

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS  
EASTERN DIVISION

SIMON BERNSTEIN IRREVOCABLE )  
INSURANCE TRUST DTD 6/21/95, )  
by Ted S. Bernstein, )

Plaintiff, )

v. )

HERITAGE UNION LIFE INSURANCE )  
COMPANY, )

Defendant, )

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HERITAGE UNION LIFE INSURANCE )  
COMPANY )

Counter-Plaintiff )

v. )

SIMON BERNSTEIN IRREVOCABLE )  
TRUST DTD 6/21/95 )

Counter-Defendant )

and, )

FIRST ARLINGTON NATIONAL BANK )  
as Trustee of S.B. Lexington, Inc. Employee )  
Death Benefit Trust, UNITED BANK OF )  
ILLINOIS, BANK OF AMERICA, )  
Successor in interest to LaSalle National )  
Trust, N.A., SIMON BERNSTEIN TRUST, )  
N.A., TED BERNSTEIN, individually and )  
as purported Tstee of the Simon Bernstein )  
Irrevocable Insurance Trust Dtd 6/21/95, )  
and ELIOT BERNSTEIN )  
Third-Party Defendants. )

Case No. 13 cv 3643  
Honorable Amy J. St. Eve  
Magistrate Mary M. Rowland

PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM OF LAW  
IN OPPOSITION TO ESTATE OF SIMON  
BERNSTEIN'S MOTION TO  
INTERVENE

EXHIBIT   D

ELIOT IVAN BERNSTEIN,

Cross-Plaintiff

v.

TED BERNSTEIN, individually and  
as alleged Trustee of the Simon Bernstein  
Irrevocable Insurance Trust Dtd, 6/21/95

Cross-Defendant

and,

PAMELA B. SIMON, DAVID B.SIMON,  
both Professionally and Personally  
ADAM SIMON, both Professionally and  
Personally, THE SIMON LAW FIRM,  
TESCHER & SPALLINA, P.A.,  
DONALD TESCHER, both Professionally  
and Personally, ROBERT SPALLINA,  
both Professionally and Personally,  
LISA FRIEDSTEIN, JILL IANTONI  
S.B. LEXINGTON, INC. EMPLOYEE  
DEATH BENEFIT TRUST, S.T.P.  
ENTERPRISES, INC. S.B. LEXINGTON,  
INC., NATIONAL SERVICE  
ASSOCIATION (OF FLORIDA),  
NATIONAL SERVICE ASSOCIATION  
(OF ILLINOIS) AND JOHN AND JANE  
DOES

Third-Party Defendants.

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**NOW COMES** Plaintiffs, SIMON BERNSTEIN IRREVOCABLE INSURANCE TRUST dtd 6/21/95, by TED BERNSTEIN, as Trustee, (collectively referred to as “BERNSTEIN TRUST”), TED BERNSTEIN, individually, PAMELA B. SIMON, JILL IANTONI AND LISA FRIEDSTEIN, and state as their Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Estate of Simon Bernstein’s Motion to Intervene as follows:

### INTRODUCTION

On January 14, 2014, this court entered an Order denying the motion to intervene of William Stansbury -- a potential creditor of the Estate of Simon Bernstein. In so doing, the court found that allowing Stansbury to intervene would (i) “not serve the interests of judicial economy and would unduly prejudice the present parties to this lawsuit”, and (ii) “unduly delay the determination of the beneficiaries of the life insurance policy at issue in this lawsuit.”<sup>1</sup>

Now, six months later, Stansbury seeks a second bite at the apple. Stansbury petitioned the Florida Probate Court to have an administrator ad litem appointed on behalf of the “Estate” to further Stansbury’s own agenda against the express wishes of decedent, Simon Bernstein. In fact, had Stansbury’s motion been granted in its entirety by the Florida court, Stansbury himself would have been appointed administrator ad litem. Instead, the Florida Court appointed the Curator (Mr. Brown) as administrator ad litem, but that appointment was expressly made subject to the conditions placed on the record in the Probate Court which will be discussed later.

What will become apparent is that this motion is a motion of the Estate in name only. This court should apply the law of the case established by its January 14<sup>th</sup> Order to deny Stansbury’s second effort to intervene in this lawsuit.

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<sup>1</sup> Order entered January 14, 2014 [Dkt. #110].

### **FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

1. After this court denied Stansbury's first motion to intervene, Stansbury filed a petition in the Florida Probate Court to have himself appointed as administrator ad litem.<sup>2</sup>

2. Benjamin Brown had been appointed curator of the Estate of Simon Bernstein following the resignation of the Estate's personal representative.

3. During the hearing counsel for the various interested parties in the probate matter, either objected to the appointment of any administrator ad litem so as to preserve estate assets, and/or objected to the appointment of William Stansbury. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Florida Court ultimately appointed Benjamin Brown to act as administrator ad litem.

4. As stated in the Probate Court's Order appointing Benjamin Brown, such appointment was made subject to the conditions that were made part of the record during the hearing.<sup>3</sup>

5. During the hearing on the motions, the discourse between counsel for the various interested parties and the judge made it clear that the instant motion to intervene would only occur with the legal fees and costs being funded not by the Estate, but by William Stansbury.<sup>4</sup>

6. One condition demanded by William Stansbury since he was funding this excursion was that he be kept advised by the Curator and his counsel and have input with how this litigation is prosecuted.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> See Transcript of Hearing on petition to appoint administrator ad litem in the matter of the Estate of Simon Bernstein at pg. 5-6. A true and accurate copy of the transcript is attached hereto as **Exh. A**. See

<sup>3</sup> See Probate Court Order attached to the Estate's motion to intervene as **Exhibit B** (Dkt. # ).

<sup>4</sup> See Transcript of Hearing on petition to appoint administrator ad litem in the matter of the Estate of Simon Bernstein. **Exh. A**, pg. 13-14, 34-35, 39.

<sup>5</sup> See Transcript, **Exh. A** at pg. 28-29.

7. The sole factual basis asserted by the Estate for its motion to intervene is set forth in its Complaint for Intervenor as follows: “Intervenor Benjamin Brown seeks a judgment from this Court declaring that *no* valid beneficiary is named under the Policy and the proceeds of the Policy must therefore be paid to the Estate.”

8. It has been over six months since the court entered its Order denying Stansbury’s motion. Stansbury chose not to pursue any motion for reconsideration or appellate review of the Order. Instead, Stansbury initiated and funded the Estate’s motion to intervene.

9. The Insurer, in response to a Notice for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition provided the Affidavit of its witness, Don Sanders.<sup>6</sup> A true and correct copy of the Aff. of Don Sanders is attached hereto as **Exh. B**.

10. At the time of the making of his Affidavit, Don Sanders was familiar with the Insurer’s Policy records. (Aff. of Don Sanders, **Exh. B** at ¶33).

11. According to the Policy records as verified by Don Sanders, no owner of the Policy ever submitted a beneficiary designation which designated “Simon Bernstein’s estate” or “the Estate” as beneficiary. (Aff. of Don Sanders, **Exh. B** at ¶70).

12. According to the Policy records as verified by Don Sanders, “on the date of death of Simon Bernstein, the Owner of the Policy was Simon Bernstein, the primary beneficiary was designated as ‘LaSalle National Trust, N.A. as Successor Trustee’, and the Contingent Beneficiary was designated as ‘Simon Bernstein Irrevocable Insurance Trust dated June 21, 1995.’ ” (Aff. of Don Sanders, **Exh. B** at ¶62).

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<sup>6</sup> The Affidavit of Donald Sanders is attached hereto and made a part hereof as **Exh. B**.

### STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court must grant a motion to intervene as a matter of right if: (1) the petition is timely filed; (2) the representation by the parties already in the suit is inadequate; and (3) the party seeking intervention has a sufficient interest in the suit.

In order to show inadequacy of representation, for purposes of a motion to intervene as of right, one must not engage in speculation, but rather allege specific facts demonstrating a right to intervene. *In re Marriage of Vondra*, 2013 Ill. App. (1<sup>st</sup>) 123025, 373 Ill. Dec. 620, 994 N.E.2<sup>nd</sup> 105 (1<sup>st</sup> Dist., 2013).

This court's summary of the standard of review for a motion to intervene included the following:

“Whether an applicant has a sufficient interest to intervene is a highly fact-specific making comparison to other cases of limited value.” “Permissive intervention under Rule 24(b), permits “anyone to intervene who... has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact,” unless intervention would “*unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties rights.*”<sup>7</sup> (emphasis added).

### ARGUMENT

**A. This court should apply the law of the case to bar the Estate's motion to intervene since the Estate is in privity with Stansbury whose own motion to intervene was previously denied in this same litigation.**

Over six months ago, this Court denied Stansbury's motion to intervene. The holding was based, in part, on the tenuousness of the connection between the instant litigation over the Policy proceeds and Stansbury's claims pending in Florida against certain corporate defendants' and the Estate of Simon Bernstein relating to unpaid insurance commissions. The court rejected both of Stansbury's arguments for intervention as a matter of right, and for permissive intervention. Stansbury did not file any motion to reconsider or seek appellate review.

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<sup>7</sup> See Order of January 14, 2014 [Dkt. #110]

The basis for Stansbury's motion to intervene was identical to that set forth by the Estate in the instant motion to intervene. Both Stansbury and the Estate argue that the Estate's purported interest in the Policy proceeds is solely as a beneficiary of last resort. Neither Stansbury nor the Estate set forth any affirmative argument or evidence attempting to establish that the Estate was the named beneficiary of the Policy proceeds.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to avoid relitigation of a substantially similar issue arising between the same parties (or their privies) where such issue has already been determined in the course of a separate proceeding. *Rekhi v. Wildwood Industries, Inc.*, 61 F.3d 1313, 130 Lab Cas. P57, 969, 2 Wage & Hour Cas.2d 1428 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir., 1995).

The doctrine of law of the case also applies to avoid relitigation of substantially similar issues but in the *same* proceeding. In *Radwill v. Manor Care of Westmont, IL LLC*, 2013 IL App (2d) 120957, 369 Ill. Dec. 452, 986 N.E.2d 765 (2<sup>nd</sup> Dist., 2013), the court explained the rationale behind the law of the case doctrine as follows:

"The law-of-the-case doctrine protects the parties' settled expectations, ensures uniformity of decisions, maintains consistency during the course of a single case, effectuates proper administration of justice, and brings litigation to an end. *Petre v. Kucich*, 356 Ill.App.3d 57, 63, 291 Ill.Dec 867, 824 N.E.2d 1117 (2005). Thus, the doctrine bars relitigation of an issue previously decided in the same case. *Long v. Elborno*, 397 Ill.App.3d 982, 989, 337 Ill.Dec. 432, 922 N.E.2d 555 (2010). Issues previously decided include issues of both law and fact. *Alwin v. Village of Wheeling*, 371 Ill.App.3d 898, 910, 309 Ill.Dec. 656, 864 N.E.2d 897 (2007).

As set forth in the transcript of the Probate hearing appointing the Curator as administrator ad litem, the Estate, in this instance, is in privity with Stansbury. It is a matter of public record that Stansbury is funding this venture, and was granted direct involvement in litigating this matter under the auspices of the "Estate".

The arguments set forth by the Estate mirror those contained in the prior motion made by Stansbury. Because the issues, and arguments are virtually identical, and the moving party (the Estate) is in privity with the prior movant (Stansbury), the law of the case must apply to bar relitigation of this issue. The court spoke in its Order of January 14, 2014, and nothing contained in the Estate's motion or complaint to intervene necessitates revisiting the issue.

**B. The unrefuted sworn testimony of Don Sanders, Vice-President of Operations for the Insurer both supports Plaintiff's claim that it is the named beneficiary of the Policy proceeds and negates the Estate's claims. (go through the Paragraphs and cite in the statement of unrefuted facts).**

As indicated in Plaintiffs' Statement of Undisputed Facts, the Insurer has provided its Policy records and the Affidavit of Don Sanders as evidence in this case. Don Sanders reviewed the Policy records and in his Affidavit Don Sanders declares that the Estate was never named a beneficiary of the Policy proceeds. The Estate has offered nothing to dispute this essential truth.

**C. The Estate's motion to intervene is not based on any actual claim it has upon the Stake, instead it is based solely on efforts to negate the claims of the true beneficiary.**

As stated above, the Estate's motion to intervene is not based on any allegation of its own claim to the Stake. Rather, the motion merely attempts to negate the claim of the Bernstein Trust by baldly asserting that the trust does not exist because a trust agreement cannot be located.



In an interpleader action each claimant has the burden of establishing its entitlement to the Stake, and it is insufficient to negate or rely on the weakness of the claims of others. *Eskridge v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co.*, 250 Ill.App.3d 603 at 608-609, 190 Ill.Dec. 295, 621 N.E.2d 164 (1<sup>st</sup> Dist., 1983).

Here, the Estate argues that no one is representing its interests. But, the Estate, like Stansbury before it, fails to articulate any facts that support an affirmative claim by the Estate to the Stake.

The Estate argues that if all other claims are negated and thus fail then the Estate would have a claim by default. As such, the Estate needs no representation because under the Estate's theory it would simply be the beneficiary of last resort.

More importantly, in order to enforce the intent of Simon Bernstein as expressed in his Will, the Curator or Personal Representative of the Estate should be disclaiming any interest in the Stake. Instead, the Curator seeks to ignore the Will of the Simon Bernstein in order to unjustly enrich the Estate largely for the benefit and at the behest of a potential third-party creditor, and at the expense of the ultimate beneficiaries, decedent's five children. That's just plain wrong.

In Stansbury's prior motion to intervene, he attached the Petition filed by the Executors of the Estate admitting the Will to Probate in Palm Beach County, Florida, and the Petition includes a copy of the Last Will of Simon Bernstein (the "Will").

The Will was incorporated as an Exhibit in support of Stansbury's motion yet the Will itself contains a provision wherein Simon Bernstein reaffirms his beneficiary designations. The Will states in pertinent part as follows:

**Other Beneficiary Designations.** Except as otherwise explicitly and with particularity provided herein (a) no provision of this Will shall revoke or modify any beneficiary designation of mine made by me and not revoked by me prior to my death under any individual retirement account, other retirement plan or account, or annuity or *insurance contract*; (b) I hereby reaffirm any such beneficiary designation such that any assets held in such account, plan, or contract shall pass in accordance with such designation, and (c) regardless of anything herein to the contrary, any such assets which would otherwise pass pursuant to this Will due to the beneficiary designation not having met the requirements for a valid testamentary disposition under applicable law or otherwise shall be paid as a gift made hereunder to the persons in the manner provided in such designation which is incorporated herein by reference.<sup>8</sup>

Here, the designations of beneficiary of the Policy proceeds point directly to one such beneficiary which is the Bernstein Trust. Simon Bernstein designated the Bernstein Trust as beneficiary of the VEBA, and the VEBA Trustee was always designated as the primary beneficiary of the Policy proceeds. The contingent but sole surviving beneficiary of the Policy proceeds as of the date of Simon Bernstein's Death was the Bernstein Trust itself. Since the VEBA had been previously dissolved, the Policy proceeds are payable to the Bernstein Trust. None of the Bank Defendants whose names appear in the caption above, and whom acted as corporate trustees of the VEBA from to time has made a claim to the Stake. In fact, the only Bank party to have appeared in this matter was dismissed on their own motion after having expressly disclaimed any such interest.<sup>9</sup>

In his Will, Simon Bernstein instructs the executor to disclaims the Estate's interest in the Policy proceeds at issue. Simon Bernstein's instructions were that in the case of an invalid testamentary disposition the instrument designating the beneficiary shall be incorporated into the Will and the proceeds shall be gifted to the intended beneficiaries as established by the beneficiary designation.

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<sup>8</sup> See (Dkt. #56-5, at pg. 35 of 41, Stansbury's Intervenor Complaint, Exh. B, Will of Simon Bernstein at p.6)

<sup>9</sup> See Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by JPMorgan Bank, and the Order dismissing JP Morgan . (Dkts. #102 and #106).

Here, it is clear that Simon Bernstein expressed his intent by named the Bernstein Trust as beneficiary of the Policy proceeds, that the Policy proceeds should go to the Bernstein Trust beneficiaries (the five Bernstein children) even in the event that the beneficiary designation is ruled to be an invalid testamentary disposition such as the Estate argues.

**D. As set forth above, the Estate's motion to intervene is not based on any actual claim it has upon the Stake, instead it is based solely on his efforts to negate the claims of the true beneficiary of the Stake.**

The Estate's motion to intervene is not based on any allegation of its own claim to the Stake. Rather, the Estate attempts to negate the claim of the Bernstein Trust by baldly asserting that the trust does not exist because a trust agreement cannot be located.

In an interpleader action each claimant has the burden of establishing its entitlement to the Stake, and it is insufficient to negate or rely on the weakness of the claims of others. *Eskridge v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co.*, 250 Ill.App.3d 603 at 608-609, 190 Ill.Dec. 295, 621 N.E.2d 164 (1<sup>st</sup> Dist., 1983). Here, the Estate argues that no one is representing the claims of the Estate. But, the Estate fails to articulate any facts that support a claim by the Estate to the Stake.

It appears the Estate is arguing if all other claims are negated and thus fail then the Estate would have a claim by default. If that is the Estate's position, then the Estate needs no representation because under Stansbury's theory the Estate would simply be the beneficiary of last resort. Even this potential claim fails, as the Policy proceeds would likely pass by virtue of the laws of intestacy to the children of Simon Bernstein, as a last resort, and not through the Estate. Simon Bernstein, in his Will, expressly reaffirmed his beneficiary designations and in so doing he essentially disclaimed the Estate's interest in the Policy proceeds.

**E. Stansbury's unsupported assertion that the court should grant his motion to intervene based on Permissive Intervention under FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)(B) fails for similar reasons.**

The Estate's request for permissive intervention is based on its conclusory assertion that it "has a claim that shares with the main action a common question of law and fact, to wit, the proper disposition of the life insurance proceeds in excess of \$1,000,000.00."<sup>10</sup>

This language again mirrors the language in Stansbury's prior motion to intervene.<sup>11</sup> And like Stansbury, this conclusory allegation is totally unsupported by any evidence establishing a claim to the stake. Without any factual allegations of a claim, the court is left with nothing additional to determine as a result of the motion and complaint to intervene. Since the Estate has nothing to offer in support of its claim, there is no reason whatsoever for this court to add it to this litigation especially at this late date.

**F. Public policy concerns mitigate against the Estate's motion.**

Should the court grant the Estate's motion to intervene it will provide precedent to other similarly situated claimants who lack any factual basis for its claim. Allowing spurious claimants to participate in such litigation will only drive up costs, create needless delay and obfuscate matters for those with truly viable claims to the stake.

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<sup>10</sup> See Dkt. #110, Estate motion to intervene at ¶9.

<sup>11</sup> See Dkt. #56-5 at ¶9, Stansbury Motion to Intervene.

**CONCLUSION**

For all of the foregoing reasons (including the reasons set forth by this court in its prior Order of January 14, 2014) this court should deny the Estate's motion to intervene.

**By:** */s/Adam M. Simon*  
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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

The undersigned, an attorney, certifies that he caused a copy of the Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to the Estate of Simon Bernstein Motion to Intervene to be served upon the following persons and entities electronically by ECF notification and/or by US Mail (if so indicated):

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on the 28th day of June, 2014.

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