instrument of transfer or any other act by any retiring Trustee) and all the duties of all predecessors.

G. Liability and Indemnification of Trustee.

1. Liability in General. No individual Trustee (that is, a Trustee that is not a corporation or other entity) shall be liable for any of his or her actions or failures to act as Trustee, even if the individual Trustee is found by a court to have been negligent or in breach of fiduciary duty, except for liability caused by his or her actions or failures to act done in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust or the interests of the beneficiaries. Each Trustee that is a corporation or other entity will be liable for its actions or failures to act that are negligent or that breach its fiduciary duty, without contribution by any individual Trustee.

2. Indemnification of Trustee. Except in regard to liabilities imposed on a Trustee under Subparagraph IV.G.1, each Trustee shall be held harmless and indemnified from the assets of the trust for any liability, damages, attorney's fees, expenses, and costs incurred as a result of its service as Trustee. A Trustee who ceases to serve for any reason will be entitled to receive reasonable security from the assets of the trust to protect it from liability, and may enforce these provisions for indemnification against the current Trustee or against any assets held in the trust, or if the former Trustee is an individual

and not a corporation or other entity, against any beneficiary to the extent of distributions received by that beneficiary. This indemnification right extends to the estate, personal representatives, legal successors and assigns of a Trustee.

3. Indemnification of Trustee - Additional Provisions. I recognize that if a beneficiary accuses a Trustee of wrongdoing or breach of fiduciary duty, the Trustee may have a conflict of interest that ordinarily would prevent it from paying legal fees and costs from the trust estate to defend itself. I do not want to put a financial burden on any individual named to serve as a Trustee. Just as important, I do not want an individual who has been selected to serve as a Trustee to be reluctant to accept the position, or while serving to be intimidated in the performance of the Trustee's duties because of the threats of lawsuits that might force the Trustee to pay fees and costs from the Trustee's personal resources. For this reason, I deliberately and intentionally waive any such conflict of interest with respect to any individual serving as Trustee so that he or she can hire counsel to defend himself or herself against allegations of wrongdoing or if sued for any reason (whether by a beneficiary or by someone else) and pay all fees and costs for his or her defense from the trust estate until the dispute is resolved. I understand and agree that a court may award, disallow or allocate fees and costs in whole or in part after the dispute is resolved, as provided by law. The Trustee will account for all such fees and costs paid by it as provided by law. This provision shall not apply to any Trustee that is a corporation or other entity.

H. Compensation Bond. Each Trustee is entitled to be paid reasonable compensation for services rendered in the administration of the trust. Reasonable compensation for a non-individual Trustee will be its published fee schedule in effect when its services are rendered unless otherwise agreed in writing, and except as follows. Any fees paid to a non-individual Trustee for making principal distributions, for termination of the trust, and upon termination of its services must be based solely on the value of its services rendered, not on the value of the trust principal. During my lifetime the Trustee's fees are to be charged wholly against income (to the extent sufficient), unless directed otherwise by me in writing. Each Trustee shall serve without bond.

I. Maintenance of Records. The Trustee shall maintain accurate accounts and records. It shall render annual statements of the receipts and disbursements of income and principal of a trust upon the written request of any adult vested beneficiary of such trust or the guardian of the person of any vested beneficiary and the approval of such beneficiary shall be binding upon all persons then or thereafter interested in such trust as to the matters and transactions shown on such statement. The Trustee may at any time apply for a judicial settlement of any account. No Trustee shall be required to file any statutory or other periodic accountings of the administration of a trust.

J. Interested Trustee. The Trustee may act under this Agreement even if interested in these Trusts in an individual capacity, as a fiduciary of another trust or estate (including my estate) or in any other capacity. The Trustee may in good faith enter into a sale, encumbrance, or other transaction involving the investment or management of trust property for the Trustee's own personal account or which is otherwise affected by a conflict between the Trustee's fiduciary and personal interests, without liability and without being voidable by a beneficiary. The Trustee is specifically authorized to make loans to, to receive loans from, or to sell, purchase or exchange assets in a transaction with (i) the



Trustee's spouse, (ii) the Trustee's children or grandchildren, siblings, parents, or spouses of such persons, (iii) an officer, director, employee, agent, or attorney of the Trustee, or (iv) a corporation, partnership, limited liability company, or other business entity in which the Trustee has a financial interest, provided that in any transaction the trusts hereunder receive fair and adequate consideration in money or money's worth. The Trustee may renounce any interest or expectancy of a trust in, or an opportunity to participate in, specified business opportunities or specified classes or categories of business opportunities that are presented to the Trustee. Such renunciation shall not prohibit the Trustee from participating in the Trustee's individual capacity in such opportunity or expectancy.

K. Third Parties. No one dealing with the Trustee need inquire into its authority or its application of property.

L. Merger of Trusts. If the Trustee is also trustee of a trust established by myself or another person by will or trust agreement, the beneficiaries to whom income and principal may then be paid and then operative terms of which are substantially the same as those of a trust held under this Agreement, the Trustee in its discretion may merge either such trust into the other trust. The Trustee, in exercising its discretion, shall consider economy of administration, convenience to the beneficiaries, tax consequences and any other factor it considers important. If it is later necessary to reestablish the merged trust as separate trusts, it shall be divided proportionately to the value of each trust at the time of merger.

M. Multiple Trustees. If two Trustees are serving at any time, any power or discretion of the Trustees may be exercised only by their joint agreement. Either Trustee may delegate to the other Trustee the authority to act on behalf of both Trustees and to exercise any power held by the Trustees. If more than two Trustees are serving at any time, and unless unanimous agreement is specifically required by the terms of this Trust Agreement, any power or discretion of the Trustees may be exercised only by a majority. The Trustees may delegate to any one or more of themselves the authority to act on behalf of all the Trustees and to exercise any power held by the Trustees. Trustees who consent to the delegation of authority to other Trustees will be liable for the consequences of the actions of those other Trustees as if the consenting Trustees had joined the other Trustees in performing those actions. A dissenting Trustee who did not consent to the delegation of authority to another Trustee and who has not joined in the exercise of a power or discretion cannot be held liable for the consequences of the exercise. A dissenting Trustee who joins only at the direction of the majority will not be liable for the consequences of the exercise if the dissent is expressed in writing delivered to any of the other Trustees before the exercise of that power or discretion.

ARTICLE V. ADDITIONAL TAX AND RELATED MATTERS

A. GST Trusts. I direct (a) that the Trustee shall divide any trust to which there is allocated any GST exemption into two separate Trusts (each subject to the provisions hereof) so that the generation-skipping tax inclusion ratio of one such trust is zero, (b) any property exempt from generation-skipping taxation shall be divided as otherwise provided herein and held for the same persons



designated in Trusts separate from any property then also so divided which is not exempt from generation-skipping taxation, and (c) if upon the death of a beneficiary a taxable termination would otherwise occur with respect to any property held in trust for him or her with an inclusion ratio greater than zero, such beneficiary shall have with respect only to such property a power to appoint such fractional share thereof which if included in such beneficiary's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes (without allowing any deduction with respect to such share) would not be taxed at the highest federal estate tax rate and such fractional share of such property shall be distributed to such persons including only such beneficiary's estate, spouse, and issue, as such beneficiary may appoint, and any part of a trust such beneficiary does not effectively appoint shall be treated as otherwise provided for disposition upon his or her death, provided, if upon his or her death two or more Trusts for his or her benefit are directed to be divided among and held or distributed for the same persons and the generation-skipping tax inclusion ratio of any such trust is zero, the amount of any other such Trust to which there is allocated any of such beneficiary's GST exemption shall be added to the Trusts with generation-skipping tax inclusion ratios of zero in equal shares. For purposes of funding any pecuniary payment to which there is allocated any GST exemption, such payment shall be satisfied with cash or property which fairly represents appreciation and depreciation (occurring between the valuation date and the date of distribution) in all of the assets from which such distribution could be made, and any pecuniary payment made before a residual transfer of property to which any GST exemption is allocated shall be satisfied with cash or property which fairly represents appreciation and depreciation (occurring between the valuation date and the date of distribution) in all of the assets from which such pecuniary payment could be satisfied and shall be allocated a pro rata share of income earned by all such assets between the valuation date and the date of payment. Except as otherwise expressly provided herein, the valuation date with respect to any property shall be the date as of which its value is determined for federal estate tax purposes with respect to the transferor thereof, and subject to the foregoing, property distributed in kind in satisfaction of any pecuniary payment shall be selected on the basis of the value of such property on the valuation date. All terms used in this paragraph which are defined or explained in Chapter 13 of the Code or the regulations thereunder shall have the same meaning when used herein. I request (but do not require) that if two or more Trusts are held hereunder for any person, no principal be paid to such person from the Trusts with the lower inclusion ratios for generation-skipping tax purposes unless the trust with the highest inclusion ratio has been exhausted by use, consumption, distribution or otherwise or is not reasonably available. The Trustee is authorized and directed to comply with the provisions of the Treasury Regulations interpreting the generation skipping tax provisions of the Code in severing or combining any trust, creating or combining separate trust shares, allocating GST exemption, or otherwise, as necessary to best accomplish the foregoing allocations, inclusion ratios, combinations, and divisions, including, without limitation, the payment of "appropriate interest" as determined by the Trustee as that term is applied and used in said Regulations.

B. Individual Retirement Accounts. In the event that this trust or any trust created under this Agreement is the beneficiary of an Individual retirement account established and maintained under Code Section 408 or a qualified pension, profit sharing or stock bonus plan established and maintained under Code Section 401 (referred to in this paragraph as "IRA"), the following provisions shall apply to such trust:



1. I intend that the beneficiaries of such trust shall be beneficiaries within the meaning of Code Section 401(a)(9) and the Treasury Regulations thereunder. All provisions of such trust shall be construed consistent with such intent. Accordingly, the following provisions shall apply to such trust:

a. No benefits from any IRA may be used or applied for the payment of any debts, taxes or other claims against my estate as set forth in the later paragraph captioned "Taxes", unless other assets of this trust are not available for such payment.

b. In the event that a beneficiary of any trust created under this Agreement has a testamentary general power of appointment or a limited power of appointment over all or any portion of any trust established under this Agreement, and if such trust is the beneficiary of any benefits from any IRA, the beneficiary shall not appoint any part of such trust to a charitable organization or to a lineal descendant of mine (or a spouse of a lineal descendant of mine) who is older than the beneficiary whose life expectancy is being used to calculate distributions from such IRA.

2. The Trustee shall deliver a copy of this Agreement to the custodian of any IRA of which this trust or any trust created under this Agreement is the named beneficiary within the time period prescribed Code Section 401(a)(9) and the Treasury Regulations thereunder, along with such additional items required thereunder. If the custodian of the IRA changes after a copy of this Agreement has been provided pursuant to the preceding sentence, the Trustee shall immediately provide a copy of this Agreement to the new custodian. The Trustee shall request each custodian to complete a receipt of the Agreement and shall attach such receipt to this Agreement. The Trustee shall provide a copy of each amendment of this Agreement to the custodian and shall obtain a receipt of such amendment.

C. Gift Transfers Made From Trust During My Lifetime. I direct that all gift transfers made from the trust during my lifetime be treated for all purposes as if the gift property had been first withdrawn by (or distributed to) me and then transferred by me to the donees involved. Thus, in each instance, even where title to the gift property is transferred directly from the name of the trust (or its nominee) into the name of the donee, such transfer shall be treated for all purposes as first a withdrawal by (or distribution of the property to) me followed by a gift transfer of the property to the donee by me as donor, the Trustee making the actual transfer in my behalf acting as my attorney in fact, this paragraph being, to that extent, a power of attorney from me to the Trustee to make such transfer, which power of attorney shall not be affected by my Disability, incompetence, or incapacity.

D. Gifts. If I am Disabled, I authorize the Trustee to make gifts from trust property during my lifetime for estate planning purposes, or to distribute amounts to my legally appointed guardian or to my attorney-in-fact for those purposes, subject to the following limitations:

1. Recipients. The gifts may be made only to my lineal descendants or to trusts primarily for their benefit, and in aggregate annual amounts to any one such recipient that do not exceed the exclusion amount provided for under Code Section 2503(b).



2. Trustee Limited. When a person eligible to receive gifts is serving as Trustee, the aggregate of all gifts to that person during the calendar year allowable under the preceding subparagraph 1. shall thereafter not exceed the greater of Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000), or five percent (5%) of the aggregate value of the trust estate. However, gifts completed prior to a recipient's commencing to serve as Trustee shall not be affected by this limitation.

3. Charitable Pledges. The Trustee may pay any charitable pledges I made while I was not Disabled (even if not yet due).

E. Death Costs. If upon my death the Trustee hold any United States bonds which may be redeemed at par in payment of federal estate tax, the Trustee shall pay the federal estate tax due because of my death up to the amount of the par value of such bonds and interest accrued thereon at the time of payment. The Trustee shall also pay from the trust all of my following death costs, but if there is an acting executor, administrator or Personal Representative of my estate my Trustee shall pay only such amounts of such costs as such executor, administrator or Personal Representative directs:

1. my debts which are allowed as claims against my estate,
2. my funeral expenses without regard to legal limitations,
3. the expenses of administering my estate,
4. the balance of the estate, inheritance and other death taxes (excluding generation-skipping transfer taxes unless arising from direct skips), and interest and penalties thereon, due because of my death with respect to all property whether or not passing under my Will or this Agreement (other than property over which I have a power of appointment granted to me by another person, and qualified terminable interest property which is not held in a trust that was subject to an election under Code Section 2652(a)(3) at or about the time of its funding) and life insurance proceeds on policies insuring my life which proceeds are not held under this trust or my probate estate at or by reason of my death), and
5. any gifts made in my Will or any Codicil thereto.

The Trustee may make any such payment either to my executor, administrator or Personal Representative or directly to the proper party. The Trustee shall not be reimbursed for any such payment, and is not responsible for the correctness or application of the amounts so paid at the direction of my executor, administrator, or Personal Representative. The Trustee shall not pay any of such death costs with any asset which would not otherwise be included in my gross estate for federal or state estate or inheritance tax purposes, or with any asset which otherwise cannot be so used, such as property received under a limited power of appointment which prohibits such use. Further, no payment of any such death costs shall be charged against or paid from the tangible personal property disposed of pursuant to the prior paragraph captioned "Disposition of Tangible Personal Property."

F. Subchapter S Stock. Regardless of anything herein to the contrary, in the event that after my death the principal of a trust includes stock in a corporation for which there is a valid election to be treated under the provisions of Subchapter S of the Code, the income beneficiary of such a trust is a U.S. citizen or U.S. resident for federal income tax purposes, and such trust is not an "electing small business trust" under Code Section 1361(e)(1) in regard to that corporation, the Trustee shall (a) hold such stock as a substantially separate and independent share of such trust within the meaning of Code Section 663(c), which share shall otherwise be subject to all of the terms of this Agreement, (b) distribute all of the income of such share to the one income beneficiary thereof in annual or more frequent installments, (c) upon such beneficiary's death, pay all accrued or undistributed income of such share to the beneficiary's estate, (d) distribute principal from such share during the lifetime of the income beneficiary only to such beneficiary, notwithstanding any powers of appointment granted to any person including the income beneficiary, and (e) otherwise administer such share in a manner that qualifies it as a "qualified Subchapter S trust" as that term is defined in Code Section 1361(d)(3), and shall otherwise manage and administer such share as provided under this Agreement to the extent not inconsistent with the foregoing provisions of this paragraph.

G. Residence as Homestead. I reserve the right to reside upon any real property placed in this trust as my permanent residence during my life, it being the intent of this provision to retain for myself the requisite beneficial interest and possessory right in and to such real property to comply with Section 196.041 of the Florida Statutes such that said beneficial interest and possessory right constitute in all respects "equitable title to real estate" as that term is used in Section 6, Article VII of the Constitution of the State of Florida. Notwithstanding anything contained in this trust to the contrary, for purposes of the homestead exemption under the laws of the State of Florida, my interest in any real property in which I reside pursuant to the provisions of this trust shall be deemed to be an interest in real property and not personalty and shall be deemed my homestead.

[remainder of page intentionally left blank]



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amended and Restated Trust Agreement on the date first above written.

SETTLOR and TRUSTEE:

[Handwritten signature of Simon L. Bernstein]

SIMON L. BERNSTEIN

This instrument was signed by SIMON L. BERNSTEIN in our presence, and at the request of and in the presence of SIMON L. BERNSTEIN and each other, we subscribe our names as witnesses on this 21 day of July, 2012:

[Handwritten signature of Robert L. Spallina]
Print Name: ROBERT L. SPALLINA
Address: 7387 WISTERIA AVENUE
PARKLAND, FL 33076

[Handwritten signature of Kimberly Moran]
Print Name: Kimberly Moran
Address: 6362 Las Flores Drive
Boca Raton, FL 33433

STATE OF FLORIDA

SS.

COUNTY OF PALM BEACH

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 25 day of July, 2012, by SIMON L. BERNSTEIN.

[Handwritten signature of Lindsay Baxley]
Signature - Notary Public - State of Florida
Lindsay Baxley
Print, type or stamp name of Notary Public

[Seal with Commission Expiration Date]

NOTARY PUBLIC - STATE OF FLORIDA
Lindsay Baxley
Commission # EE092282
Expires: MAY 10, 2015
BONDED THRU ATLANTIC BONDING CO., INC.

Personally Known _____ or Produced Identification _____
Type of Identification Produced _____

SIMON L. BERNSTEIN
AMENDED AND RESTATED TRUST AGREEMENT

4

EXHIBIT A

611 So.2d 43
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Fourth District.

Dareyl FUNCHESS, as personal representative
of the estate of Samantha McHellon Funchess,
deceased, on behalf of the estate and on behalf of the
survivors of the decedent, to wit: Dareyl Funchess,
surviving spouse; Lajuan Jamar Funchess, a minor;
Samuel McHellon, a minor, Helen White and
Donial McHellon, natural parents, Appellant,
v.
GULF STREAM APARTMENTS OF BROWARD
COUNTY, INC., John V. Tinglof, Robert
R. Tinglof and Iver A. Tinglof, Appellees.

No. 91-1716.

|

Dec. 23, 1992.

|

Rehearing and Rehearing En
Banc Denied Jan. 25, 1993.

Wrongful death action was brought in name of personal
representative of deceased. Administrator ad litem was
substituted as plaintiff. Defendants moved to dismiss. The
Circuit Court, Broward County, Patricia W. Cocalis, J.,
dismissed. Administrator appealed. The District Court of
Appeal, Dell, J., held that administrator ad litem could
maintain wrongful death action.

Reversed and remanded.

West Headnotes (2)

[1] Executors and Administrators

⇒ Authority and Duty in General

Administrator ad litem could maintain
wrongful death action originally brought in
name of personal representative; wrongful
death statute provided for liberal construction
and did not prohibit continuation of suit
in name of administrator ad litem and
defendants had not shown either prejudice or
any meaningful distinction between authority

of administrator ad litem and personal
representative to act as nominal plaintiff
in wrongful death action. West's F.S.A. §§
731.201(25), 733.308, 768.16, 768.20.

8 Cases that cite this headnote

[2] Executors and Administrators

⇒ Authority and Duty in General

Administrator ad litem must represent
beneficiaries of estate with same degree
of neutrality and fidelity as personal
representative and administrator ad litem is
also subject to supervision of appointing
court.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms

*44 Edward A. Perse of Perse, P.A. & Ginsberg, P.A.,
and Ratiner & Glinn, P.A., Miami, for appellant.

Richard T. Woulfe and Peter R. Goldman of Bunnell,
Woulfe & Keller, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.

Opinion

DELL, Judge.

Appellant contends the trial court erred when it dismissed
this action for the wrongful death of Samantha Funchess
and entered judgment for appellees.¹ We agree and
reverse and remand this cause for further proceedings.

The trial court's order neither contains findings nor states
reasons for its dismissal of appellant's action. Appellant
contends the trial court erred if it dismissed this action
based upon the inability of an administrator ad litem to
maintain a wrongful death action originally brought in
the name of a personal representative. In the alternative,
appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion if it
dismissed this suit based upon appellant's failure to timely
obtain the appointment of a personal representative.

[1] Appellant initially filed this wrongful death action in
the name of a personal representative properly appointed
by the probate division. The probate division thereafter

removed the personal representative at the request of the decedent's mother and appointed John Spellacy as administrator ad litem of the estate. Appellees did not move to dismiss when the court appointed Spellacy as administrator ad litem. Only after Spellacy resigned and appellant failed to have a successor administrator ad litem appointed did appellees move to dismiss for lack of a personal representative.

Appellant argues an administrator ad litem may properly maintain a wrongful death action because the term "personal representative" encompasses the term "administrator ad litem". The wrongful death statute, *45 section 768.18, Florida Statutes (1989), does not define the term "personal representative". However, section 731.201(25) provides:

"Personal representative" means the fiduciary appointed by the court to administer the estate and refers to what has been known as an administrator, administrator cum testamento annexo, administrator de bonis non, ancillary administrator, ancillary executor, or executor.

Section 733.308 provides the circumstances where a court must appoint an administrator ad litem:

When it is necessary that an estate be represented and there is no personal representative of the estate, the court shall appoint an administrator ad litem without bond for that particular proceeding.

Rule 5.120(a), Florida Rules of Probate and Guardianship, permits the appointment of an administrator ad litem in the following circumstances:

When it is necessary that the estate of a decedent ... be represented in any probate ... proceeding and there is no personal representative of the estate ..., or the personal representative ... is or may be interested adversely to the estate ..., or is enforcing his own debt or claim against the estate ..., or the necessity arises otherwise, the court may appoint an administrator ad

litem ... without bond or notice for that particular proceeding.

(emphasis added).

Appellant points out section 768.17, Florida Statutes (1989), provides the wrongful death statute "shall be liberally construed." Section 768.20 states in part:

The action shall be brought by the decedent's personal representative, who shall recover for the benefit of the decedent's survivors and estate all damages, as specified in this act, caused by the injury resulting in death.

The statute, therefore, requires a single action brought by a personal representative to recover damages for all beneficiaries under the act. By requiring the personal representative to bring a single action, the statute eliminates the potential for competing beneficiaries to race to judgment, preferential treatment of one or more beneficiaries in the disposition of their claims and, most significantly, multiple claims and lawsuits against the wrongdoer.

[2] An administrator ad litem must represent the beneficiaries of the estate with the same degree of neutrality and fidelity as a personal representative and an administrator ad litem is always subject to the supervision of the appointing court. The proceeds of any judgment recovered in the wrongful death action by an administrator ad litem would be protected and distributed as provided by the Probate Code. See *In re Estate of Cordiner*, 458 So.2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); *Woolf v. Reed*, 389 So.2d 1026 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Furthermore, the substitution of an administrator ad litem would not affect appellees' exposure to multiple claims.

Appellees have not shown how they would suffer prejudice by the continuation of the action by the administrator ad litem nor have they shown any meaningful distinction between the authority of an administrator ad litem and a personal representative to act as a nominal plaintiff in a wrongful death action. Since the wrongful death statute provides for a liberal construction and does not prohibit the continuation of the suit in the name of an administrator ad litem, we hold the trial court erred

when it dismissed the action for lack of a "personal representative".

We also reject appellee's argument that the trial court's order of dismissal should be affirmed because appellant failed to timely have a personal representative appointed and substituted as plaintiff. On January 9, 1991, the trial court required appellant to have a personal representative appointed by January 14. The probate division appointed Randolph Potter as successor administrator ad litem on January 10 and appellant filed a motion to substitute Potter for Funchess as plaintiff on January 14.

We have held an administrator ad litem can maintain this action to final judgment. Therefore, if the trial court dismissed this cause for lack of a personal representative, it erred. On the other hand, if it dismissed *46 this cause

as a sanction, the trial court relied upon an erroneous premise for its dismissal.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand this cause to the trial court with directions to vacate its judgment in favor of appellees and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

HERSEY and STONE, JJ., concur.

All Citations

611 So.2d 43, 18 Fla. L. Weekly D92

Footnotes

1

The following summarizes the procedural history leading to the dismissal of appellant's action:

On January 26, 1989, Dareyl Funchess, nominal appellant, as personal representative of the estate of Samantha Funchess, his deceased wife, filed a wrongful death action against appellees, pursuant to section 768.16, Florida Statutes (1989). The decedent's mother petitioned for the removal of Dareyl Funchess as personal representative, and on June 19, 1989, the probate division entered an order which removed Dareyl Funchess as personal representative of the estate and appointed John Spellacy as administrator ad litem of the estate. On September 7, 1990, at Spellacy's request, the probate division entered an order discharging him as administrator ad litem.

On December 5, 1990, appellees moved to dismiss appellant's wrongful death action based upon the ground that the decedent's estate was no longer represented by Funchess or any other personal representative. On December 10, appellant moved to substitute Spellacy for Funchess as plaintiff. On January 9, 1991, the trial court entered an order on appellees' motion to dismiss which directed a personal representative shall be appointed by January 14, or the motion is granted and the action is dismissed. The next day, the probate division entered an order which noted its previous discharge of Spellacy as administrator ad litem and appointed Randolph Potter as successor administrator ad litem. On January 14, appellant filed a motion to substitute Potter for Funchess as plaintiff, and on January 29, the trial court entered an order substituting Potter as plaintiff.

On February 6, 1991, appellees moved to vacate the January 29 order claiming appellant obtained the order ex parte. On April 23, 1991, the trial court entered an order which vacated its January 29 order, granted appellees' motion to dismiss and dismissed appellant's action.

EXHIBIT B

879 So.2d 675
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Fourth District.

Mark P. ARZUMAN, a/k/a Mark
P. Arzoumanian, Appellant,
v.
The ESTATE OF Prince Bander
BIN Saud Bin, etc., Appellee.

No. 4D03-2406.

|
Aug. 11, 2004.

Synopsis

Background: Personal representative of estate filed petition for discharge and approval of final accounting. The Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Palm Beach County, Gary L. Vonhof, J., issued final order granting petition. Claimant against estate appealed.

[Holding:] The District Court of Appeal, Klein, J., held that appeal was not timely.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes (2)

[1] Executors and Administrators

↳ Persons Entitled to Object

Claimant against estate was an "interested person" in proceedings to approve final accounting and discharge personal representative. West's F.S.A. § 731.201(21).

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[2] Executors and Administrators

↳ Perfection of Appeal and Effect Thereof

Time for claimant against estate to appeal order approving settlement of separate wrongful death action against estate began to run when trial court approved settlement,

rather than when trial court granted personal representative's motion to disburse funds, approve final accounting, and discharge personal representative; order approving settlement finally determined right of claimant in that it resulted in estate having no assets with which to pay his claim. West's F.S.A. R.App.P.Rule 9.110(a)(2).

1 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms

*675 Mark P. Arzuman, a/k/a Mark P. Arzoumanian, Boca Raton, pro se.

Lawrence Bunin of Lawrence Bunin, P.A., Plantation, for appellee.

Opinion

KLEIN, J.

Appellant, a claimant against the appellee estate, appeals a final order granting the personal representative's motion to disburse funds, approve final accounting, and discharge personal representative. He argues that the trial court erred in approving the settlement of a wrongful death claim in which the estate was a plaintiff, but we conclude that this appeal is not timely as to the order approving the settlement, which was a final order.

*676 The decedent died in an airplane accident, and the estate filed a negligence suit which was settled for a total of \$750,000. The settlement, which apportioned \$700,000 to decedent's mother and \$50,000 to the estate, was approved by the court. The low amount to the estate resulted from the fact that the decedent reported no income. The aviation lawyer who obtained the recovery testified that the estate had no recoverable damages. Claimant, who had a pending lawsuit against the estate, filed an appeal from the March 2002 order approving the settlement, but subsequently dismissed it.

In April 2003, the personal representative filed a petition for discharge and approval of final accounting, noting that claimant's lawsuit was still pending, but asserting that the estate would have no assets to pay any judgment claimant might obtain in the future. Following a hearing

the court granted the petition, finding that if claimant obtained a judgment, it would be a class 8 claim under section 733.707, Florida Statutes, and that, after paying expenses having a higher priority, the estate would have no funds remaining. It is this order, which was entered in May 2003, which claimant has appealed, but his primary argument is that the court erred in approving the wrongful death settlement a year earlier.

[1] The estate argues that claimant is not an “interested person” under section 731.201(21), Florida Statutes (2002), which defines interested person as:

any person who may reasonably be expected to be affected by the outcome of the particular proceeding involved.... The meaning, as it relates to particular persons, may vary from time to time and must be determined according to the particular purpose of, and matter involved in, any proceedings.

The closest case is *Montgomery v. Cribb*, 484 So.2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), in which a claimant's claim against an estate had been stricken, and the order striking the claim was on appeal. The second district held that the claimant was an interested party. We agree with that decision and conclude that claimant was an interested person.

[2] The estate next argues that claimant was required to appeal the order approving the settlement when it was entered. Final orders in probate proceedings are defined under rule 9.110(a)(2), as orders which “finally determine a right or obligation of an interested person as defined in the Florida Probate Code.”

We conclude that the order approving the settlement of the tort claim did “finally determine a right” of

this claimant. Section 733.708, Florida Statutes (2002), which addresses the compromise of lawsuits filed by estates, provides that the probate court may authorize the settlement “if satisfied that the compromise will be for the best interest of the interested persons,” and that an order authorizing settlement “shall relieve the personal representative of liability or responsibility for the compromise.”

In this case once the order approving the settlement became final, the personal representative was, by statute, absolved of further responsibility. The order approving the settlement accordingly did finally determine a right of the claimant in that it resulted in the estate having no assets with which to pay his claim.

We are of course aware that, when we decide that an appellant should have appealed an earlier order, it can result in *677 grave consequences.¹ In probate cases, however, where the order of final discharge may not be entered for years after the opening of an estate, interim appeals of orders which finally determine rights or obligations are necessary for the orderly administration of the estate. If we were to review the order approving settlement at this late date, it is doubtful that any remedy would be available which would benefit claimant.

We have considered the issues which appellant has raised regarding the final order of discharge and find them to be without merit. Affirmed.

SHAHOOD, J., and EMAS, KEVIN M., Associate Judge, concur.

All Citations

879 So.2d 675, 29 Fla. L. Weekly D1844

Footnotes

1

Even if we had reviewed the order approving the settlement, we would have affirmed, because as we noted earlier, the estate had no damage recoverable in the wrongful death claim.

EXHIBIT C

KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment
Distinguished by J.B. v. Florida Dept. of Children and Family
Services, Fla., September 28, 2000

484 So.2d 73

District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Second District.

William T. MONTGOMERY, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Kenneth
W. Montgomery, deceased, Appellant,
v.

Barbara CRIBB and Joseph A. Perez, as
Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate
of Vivian S. Perez, deceased, Appellees.

No. 85-1288.

March 5, 1986.

Personal representatives moved to strike claim against decedent's estate based on a summary judgment that had been entered in favor of estate in separate action. The Circuit Court, Highlands County, Dennis P. Maloney, J., did not rule on motion for continuance brought by claimant and entered an order granting personal representatives' motion to strike. The District Court of Appeal held that the court should not have ruled on motion to strike because claimant did not receive reasonable notice of hearing.

Reversed and remanded for consistent proceedings.

West Headnotes (4)

[1] **Executors and Administrators**

⇒ Findings and Decision

Trial court improperly ruled on personal representatives' motion to strike claim against the estate, where claimant received notice of hearing on motion to strike two days before the hearing was to be held and the trial court did not rule on claimant's motion for continuance which was based on his lack of reasonable notice of the hearing.

4 Cases that cite this headnote

[2] **Motions**

⇒ Service and Filing

Unless the court orders otherwise, every petition or motion for an order determining rights of an interested person shall be served on interested persons where "interested persons" are those who reasonably may be expected to be affected by the outcome of the particular proceeding. West's F.S.A. § 731.201(21).

Cases that cite this headnote

[3] **Executors and Administrators**

⇒ Proceedings

For a hearing on a motion to strike claim against estate based on summary judgment that had been entered, two day notice to claimant against whom the summary judgment was directed was not a reasonable length of time under West's F.S.A. R.P. & G.P Rule 5.042(c).

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[4] **Executors and Administrators**

⇒ Persons Who May Contest Claims

Executors and Administrators

⇒ Proceedings

Decedent's personal representatives were not privileged to proceed ex parte in a motion to strike claim against the estate based on summary judgment that had been entered in a separate action, and claimant was entitled to reasonable notice of the hearing as claimant remained an interested person in the proceeding because an appeal was pending on an issue pertaining to his claim against the estate.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms

*74 Carl J. Robie, III, Sarasota, for appellant.

Jon H. Anderson, Lakeland, for appellees.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, William Montgomery, seeks review of an order granting a motion to strike filed by appellees, Barbara Cribb and Joseph A. Perez, personal representatives of the estate of Vivian S. Perez. We reverse.

Vivian Perez died on December 15, 1982. Her will was admitted to probate and the court appointed Barbara Cribb and Joseph Perez as personal representatives of the estate. On September 26, 1983, Kenneth Montgomery, a minor, drowned in a swimming pool located on the Perez estate. His father, the appellant, filed a statement of claim against the estate for damages arising out of the allegedly wrongful death of his son. The appellees timely objected to appellant's statement of claim and the appellant filed a separate civil action. The appellees filed an answer and affirmative defenses alleging, among other things, that appellant had accepted an offer of settlement but had refused to arrange for the execution of an appropriate release. The appellees then filed a motion to enforce settlement and a motion for summary judgment.

In addition to the reasons set forth in the motion to enforce settlement, the motion for summary judgment sought relief on the basis that the sole cause of the son's death had been inadequate parental supervision, that appellant's son had not been an invitee, and that the attractive nuisance doctrine did not, as a matter of law, apply. The trial court found there existed no substantial issue as to any material fact and, on September 21, 1984, granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees. The appellant voluntarily dismissed an appeal of that order, apparently in consideration of \$5000 tendered by the appellees. He later obtained new counsel who, without success, attempted to set aside dismissal of the appeal.

On November 15, 1984, appellees filed a motion for supplemental relief stating they were ready to perform the settlement agreement by tendering \$5000 into the registry of the court. On March 5, 1985, the court granted the motion, thereby releasing appellees from further liability.

The appellant filed, on April 11, 1985, a notice of appeal of that order. Eleven days later, the appellees filed a motion to require appellant to return their tender of \$5000. Appellees alleged that in exchange for their tender of \$5000, appellant had dismissed his appeal of the final summary judgment, that appellant had subsequently engaged new counsel to appeal the order granting the motion for supplemental relief, that the appellant had disavowed the settlement agreement entered into by his former attorney, and that appellant therefore had no basis for retaining the \$5000. The appellant then filed a stipulation agreeing to return appellees' tender. On appeal, this court temporarily relinquished jurisdiction to the trial court for the parties to secure a final order as to the effect of appellant's release of tender. That appeal is still pending.

Meanwhile, appellees had filed, on April 22, 1985, a motion to strike appellant's claim against the estate based upon the summary judgment that had been entered. On April 23, 1985, appellant received notice that a hearing on the motion to strike would be held on April 25, 1985. Prior to the hearing, appellant filed a motion for continuance on the basis that he had not been given reasonable notice of the hearing. The trial court did not rule on appellant's motion for continuance, and following the hearing, entered an order granting appellees' motion to strike. Appellant has timely appealed that order.

[1] [2] Appellant contends that the court erred in ruling on the motion to strike because appellant did not receive reasonable *75 notice of the hearing. We agree. Florida Rule of Probate and Guardianship 5.041(a), provides that unless the court orders otherwise, every petition or motion for an order determining rights of an interested person shall be served on interested persons. "Interested persons" are those who reasonably may be expected to be affected by the outcome of the particular proceeding. § 731.201(21), Fla.Stat. (1985).

[3] Florida Rule of Probate and Guardianship 5.042(c), provides that unless a motion is to be heard ex parte, a copy of the notice of the hearing on the motion must be served a reasonable length of time prior to the hearing. We find that two-day notice is not a reasonable length of time. See *Reynolds v. Reynolds*, 187 So.2d 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966); see also, *Hernandez v. Ward*, 437 So.2d 781 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).

[4] Appellees argue they were privileged to proceed ex parte in this matter because, following this court's denial of appellant's motion to set aside the voluntary dismissal of the summary judgment appeal, appellant was no longer an "interested person." We disagree. Appellant remains an "interested person" in these proceedings because an appeal is pending on an issue pertaining to his claim against the estate. Appellant, therefore, was entitled to reasonable notice, and we, accordingly, reverse the trial court's order granting the motion to strike. Upon remand, after the appellant is given reasonable notice, the court may again rule upon the motion to strike.

Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.

GRIMES, A.C.J., and DANAHY and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.

All Citations

484 So.2d 73, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 569

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EXHIBIT D

573 So.2d 57

District Court of Appeal of Florida,
First District.

In re the ESTATE OF Katherine V. BELL,
also known as Virginia Bell, Deceased.
William HUNTER, Daniel Hunter and
Marywil Hunter Croson, Appellants,

v.

Oleta JOHNSON, Personal Representative
of the Estate of Katherine V. Bell,
also known as Virginia Bell, Appellee.

No. 90-1318.

|

Dec. 26, 1990.

Will beneficiaries moved to compel production of estate assets or to remove another beneficiary as personal representative. The Circuit Court, Hamilton County, David E. Bembry, J., denied motion, and beneficiaries appealed. The District Court of Appeal, Nimmons, J., held that certificates of deposit were estate assets, even though beneficiary who was also personal representative was listed as trust beneficiary on one and co-owner of other, absent language in the power of attorney expressly authorizing gift of testatrix' assets to beneficiary.

Reversed in part; affirmed in part; and remanded.

West Headnotes (3)

[1] **Executors and Administrators**

☞ Trust Estates and Other Equitable Estates and Interests

Executors and Administrators

☞ Ownership of Property at Time of Death

Principal and Agent

☞ Purpose and Terms of and Consideration for Sale or Conveyance

Certificates of deposit purchased under power of attorney by beneficiary with testatrix' funds were assets of testatrix' estate, even though beneficiary was listed as trust beneficiary on one certificate and co-owner of other, where

power of attorney did not expressly authorize gift of testatrix' assets to beneficiary, and where testatrix did not document wish to make gift although she had ample opportunity to do so.

3 Cases that cite this headnote

[2] **Witnesses**

☞ Agency

Dead man's statute barred testimony of will beneficiary as to statements evidencing testatrix' intent to authorize gift to beneficiary under power of attorney. West's F.S.A. § 90.602.

4 Cases that cite this headnote

[3] **Executors and Administrators**

☞ Hostility or Adverse Interest

Personal representative who held conflicting and adverse interests against estate was required to be removed, where personal representative had purchased certificates of deposit under power of attorney for her own benefit with testatrix' funds, and where court found certificates were estate assets.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms

*57 Thomas W. Brown and Donna Houghton Thames of Brannon, Brown, Haley, Robinson & Cole, P.A., Lake City, for appellants.

*58 David D. Eastman of Parker, Skelding, Labasky & Conry, Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion

NIMMONS, Judge.

Appellants, beneficiaries of decedent Katherine V. Bell's will, appeal a final order denying their motion to compel production of estate assets or remove the personal representative, and finding two certificates of deposit are not estate assets. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

On January 7, 1985, Katherine V. Bell, also known as Virginia Bell, executed her last will and testament. In the will she bequeathed all funds remaining in her estate, after debts had been paid, to Oleta Johnson (a first cousin), Marywil Hunter Croson (a niece), William Miles Hunter, Jr. (a nephew), and Daniel Thomas Hunter (a nephew), to be divided equally among them. Bell also bequeathed her home, the land upon which it was situated, and all household furniture and fixtures to Oleta Johnson, and named Johnson personal representative. At the same time the will was drawn, Bell executed a power of attorney naming Oleta Johnson as attorney-in-fact. Both of these documents were executed approximately three weeks after Bell entered a nursing home where she remained until her death on February 21, 1989. There was no dispute that Ms. Bell was alert and mentally competent until a few weeks before she passed away.

On April 12, 1985, Johnson, using the power of attorney, purchased with \$37,000 of Bell's funds a certificate of deposit in that sum at the First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Live Oak. That CD was set up with Bell's name as "trustee" and Oleta Johnson as "beneficiary." On July 12, 1985, in a similar fashion, Johnson purchased with \$40,000 of Bell's funds another Certificate of Deposit at the Hamilton County Bank, n/k/a Barnett Bank. That CD was set up in the names of "Katherine V. Bell or Oleta Johnson."

Following Bell's death, Johnson filed a petition for administration and was appointed as personal representative. In an inventory filed by Johnson, the two CD's were referred to with the statement that, notwithstanding the names of the owners of the CD's as reflected on the certificates themselves, Johnson intended "that all of the principal and accrued interest of [the certificates] shall be a part of the estate assets."

The appellants objected to the appellee's accounting of funds and monies received or disbursed from the estate, so the trial court required a full and complete accounting of all the estate funds from the time Johnson became cosigner on any of the decedent's accounts or from January 1, 1985, whichever was first.

A special report prepared by a certified public accountant was submitted, but the appellants remained unsatisfied and filed another motion to compel the personal

representative to make a full and complete accounting of the decedent's funds, including receipts from interest on the certificates of deposit, income tax refunds, and rental income. At the hearing on the motion, Johnson testified that she and Bell, her cousin, enjoyed a close relationship for over twenty years and when Bell was ill, Johnson willingly took care of her and visited her in the nursing home at least three times a week. Johnson testified Bell gave her the interest checks on the certificates of deposit after reviewing them and Johnson, with her power of attorney, would sign Bell's name to them. Johnson also testified the tenants renting Bell's home simply made the rental checks out to Johnson per Bell's wishes. Johnson indicated none of the other beneficiaries were close to Bell and had visited only a few times in the previous forty years.

The trial judge denied the appellants' motion to compel and the appellants filed another motion to compel production of the assets or, in the alternative, to remove the personal representative. Johnson filed a motion to withdraw the certificates of deposit from the estate's assets. In the trial court's order, the appellants' motion was denied and the certificates of deposit, the decedent's house, and all rental income associated with it were found to be the personal property of Johnson.

*59 The appellants raise three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in finding the two certificates of deposit were not estate assets; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the appellants' motion to compel a full and complete accounting; and (3) whether the trial court erred in not removing the personal representative based on a conflict of interest.

According to *Johnson v. Fraccacreta*, 348 So.2d 570 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), a general power of attorney does not give the agent authority to make a gift of the principal's property. A conveyance that exceeds the scope of the power of attorney is void. In *Fraccacreta*, the decedent owned real property and, several months before her death, executed a power of attorney appointing her daughter as attorney-in-fact. The daughter used her power of attorney to execute a warranty deed conveying the decedent's property to the decedent and her husband as tenants by the entireties. The administrator ad litem brought the action contending the power of attorney did not authorize the attorney-in-fact/agent to make a gift. The court agreed and held that in construing an instrument creating a power of attorney, the court must look to the language of the

instrument and that an agent has no power to make a gift of the principal's property unless that power is expressly conferred by the instrument or unless such power arises as a necessary implication from the powers which are expressly conferred.

[1] [2] The power of attorney executed by Ms. Bell in the case at bar is devoid of any language purporting to authorize Johnson to use Ms. Bell's funds to purchase certificates of deposit in such a way as to create an individual pecuniary interest in Johnson. Furthermore, there were no witnesses to any oral agreement that may have existed between Bell and Johnson. Johnson is precluded, pursuant to the Dead Man's Statute,¹ from testifying as to any statements Bell may have made evidencing her intent to authorize Johnson to appropriate Bell's property for Johnson's own use and benefit.

Under *Hodges v. Surratt*, 366 So.2d 768 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), the court held the attorney-in-fact for the decedent violated her fiduciary duty by transferring the principal's property to her husband and appropriating funds in the checking account for her own use absent clear language in the power of attorney authorizing such actions.

Hodges was cited with approval in *Krevatas v. Wright*, 518 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Krevatas was a close friend and neighbor of Mrs. Fambrough, a childless widow with no local relatives. Mrs. Fambrough executed a power of attorney designating Krevatas attorney-in-fact and delivered it to him three years later. Approximately three weeks before she died, Fambrough changed her checking account, the balance of which never exceeded \$6,000, to a survivorship account, adding Krevatas' name. She also, via her will, left \$20,000 and her car to Krevatas, and during her last few weeks, signed documents making gifts to Krevatas and others. Krevatas used the power of attorney to transfer \$100,000 into the survivorship account from her other accounts and altered existing CD's totalling \$25,000 so that he and one of Mrs. Fambrough's nieces would have survivorship rights.

The court noted an absence of evidence indicating Mrs. Fambrough participated in the transfer of money into her checking account or the creation of survivorship interests in her certificates of deposit. Additionally, the court found Mrs. Fambrough did not intend to give Krevatas more money than was in the checking account at the time she changed it to a survivorship account. This apparent lack

of intent was based on the fact that Mrs. Fambrough documented a gift to Krevatas in the last few weeks of her life while she was still alert when she easily could have documented her desire for him to have the money. The court found that neither the power of attorney itself nor the circumstances surrounding the execution of the document demonstrated an express or implied authority for Krevatas to use the power for his personal benefit.

*60 In the case at bar, the facts indicate that the will and the power of attorney were executed approximately three weeks after Ms. Bell entered a nursing home where she remained alert for several years prior to her death in 1989. She had ample opportunity to document in writing her wishes regarding the disposition of her estate assets. However, the language of the power of attorney does not expressly authorize Johnson to make a gift of Bell's assets for her own personal benefit, nor does the will evidence Bell's intent for Johnson to have the funds. Further, there is no evidence of implied authorization from the circumstances surrounding the execution of the documents. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's finding that the two certificates of deposit were not estate assets.²

[3] In reversing the first issue, we must also reverse the third issue. According to Section 733.504(9), Florida Statutes, a personal representative may be removed for holding or acquiring conflicting or adverse interests against the estate which will adversely interfere with the administration of the estate as a whole. In holding that the certificates of deposit are to be considered estate assets, a conflict between the personal representative and the estate is created, requiring Johnson's removal as personal representative.

We affirm as to the second issue, since the trial court did not err in failing to compel a full and complete accounting. It is obvious from the record that the appellee testified as to the whereabouts of the funds the appellants claim are unaccounted for. The trial court did not err in refusing to order another accounting.

Accordingly, we reverse in part and affirm in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

SMITH and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.

All Citations

573 So.2d 57, 16 Fla. L. Weekly 37

Footnotes

1

Section 90.602, Florida Statutes.

2

The trial court's order relied in part upon Section 658.56, Florida Statutes. However, that section has no application to the case at bar because Bell had nothing to do with the purchase of the two CD's.

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EXHIBIT E

West's Florida Statutes Annotated
Title XLII. Estates and Trusts (Chapters 731-740) (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 731. Probate Code: General Provisions (Refs & Annos)
Part II. Definitions

West's F.S.A. § 731.201

731.201. General definitions

Effective: October 1, 2013

Currentness

Subject to additional definitions in subsequent chapters that are applicable to specific chapters or parts, and unless the context otherwise requires, in this code, in s. 409.9101, and in chapters 736, 738, 739, and 744, the term:

(1) "Authenticated," when referring to copies of documents or judicial proceedings required to be filed with the court under this code, means a certified copy or a copy authenticated according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(2) "Beneficiary" means heir at law in an intestate estate and devisee in a testate estate. The term "beneficiary" does not apply to an heir at law or a devisee after that person's interest in the estate has been satisfied. In the case of a devise to an existing trust or trustee, or to a trust or trustee described by will, the trustee is a beneficiary of the estate. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the beneficiary of the trust is not a beneficiary of the estate of which that trust or the trustee of that trust is a beneficiary. However, if each trustee is also a personal representative of the estate, each qualified beneficiary of the trust as defined in s. 736.0103 shall be regarded as a beneficiary of the estate.

(3) "Child" includes a person entitled to take as a child under this code by intestate succession from the parent whose relationship is involved, and excludes any person who is only a stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild, or a more remote descendant.

(4) "Claim" means a liability of the decedent, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, and funeral expense. The term does not include an expense of administration or estate, inheritance, succession, or other death taxes.

(5) "Clerk" means the clerk or deputy clerk of the court.

(6) "Collateral heir" means an heir who is related to the decedent through a common ancestor but who is not an ancestor or descendant of the decedent.

(7) "Court" means the circuit court.

(8) "Curator" means a person appointed by the court to take charge of the estate of a decedent until letters are issued.

(9) "Descendant" means a person in any generational level down the applicable individual's descending line and includes children, grandchildren, and more remote descendants. The term "descendant" is synonymous with the terms "lineal descendant" and "issue" but excludes collateral heirs.

(10) "Devise," when used as a noun, means a testamentary disposition of real or personal property and, when used as a verb, means to dispose of real or personal property by will or trust. The term includes "gift," "give," "bequeath," "bequest," and "legacy." A devise is subject to charges for debts, expenses, and taxes as provided in this code, the will, or the trust.

(11) "Devisee" means a person designated in a will or trust to receive a devise. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, in the case of a devise to an existing trust or trustee, or to a trust or trustee of a trust described by will, the trust or trustee, rather than the beneficiaries of the trust, is the devisee. However, if each trustee is also a personal representative of the estate, each qualified beneficiary of the trust as defined in s. 736.0103 shall be regarded as a devisee.

(12) "Distributee" means a person who has received estate property from a personal representative or other fiduciary other than as a creditor or purchaser. A testamentary trustee is a distributee only to the extent of distributed assets or increments to them remaining in the trustee's hands. A beneficiary of a testamentary trust to whom the trustee has distributed property received from a personal representative is a distributee. For purposes of this provision, "testamentary trustee" includes a trustee to whom assets are transferred by will, to the extent of the devised assets.

(13) "Domicile" means a person's usual place of dwelling and shall be synonymous with residence.

(14) "Estate" means the property of a decedent that is the subject of administration.

(15) "Exempt property" means the property of a decedent's estate which is described in s. 732.402.

(16) "File" means to file with the court or clerk.

(17) "Foreign personal representative" means a personal representative of another state or a foreign country.

(18) "Formal notice" means a form of notice that is described in and served by a method of service provided under rule 5.040(a) of the Florida Probate Rules.

(19) "Grantor" means one who creates or adds to a trust and includes "settlor" or "trustor" and a testator who creates or adds to a trust.

(20) "Heirs" or "heirs at law" means those persons, including the surviving spouse, who are entitled under the statutes of intestate succession to the property of a decedent.

(21) "Incapacitated" means a judicial determination that a person lacks the capacity to manage at least some of the person's property or to meet at least some of the person's essential health and safety requirements. A minor shall be treated as being incapacitated.

(22) "Informal notice" or "notice" means a method of service for pleadings or papers as provided under rule 5.040(b) of the Florida Probate Rules.

(23) "Interested person" means any person who may reasonably be expected to be affected by the outcome of the particular proceeding involved. In any proceeding affecting the estate or the rights of a beneficiary in the estate, the personal representative of the estate shall be deemed to be an interested person. In any proceeding affecting the expenses of the administration and obligations of a decedent's estate, or any claims described in s. 733.702(1), the trustee of a trust described in s. 733.707(3) is an interested person in the administration of the grantor's estate. The term does not include a beneficiary who has received complete distribution. The meaning, as it relates to particular persons, may vary from time to time and must be determined according to the particular purpose of, and matter involved in, any proceedings.

(24) "Letters" means authority granted by the court to the personal representative to act on behalf of the estate of the decedent and refers to what has been known as letters testamentary and letters of administration. All letters shall be designated "letters of administration."

(25) "Minor" means a person under 18 years of age whose disabilities have not been removed by marriage or otherwise.

(26) "Other state" means any state of the United States other than Florida and includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession subject to the legislative authority of the United States.

(27) "Parent" excludes any person who is only a stepparent, foster parent, or grandparent.

(28) "Personal representative" means the fiduciary appointed by the court to administer the estate and refers to what has been known as an administrator, administrator cum testamento annexo, administrator de bonis non, ancillary administrator, ancillary executor, or executor.

(29) "Petition" means a written request to the court for an order.

(30) "Power of appointment" means an authority, other than as an incident of the beneficial ownership of property, to designate recipients of beneficial interests in property.

(31) "Probate of will" means all steps necessary to establish the validity of a will and to admit a will to probate.

(32) "Property" means both real and personal property or any interest in it and anything that may be the subject of ownership.

731.201. General definitions, FL ST § 731.201

(33) "Protected homestead" means the property described in s. 4(a)(1), Art. X of the State Constitution on which at the death of the owner the exemption inures to the owner's surviving spouse or heirs under s. 4(b), Art. X of the State Constitution. For purposes of the code, real property owned in tenancy by the entireties or in joint tenancy with rights of survivorship is not protected homestead.

(34) "Residence" means a person's place of dwelling.

(35) "Residuary devise" means a devise of the assets of the estate which remain after the provision for any devise which is to be satisfied by reference to a specific property or type of property, fund, sum, or statutory amount. If the will contains no devise which is to be satisfied by reference to a specific property or type of property, fund, sum, or statutory amount, "residuary devise" or "residue" means a devise of all assets remaining after satisfying the obligations of the estate.

(36) "Security" means a security as defined in s. 517.021.

(37) "Security interest" means a security interest as defined in s. 671.201.

(38) "Trust" means an express trust, private or charitable, with additions to it, wherever and however created. It also includes a trust created or determined by a judgment or decree under which the trust is to be administered in the manner of an express trust. "Trust" excludes other constructive trusts, and it excludes resulting trusts; conservatorships; custodial arrangements pursuant to the Florida Uniform Transfers to Minors Act;¹ business trusts providing for certificates to be issued to beneficiaries; common trust funds; land trusts under s. 689.071, except to the extent provided in s. 689.071(7); trusts created by the form of the account or by the deposit agreement at a financial institution; voting trusts; security arrangements; liquidation trusts; trusts for the primary purpose of paying debts, dividends, interest, salaries, wages, profits, pensions, or employee benefits of any kind; and any arrangement under which a person is nominee or escrowee for another.

(39) "Trustee" includes an original, additional, surviving, or successor trustee, whether or not appointed or confirmed by court.

(40) "Will" means an instrument, including a codicil, executed by a person in the manner prescribed by this code, which disposes of the person's property on or after his or her death and includes an instrument which merely appoints a personal representative or revokes or revises another will.

Credits

Laws 1974, c. 74-106, § 1; Laws 1975, c. 75-220, § 4; Laws 1977, c. 77-174, § 1; Laws 1985, c. 85-79, § 2; Laws 1987, c. 87-226, § 66; Laws 1988, c. 88-340, § 1; Laws 1993, c. 93-257, § 7. Amended by Laws 1995, c. 95-401, § 6, eff. July 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 97-102, § 949, eff. July 1, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 98-421, § 52, eff. July 1, 1998; Laws 2001, c. 2001-226, § 11, eff. Jan. 1, 2002; Laws 2002, c. 2002-1, § 106, eff. May 21, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 2003-154, § 2, eff. June 12, 2003; Laws 2005, c. 2005-108, § 2, eff. July 1, 2005; Laws 2006, c. 2006-217, § 29, eff. July 1, 2007; Laws 2007, c. 2007-74, § 3, eff. July 1, 2007; Laws 2007, c. 2007-153, § 8, eff. July 1, 2007; Laws 2009, c. 2009-115, § 1, eff. July 1, 2009; Laws 2010, c. 2010-132, § 4, eff. Oct. 1, 2010; Laws 2012, c. 2012-109, § 1, eff. July 1, 2012; Laws 2013, c. 2013-172, § 16, eff. Oct. 1, 2013.

Editors' Notes

APPLICABILITY

<The introductory language to § 1 of Laws 2012, c. 2012-109, provides:>

<“Effective July 1, 2012, and applicable to proceedings pending before or commenced on or after July 1, 2012, subsection (33) of section 731.201, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:”>

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Footnotes

1

See § 710.101 et seq.

West's F. S. A. § 731.201, FL ST § 731.201

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EXHIBIT F

West's Florida Statutes Annotated

Title XLII. Estates and Trusts (Chapters 731-740) (Refs & Annos)

Chapter 733. Probate Code: Administration of Estates (Refs & Annos)

Part VI. Duties and Powers of Personal Representative

West's F.S.A. § 733.602

733.602. General duties

Effective: July 1, 2009

Currentness

(1) A personal representative is a fiduciary who shall observe the standards of care applicable to trustees. A personal representative is under a duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the decedent's will and this code as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate. A personal representative shall use the authority conferred by this code, the authority in the will, if any, and the authority of any order of the court, for the best interests of interested persons, including creditors.

(2) A personal representative shall not be liable for any act of administration or distribution if the act was authorized at the time. Subject to other obligations of administration, a probated will is authority to administer and distribute the estate according to its terms. An order of appointment of a personal representative is authority to distribute apparently intestate assets to the heirs of the decedent if, at the time of distribution, the personal representative is not aware of a proceeding challenging intestacy or a proceeding questioning the appointment or fitness to continue. Nothing in this section affects the duty of the personal representative to administer and distribute the estate in accordance with the rights of interested persons.

Credits

Laws 1974, c. 74-106, § 1; Laws 1975, c. 75-220, § 74; Laws 1977, c. 77-87, § 27; Laws 1977, c. 77-174, § 1; Laws 1979, c. 79-400, § 270; Laws 1989, c. 89-340, § 3. Amended by Laws 1997, c. 97-102, § 1001, eff. July 1, 1997; Laws 2001, c. 2001-226, § 125, eff. Jan. 1, 2002; Laws 2006, c. 2006-217, § 37, eff. July 1, 2007; Laws 2009, c. 2009-115, § 11, eff. July 1, 2009.

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EXHIBIT G

West's Florida Statutes Annotated
Title XLII. Estates and Trusts (Chapters 731-740) (Refs & Annos)
Title 42-Appendix I Probate Rules (Refs & Annos)
Part II. Probate

Fla.Prob.R. Rule **5.440**

Rule **5.440**. Proceedings for Removal of Personal Representative

Currentness

(a) Commencement of Proceeding. The court on its own motion may remove, or any interested person by petition may commence a proceeding to remove, a personal representative. A petition for removal shall state the facts constituting the grounds upon which removal is sought, and shall be filed in the court having jurisdiction over the administration of the estate.

(b) Accounting. A removed personal representative shall file an accounting within 30 days after removal.

(c) Delivery of Records and Property. A removed personal representative shall, immediately after removal or within such time prescribed by court order, deliver to the remaining personal representative or to the successor fiduciary all of the records of the estate and all of the property of the estate.

(d) Failure to File Accounting or Deliver Records and Property. If a removed personal representative fails to file an accounting or fails to deliver all property of the estate and all estate records under the control of the removed personal representative to the remaining personal representative or to the successor fiduciary within the time prescribed by this rule or by court order, the removed personal representative shall be subject to contempt proceedings.

Credits

Amended Sept. 4, 1980, effective Jan. 1, 1981 (387 So.2d 949); Sept. 13, 1984, effective Jan. 1, 1985 (458 So.2d 1079); Sept. 29, 1988, effective Jan. 1, 1989 (537 So.2d 500); Sept. 24, 1992, effective Jan. 1, 1993 (607 So.2d 1306); May 2, 2002 (824 So.2d 849); July 12, 2007 (964 So.2d 140); Dec. 9, 2010 (51 So.3d 1146).

Editors' Notes

COMMITTEE NOTES

The revision of subdivision (a) of this rule by the addition of its final phrase represents a rule implementation of the procedure found in section 733.505, Florida Statutes. It is not intended to change the effect of the statute from which it was derived but has been reformatted to conform with the structure of these rules. It is not intended to create a new procedure or modify an existing procedure.

Rule History

1980 Revision: Subdivision (a) amended to require formal notice to interested persons and to delete requirement that court give directions as to mode of notice. Surety authorized to petition for removal.

1984 Revision: Editorial changes. Provisions in prior rule for contempt have been deleted since the court has the inherent power to punish for contempt. Committee notes revised.

1988 Revision: Last phrase of (a) added to implement the procedure found in section 733.505, Florida Statutes. Subdivision (b) amended to parallel interim accounting rules. Deletes ability to extend time to file and adds reference to court power to punish for contempt. Committee notes expanded. Editorial changes. Citation form changes in committee notes.

1992 Revision: Editorial changes. Committee notes revised. Citation form changes in committee notes.

2002 Revision: Entire rule amended. Contents of accountings by removed fiduciaries are now governed by rule 5.346. Editorial changes in (a), (c), and (d). Committee notes revised.

2003 Revision: Committee notes revised.

2007 Revision: Committee notes revised.

2010 Revision: Editorial change in title to clarify scope of rule.

2012 Revision: Committee notes revised.

Statutory References

§ 731.201(23), Fla. Stat. General definitions.

§ 733.504, Fla. Stat. Removal of personal representative; causes of removal.

§ 733.505, Fla. Stat. Jurisdiction in removal proceedings.

§ 733.506, Fla. Stat. Proceedings for removal.

§ 733.5061, Fla. Stat. Appointment of successor upon removal.

§ 733.508, Fla. Stat. Accounting and discharge of removed personal representatives upon removal.

§ 733.509, Fla. Stat. Surrender of assets upon removal.

Rule References

Fla. Prob. R. 5.020 Pleadings; verification; motions.

Fla. Prob. R. 5.025 Adversary proceedings.

Fla. Prob. R. 5.040 Notice.

Fla. Prob. R. 5.041 Service of pleadings and documents.

Fla. Prob. R. 5.042 Time.

Fla. Prob. R. 5.150 Order requiring accounting.

Fla. Prob. R. 5.310 Disqualification of personal representative; notification.

Fla. Prob. R. 5.345 Accountings other than personal representatives' final accountings.

Fla. Prob. R. 5.346 Fiduciary accounting.

Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.516 Service of pleadings and documents.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Forms

Florida Pleading and Practice Forms § 53:64, Petition--To Remove Personal Representative [§§ 733.504 to 733.506, Fla. Stat.; Fla. Prob. R. **5.440**].

Florida Pleading and Practice Forms § 53:66, Petition--By Interested Party--Maladministration [§ 733.504(5), Fla. Stat.; Fla. Prob. R. **5.440**].

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West's F.S.A. Title 42, App. 1, Prob. Rule **5.440**, FL ST PROB Rule **5.440**

Florida Supreme Court Rules of Civil Procedure, Judicial Administration, Criminal Procedure, Civil Procedure for Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators, Worker's Compensation, Probate, Traffic Court, Small Claims, Juvenile Procedure, Appellate Procedure, Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators, Court Appointed Arbitrators, Family Law, Certification and Regulation of Court Reporters, Certification of Spoken Language Interpreters, and Qualified and Court-Appointing Parenting Coordinators are current with amendments received through 06/01/16. All other State Court Rules are current with amendments received through 06/01/16.

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