# IN THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA CASE NO: $502012 C P 004391 X X X X S B$ 

IN RE: THE ESTATE OF SIMON L. BERNSTEIN

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE
HONORABLE MARTIN COLIN

DATE: MAY 23, 2014

TIME: 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.

## 1 APPEARANCES :

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3 APPEARING ON BEHALF OF WILLIAM STANSBURY:

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8 APPEARING OF BEHALF OF TED BERNSTEIN:

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12 APPEARING ON BEHALF OF FOUR ADULT GRANDCHILDREN:

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16 APPEARING AS THE CURATOR:

17 BENJAMIN BROWN, ESQ.
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20 APPEARING PRO SE:

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BE IT REMEMBERED, that the following proceedings were taken in the above-styled cause before Honorable MARTIN COLIN at the Palm Beach County Courthouse, 200 West Atlantic Avenue, in the City of Delray Beach, County of Palm Beach, state of Florida, on Friday, the 23rd day of May, 2014, to wit:

THE COURT: Good morning. Let me get my computer on. We're here in the Bernstein case. Appearances.

MR. BERNSTEIN: Eliot Bernstein, pro se.

MR. FEAMAN: Peter Feaman on behalf of William Stansbury. And from my office, Jeff Royer .

MR. MORRISSEY: John Morrissey on behalf of four of the adult grandchildren.

MR. ROSE: Alan Rose on behalf of Ted Bernstein.

MR. BROWN: Ben Brown as curator of the estate.

THE COURT: All right. What do we have for today?

MR. ROSE: Before we get to that, I have
one -- sort of an important issue that came up last night.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. ROSE: It will take 30 seconds.

Ted Bernstein sent me an email. And he replied to an email, and accidently the email went to Eliot Bernstein. It was attorney-client privileged communication directly to me from my client Ted Bernstein. The email went to Eliot Bernstein. Under Rule 1.285 I sent to Mr. Eliot Bernstein an email immediately asking him to delete or return the privileged materials.

I discussed the issue with Mr. Eliot Bernstein this morning and he advised me that he has emailed the document to 2,000 people.

He's had a history of posting things on the internet. Because it's attorney-client privileged information it's very sensitive and I'd request the Court to instruct him to comply with Rule 1.285. It was a reply to an email that had a bunch of names and accidentally it went to him. Mr. Bernstein advised me immediately and I advised Eliot immediately. THE COURT: Mr. Bernstein, did you get an
email from counsel?
MR. BERNSTEIN: I did not get his email.
I got an email from my brother addressed to me only. I read it, as usual when I get something bizarre that's attacking and threatening me, or whatever. It was from Ted Bernstein to Eliot Bernstein.

THE COURT: It was from --
MR. BERNSTEIN: Ted Bernstein to Eliot Bernstein.

THE COURT: Not from the lawyer?
MR. BERNSTEIN: No. He misrepresents
everything.
THE COURT: We'll take it up at the end. There's other things scheduled. If you remember, we'll take it up.

MR. ROSE: Fine.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. FEAMAN: May it please the Court.
Peter Feaman, Your Honor, on behalf of William Stansbury, interested person in the estate.

This is Mr. Stansbury's petition for the appointment of an administrator ad litem which has been submitted to Your Honor together with a supplement to the petition to the requested
relief.
We're asking this Court to appoint Mr. Stansbury as an administrator ad litem of the estate for the sole purpose of making an appearance on behalf of the estate in some litigation that is currently pending in Illinois involving a life insurance policy on Simon Bernstein's life, the deceased, with a death benefit of $\$ 1.7$ million.

That litigation has been pending for over a year from what I can tell, or about a year. And it has not involved the estate which is very interesting because the documents that I've recently obtained since the filing of our motion, Your Honor, we found out that insurance policy, according to internal records of the insurance company, is actually owned by the deceased Simon Bernstein. So arguably not only is it an asset of the estate, that insurance policy, and the proceeds therefrom, but any litigation concerning the distribution of those proceeds should be in this court, Your Honor.

Now that's jumping ahead. But the point is that we're dealing with an asset of the estate and, therefore, this court has every
interest in seeing that the estate's assets are marshaled. The first step for that, Your Honor, would be to appoint an administrator ad litem to at least intervene in that federal court action that's up in Illinois.

The former personal representatives of this estate, Your Honor, were doing everything they could to keep the money out of the estate from that life insurance policy. They have alleged that the beneficiary is the life insurance trust. The problem is nobody can find the original life insurance trust. Nobody can find even a copy of the life insurance trust. And the records that we show show that the beneficiaries are not, in fact, a life insurance trust. But the first beneficiary, according to Heritage, which is the insurance company, is LaSalle National Trust. The second beneficiary is the Simon Bernstein Trust, whatever that is. But it's not the Simon Bernstein Irrevocable Insurance Trust that is being alleged up in Illinois.

Now if there's no clear beneficiary, as Your Honor is aware, then the life insurance proceeds would go to the estate and become an
asset, or liquid assets for the estate. Now that money presently has been put into the registry of the court up in Illinois by the insurance company. They were first requested by the personal representatives of this estate, the former, to pay it to others. And the insurance company said we don't have any documentation to justify that. So they just impleaded the funds. The litigation has been pending, and despite the fact that the estate is the owner of the policy, the estate has never been represented in that action. Now the estate has a high probability of success, we believe, in this case. Because if they're going to try to establish a lost instrument without the original or without a copy it's going to be based, I assume, on oral testimony from people. And that is a high burden. Interestingly we found out at first, on this so-called insurance trust, Mr. Spallina (phonetic), who was the personal representative, formerly, of this estate, represented to the insurance company that he was the trustee of this insurance trust. When that didn't work, Your Honor - we
have a document that we'll show to the court up in Chicago -- when that didn't work they're now in court up there saying that Mr . Ted Bernstein is the trustee, or successor trustee, of that insurance trust. Yet there is no copy of that trust before the court in any fashion. The plaintiffs in that lawsuit are now not only the insurance trust, the so-called insurance trust, it's now all the adult children of Mr. Simon Bernstein. Interestingly enough, Your Honor the adult children are not beneficiaries of this estate, Your Honor. It's the ten grandchildren who are the residual beneficiaries as a result of the pour-over provision of the will that leaves all the liquid assets in a trust. The beneficiaries of that trust are the ten grandchildren. So the adults, the adult children of Mr . Simon Bernstein, have every incentive, Your Honor, to see that the estate is not inherited with these life insurance proceeds because if they succeed in this action in Illinois then the adult children inherit or receive the proceeds of the life insurance not the ten grandchildren over whom you have jurisdiction as the beneficiaries
in this estate.
The curator, Your Honor, has no objection. Mr. Brown --

THE COURT: Let me stop and hear from Mr. Brown. What's your position on their motion? MR. BROWN: I'm not taking a position on the motion, Your Honor. I can get into it further, I don't really want to interrupt Mr. Feaman. But it would seem to me that if the main estate creditor wants to try to intervene in Chicago on behalf of the estate to bring assets into the estate without looking to the estate for current payment of his fees, in other words, if he finally succeeds then he can then come back to this Court and ask to have his fees reimbursed, then that would seem to be a benefit to the estate as far as marshaling the assets of the estate and, of course, the curator and/or personal representative has a duty to the creditors also to try to marshal the assets of the estate.

THE COURT: I got your position.
Mr. Rose?
MR. ROSE: Our position is pretty simple.
And I -- this is an evidentiary hearing --

THE COURT: It's an opening to tell me what's going on. $I$ just want your position.

MR. ROSE: Tetra (phonetic) and Spallina, who were the prior PRs, believe that the claim to the insurance policy by the estate had no merit because of their discussions with their client, because of their investigation of facts. These people have no evidence to support -- they have no parol evidence. This is a fight over an insurance policy that only beneficiary -- there's no dispute that the beneficiary the insurance company has on record, there was a prior beneficiary which was a company pension plan that the company is dissolved, and that's out -- the only contingent beneficiary, and there's an affidavit that's been filed attached to one of their motions in this Court where the insurance company says the only other beneficiary ever named was the Simon Bernstein Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust. There's a shorthand in a computer system, where somebody shorthanded it in the computer, and the affidavit in the insurance company addressing that which says that's shorthand, but in our forms the only
beneficiary ever listed is this irrevocable life insurance trust, their only piece of evidence supporting their claim is that the insurance trust cannot be found. But the trust did exist. It has a tax $I D$ number from -- a federal tax ID number. There's numerous references to it between different lawyers and nobody can find the trust document now. That's an issue that's going to be resolved in Illinois. But they have no evidence -- other than the fact that the trust doesn't exist -they don't have any parol evidence. They don't have any documents. They don't have anything on behalf of the estate.

Our concern is they're going to spend the precious few estate assets that are remaining to go to Illinois and fight an issue that has no merit, can subject the estate to a claim, you know, for fees or indemnification or prevailing party attorney's fees award.

The policy was owned by Simon Bernstein. That means it's included in his taxable estate. But it does not mean it's owned in his probate estate. The beneficiary is the beneficiary. The policy proceeds are in Illinois. They've
been deposited into the court --
THE COURT: What's the issue that the Illinois judge is being asked to decide?

MR. ROSE: Being asked to decide, among competing claims, to the proceeds of this race. Eliot Bernstein is there asserting the exact position that Mr. Stansbury wants to go there to assert. Eliot is asserting that the money should go to the estate and not the irrevocable life insurance trust. That issue is going to require, you know, a summary judgment or a trial with parol evidence to determine who the beneficiary is of that policy.

Mr. Stansbury has gone there to intervene and was denied by the judge the right to intervene in the case already once.

Our main concern really is twofold. The expense on both -- what's actively being spent. We want to make sure no estate funds are being expended to pursue this. In an estate that has a very limited amount of funds here --

THE COURT: Mr. Feaman says that his client will not seek fees for his role as administrator ad litem unless and until a recovery might take place and then he'll make
an application with funds then available, meaning the $\$ 1.7$ million would then apparently come into the estate.

MR. ROSE: I haven't heard testimony to that effect yet.

THE COURT: That's a representation.
MR. ROSE: He'd also need to represent that he would indemnify and hold the estate harmless if there's any adverse action as a result of him intervening in that case and losing either an award of attorneys fees or -THE COURT: I'm not sure about that part yet. I got your position.

MR. ROSE: And then the final point is Mr. Stansbury is a potential creditor of the estate. To the extent he goes and -- even if he would win that lawsuit and bring money into the estate $I$ don't think it's fair to let him get a -- I don't know what his fee arrangement would be.

THE COURT: I'd hear that. Under the statute he has to prove that he provided a benefit to the estate.

MR. ROSE: We don't even know if his claim will still exist --

THE COURT: It may or may not.
Mr. Morrissey?
MR. MORRISSEY: To address first the last point why should Mr. Stansbury not be allowed to act even though his fees may or may not come at the end. Well, he's a claimant. He's not a creditor. There's a distinction here. As a claimant he might not be privy, or should not be privy, to certain information because he doesn't have a judgment. He's not one of the eight classes of people. If he's allowed to intervene as a claimant in the Illinois action he may, in fact, become privy to certain information that we, or the estate, does not want him to become privy to because we may end up having to negotiate with a claimant to satisfy a claim. We don't want him privy to certain information. We don't want him intervening in actions, and certainly in actions that he's already sought intervention and been denied.

THE COURT: Was he denied because he didn't have standing because he hadn't been appointed as an administrator? Is that the reason why he was denied?

MR. MORRISSEY: He attempted to intervene individually and was denied. He was denied because -- I've attached the order. I filed an opposition and attached the order. And I can read from a couple of sections of the order to indicate and let Your Honor know why he was denied.

THE COURT: Hold on. I see it here.
MR. MORRISSEY: The court there went through an extensive analysis, legal standard and analysis in its order speaking of intervention as a right, and permissive intervention. And the court said, "The fact that you might anticipate a benefit from a judgment in favor of one of the parties to a lawsuit, maybe, for example, you're a creditor of one of them, does not entitle you to intervene in their lawsuit." That is really the position that $M r$. Stansbury is in. The court went on, "Here stansbury's claimed interest is merely an economic interest that is too remote for purposes of the rule because the estate is not a party to this lawsuit. And Stansbury does not assert that he or the estate are beneficiaries to the life insurance
proceeds nor the Bernstein Trust."
THE COURT: You represent, Mr. Morrissey, who?

MR. MORRISSEY: I represent the four grandchildren.

THE COURT: Who, according to Mr. Feaman, may benefit if this money comes to the estate? MR. MORRISSEY: Correct. THE COURT: So the way the case is being litigated now -- is the only plaintiff the Simon Bernstein Irrevocable Insurance Trust vs. the life insurance company? MR. MORRISSEY: Well -THE COURT: That's the way the style of the case is. Are there more plaintiffs than that?

MR. FEAMAN: They amended subsequently and joined the adult -- four of the five of the adult children were joined as plaintiffs.

THE COURT: And who is representing them?
MR. FEAMAN: Somebody up in Chicago in
that action.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. ROSE: I think technically the lawsuit was started by the trust against the insurance
company. The insurance company filed an interpleaded, probably by counterclaim. My understanding is, subject to someone correcting me, the insurance company was granted interpleader. They put the funds in the registry of the court. The insurance company is out of the case and even though you have the original style what's left is people asserting a claim to the proceeds. Eliot is there, I think, advocating the claim on behalf of the estate --

THE COURT: Eliot is pro se. I want -- we recognize that. From Mr. Morrissey's point of view, do you take a position that your clients, the grandchildren, may have an interest in these monies?

MR. MORRISSEY: No -- well, our position is the following -THE COURT: That question first. MR. MORRISSEY: Our position -- no, on behalf of the four grandchildren. THE COURT: You waive any -- on behalf of those children you waive any claim to that money? MR. MORRISSEY: I'm not going to waive on
the record.
THE COURT: You have to stand on one side of the fence or the other on that.

MR. MORRISSEY: Quite honestly, I haven't asked them that question. I can't waive something on behalf of my clients when I haven't asked them that question point blank.

THE COURT: All right. So you have -- who
-- the Simon Bernstein Irrevocable Trust is represented by Chicago --

MR. BERNSTEIN: Adam Simon who is the brother to David Simon who is married to my sister Pam Simon who stands to benefit if the money goes through Illinois.

THE COURT: Illinois counsel, okay. And the four children are represented by one lawyer?

MR. FEAMAN: That's Adam Simon.
THE COURT: Because of the impleading of the funds the battle right now is between the trust and these four children because those are the parties that are now competing for the money?

MR. ROSE: I don't think -- I don't know
if the four children are technically parties.

I think they're just -- the battle I think is between Eliot who is asserting that these funds should come into this estate --

THE COURT: Eliot was allowed to
intervene?
MR. BERNSTEIN: I got sued in the case, Your Honor, because they had gone behind my back to try to steal this policy -- around you too -- and they were told by the insurance company, when Robert Spallina submitted what I allege is a fraudulent insurance claim, and they were told by the insurance company that the claim was denied and they needed a probate court order from you to approve the beneficiary scheme they were proposing using some mashugana lost trust --

THE COURT: Eliot, you're named as a cross-plaintiff, so you are --

MR. BERNSTEIN: Now I've somehow become a plaintiff -- a defendant that you showed me last week, or two weeks ago, when you handed me that order. I haven't quite figured out how I'm the named defendant.

Your Honor, I'm representing their -- my children's interests.

THE COURT: Hold it. I'm reading something. I see a entity in the style of the case up there called the Simon Bernstein Trust, N.A. What's that? Is that something different than the Simon Bernstein Irrevocable Trust? MR. ROSE: It's in the affidavit that was filed, I think attached to Mr. Brown's recent petition for instructions, but... In the insurance company's computer they shorthanded the name of the trust. The beneficiary is the Simon Bernstein Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust which is the --

THE COURT: Ted Bernstein is an individual in this suit now. And who is representing him? MR. ROSE: I don't know that he is an individual. If he's an individual he's represented by Adam Simon.

THE COURT: I'm reading it. That's where
I get it. They're individually and/or as purported trustee of the irrevocable trust. Eliot is a cross-plaintiff -- that's where you're named, Eliot -- vs. Ted, individually and as trustee of the irrevocable trust. And then a bunch of other people and entities are cross-defendants. Right now the competing
parties in Illinois are the irrevocable trust and Eliot. Is that basically it --

MR. ROSE: Yes.
THE COURT: -- who are active; is that true?

So the question is should the claimant be declared here an administrator ad litem for the purposes of being permitted to ask the court to be able to intervene, which the court may or may not do?

MR. ROSE: There's one other part of my opening I missed on my notes --

THE COURT: Go ahead. Sure.
MR. ROSE: Mr. Morrissey touched on it and reminded me. If you're going to appoint an administrator ad litem it should not be Mr. Stansbury. You can appoint somebody and Mr. Stansbury could fund it, he could pay the expenses of, let's say, Mr. Brown or an independent person to hire a Chicago lawyer and, you know, advance the case. But you would then be preserving issues of privilege and you would be preserving the integrity of the system rather than have Mr. Stansbury, who is a claimant, who is adverse on multiple levels to
the estate, as the active person he would be funding the litigation and, in my view, he should be required to indemnify. But you'd have a neutral third person doing it rather that Mr. Stansbury which I think makes a lot more sense.

THE COURT: What do you say about the latter comment? That's the only one $I$ want you to address.

MR. FEAMAN: The fact that Mr. Stansbury will become privy to confidential information

THE COURT: Well, we're not at --
MR. FEAMAN: Ben Brown --
THE COURT: -- I'll allow someone else to
intervene to appropriately determine whether the estate has an interest in this money or not. That's the issue, correct?

MR. FEAMAN: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Right now the person technically doing that is Eliot who tries his best as a pro se. But it's pretty tough --

MR. FEAMAN: That's right. He doesn't represent the estate.

THE COURT: He represents himself individually. So someone who may look for the interest of the estate. And, you know, these type of litigation, obviously, the Illinois judge is going to have to take evidence -- I'm not going to do that in my hearing -- on who the beneficiary is of this policy. That's what has to be determined.

MR. FEAMAN: That's correct. THE COURT: The issue is narrow and I think everyone agrees with that.

MR. FEAMAN: And --
THE COURT: What I'm thinking about is you kind of want to be able to make sure that everyone who, perhaps, could ultimately be a beneficiary of this policy have a voice in that litigation. That's the due process part of it. So my thought is, having heard everybody say what they said, $I$ rarely find it to be a problem allowing someone to intervene -- unless they're a stranger, this wouldn't be a stranger -- because a voice is a good thing to have. We allow interventions all the time here on my cases. I just hear from someone else. They don't win or lose unless there's merit to
them. Someone right now is hovering the position that the Simon Bernstein Irrevocable Trust is the beneficiary. They're lawyered up. The only other person that seems to suggest that that may not be the case and it is the estate that's the beneficiary is Eliot. So I'm considering having someone other than Eliot -or in addition to Eliot, because he's there individually on behalf of himself and he's not representing the estate -- someone represent the interest of the estate. And so the proposal is that that be someone funded by your client, Mr. Feaman, but not -- but someone who is more neutral like Mr. Brown or something like that. What do you say about that?

MR. FEAMAN: We came up with Mr. Stansbury because if he's the one that's willing to fund the intervention and to fund the person -- the lawyer -- to make sure that the estate is going to be protected --

THE COURT: He has more -- he's like Eliot. He has his own interests, personal interest. MR. FEAMAN: He does. He has interests in
money coming into the estate, absolutely.
THE COURT: But someone who is more neutral may be the right move there. If that's where I'm going on this, what is your position on that?

MR. FEAMAN: If that's where you're going on that then Ben Brown is acceptable in that regard. I would just -- since Mr. Stansbury is the one that's volunteering, if you will, to fund initially the cost of this, then he needs, through me, some input with Mr. Brown.

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. FEAMAN: On all matters.
THE COURT: You'd be allowed to have input with him. But Mr. Brown would be there, assuming he's willing to take the assignment, to preserve issues of confidentiality and other concerns that could exist. He sounded, all along, from the beginning, as the perfect centerpiece to do this. What do you say?

MR. BROWN: Actually, I -- a few things to say, Your Honor. The first thing is with regard to the privilege issue. I'm not aware of any privilege that would apply.

THE COURT: And I'm not either. But let's
get past that point.
MR. BROWN: The testamentary exception, this is squarely in the testamentary exception, so there is no privilege in my view of this.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BROWN: The second issue is that I promised David Simon, I've given to you before, this email thread where he sent me an email and said you're trying to have Mr . Stansbury appointed as administrator ad litem, the estate should not be appearing in Illinois, you're going to be wasting estate assets and you have a conflict of interest because you're the curator and the estate pours over into the revocable trust and the beneficiaries of the revocable trust don't want this policy to go to the estate. I've been accused of conflict of interest. I've been accused of beaches of fiduciary duty already by David Simon who, apparently, is Adam Simon's brother and the father of some of the grandchildren.

My third issue is that, I think it's from the Vietnam War, this comes within the category of mission creek. I'm supposed to be temporary interim limited curator. There's supposed to
be a personal representative appointed at some point. I've been asked by the parties to consider being the personal representative. Frankly, Your Honor, this case is -- goes off in a lot of different directions. Whoever the personal representative is going to spend a lot of money just dealing with the different parties and the different people who are involved. And, frankly, I don't know that I have the time. And I really don't want to be the personal representative. THE COURT: Okay. MR. BROWN: If I'm appointed administrator ad litem it seems like I'm in there for the long run on a federal case. They do move them pretty quickly here in the Southern District of Florida. I know that from experience. I don't know about the Northern District of Illinois. MR. FEAMAN: Well, there's been -- I can answer that question.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. FEAMAN: There's been a notification of a docket entry entered by the judge on -- it said that all case dispositive motions are to be filed by mid-July, July 13. So it sounds
like we're on a rocket docket to me, Your Honor .

And on behalf of Mr. Stansbury I would like to, since he is running the cost, be able to work with whomever it is to pick counsel up in Chicago. And that - and to review counsel's bills from Chicago and to help strategize with that counsel the best way to proceed up there should Your Honor go that direction.

THE COURT: All right. So let me ask this question: Is there also before me a petition to appoint or determine a PR?

MR. FEAMAN: Not today.
THE COURT: Not today, okay.
MR. BROWN: Your Honor, I don't know if that's set for hearing at all. Although I request that it be set for hearing. The other issue with a $P R$ versus a curator is that Mr. Stansbury has active litigation going on in front of Judge Blanc right now. So far there hasn't been any conflict as far as Ted Bernstein and the estate defending against Mr. Stansbury's claim, but there have been multiple instances where people in this case,
in this room, basically, have said that there could eventually be a conflict of interest because there could be some finger pointing in cross claims.

THE COURT: It's hard to purify a case like this and not have it -- not have a situation where it's allegation free of a purported conflict of interest. But it just sounds logical that if -- especially when I'm looking at the latest heading out of the case in Illinois -- if this is, in its simplest form, a dispute as to who the beneficiary of this life insurance policy is, I mean that's a -- that's kind of a narrow hearing. We do those types of things in state court. You know, you need some discovery. And then you present the evidence and the judge makes a decision. Kind of like the way you do in contract cases. And so the parties who claim to be beneficiaries of the policy seem to be Simon Bernstein's Irrevocable Trust and their representative. I'm treating Simon Bernstein Trust as the same party for the purpose of this discussion. Eliot, individually, he's there. And no one who may have a voice to say I want,
on behalf of the estate, because there's no PR. If there's a $P R$ the $P R$ would take care of that. Especially where Mr. Stansbury is willing to front the cost of the fees for that up front it sounds beneficial to have that voice.

So I'll put it this way, Mr. Brown, I would expand your curator duties, if you're willing, to take the assignment. If not, we got to go elsewhere. It's up to you.

MR. BROWN: The curator duties basically to just effectively be the party who's intervening using Mr. Stansbury's counsel?

THE COURT: No. You would be the party.
You would hire a lawyer. You're allowed to, like in any other case, you and your lawyer can hear, because your phones work and your emails work, from anyone else including Mr. Feaman and Mr. Rose and Mr. Morrissey, and anyone else can stick their two sense in. That's the way litigation goes. But it seems to be that this isn't an issue that's a finger-pointing issue. This is who the beneficiary of the policy is. The judge is going to look at the documents and either say it's clear on its face or else take parol evidence and we're on our way. This
isn't a personal type of litigation. And so, you know, the strategies are legal strategies that would be in charge of you and the lawyer you hire.

MR. BROWN: I understand that, Your Honor. Basically what you just described is something that Mr. Stansbury could very easily do and pay for himself.

THE COURT: Right. But he's -- but I don't want him to be the party to do that because I think there's -- he's a claimant. There's -- I'm not comfortable there.

MR. BROWN: Okay.
THE COURT: And, you know, you're the neutral person looking out for the estate's interest. He has -- he's not -- he's looking out for the estate's interest but in a different manner. So hypothetically if you went up into the litigation and you got convinced by looking at everything you looked at, you and your lawyer, that the beneficiary was the Simon Bernstein Irrevocable Insurance Trust, whatever that is, and not the estate, you have a duty to argue in good faith. You follow what I'm saying? That's where the
neutrality part comes in. But you are more advocating, primarily, to the estate at -that's the assignment.

MR. BROWN: I understand that, Your Honor. But -- and I know there's a lot of buts here -the estate has about 6 to $\$ 700,000$ worth of assets, that includes the jewelry.

THE COURT: Remember, I'm having Mr. Stansbury pay.

MR. BROWN: Oh, you are having Mr.
Stansbury, okay.
THE COURT: That was the deal.
MR. BROWN: And just using his counsel
that he already has retained and already tried to intervene with?

THE COURT: No. No. You pick the lawyer. He pays.

MR. BROWN: Your Honor, I will do it subject to whatever personal representative is appointed going ahead and taking over --

THE COURT: Ultimately if we get to the stage where there's a $P R$ taking the place of you, that would be different. This is - let me just tell you, I mean a couple of reasons why I think that works is Mr. Brown has worked
with me as curator in a lot of cases. I mean I haven't had one challenge to the reasonableness of the fees ever. He keeps control of the lawyers. You know, and he does really a good job there. So I really, you know, I can't think of a better person to deal with this issue given everyone's competing interest. He'll be fair on what he argues on behalf of the estate. He's not going to run up fees. He's not going to allow the lawyer to run up fees. If you want, I don't think he should be the lawyer probably because I don't think he's admitted in Illinois --

MR. BROWN: No.
THE COURT: -- and he'll be able to best determine how to filter whatever the information is that other counsel want to give to them. Again, it's a narrow issue. Okay, everyone is jumping up. MR. MORRISSEY: If I could respond on behalf of four of the grandchildren. We're now talking about having to pay, you know, from my client's perspective pockets, Mr. Brown's fees, an attorney up in Illinois -THE COURT: I just said that won't be the
case.

MR. MORRISSEY: That could potentially be the case.

THE COURT: It would only be the case if there was a recovery for the estate to which then Mr. Stansbury would say, under the statute, I performed a benefit for the estate. How could that not benefit -- and from what I'm told your clients, the grandchildren, would be the people who would benefit from that. So why would you complain about that if that's what wound up happening? There's not a dollar coming out of the estate unless there's a recovery basically, and then the recovery would take place and he would seek some recovery of fees.

MR. MORRISSEY: And he would seek that --

THE COURT: Here.
MR. MORRISSEY: Here?
THE COURT: Sure. You can say what I think you're going to say, it's okay.

MR. MORRISSEY: I just want to go back to the basics. The fact that the estate is only a taker in default. So the estate doesn't need to be represented in the Illinois action.

It's, for example, there was even talk, I believe, in the Illinois case by one of the banks or insurance companies that it's possible if there's no beneficiary then the State of Illinois could be the taker in default. Well, the State of Illinois wasn't named as a party. They don't have counsel there. Likewise, why should the estate have counsel in an action where they're only the taker of last resort? THE COURT: Because if they're the taker as a matter of law -- I mean -- I don't really follow your argument because let's say there's a hearing, which there will be, and the trust is there, Eliot is there, and the estate is there, and the judge hears it all and says the decision is the beneficiary should be the estate, would we say that that's a ridiculous thing that we had the estate participate? I don't think so.

MR. MORRISSEY: I don't know what -- I mean there is no evidence that anyone on behalf of the estate can present that they have ever been named as a beneficiary --

THE COURT: That could be. It may be then that once Mr. Brown and counsel intervene, see
the documents - I mean you're not talking -how many pages of documents could the beneficiary forms be? It can't be that many. When we sign our life insurance forms we sign a page or two, that's about it. It's not like it's going to be really exotic litigation. This is a narrow, single issue who the beneficiary is of this policy. You know, it may be that it is clear that it's this irrevocable trust and then they'll go from there to see whether that really is an entity that exists. That may be a separate issue. If the judge says -- someone can name on the life insurance policy, you know, the Star Spangled Banner Fund and if that doesn't exist then we know from contract law what happens if you name a beneficiary that doesn't exist. You go to the next level. You certainly want the life insurance funds going somewhere. That's what we would determine if that took place. Step 1, step 2, step 3, doesn't sound to be that complexed. Last word.

MR. ROSE: If I understand what you are saying, which makes sense, Mr. Brown will keep separate time for the time he spends as curator
working on the Illinois issue. He will hire counsel and the fees of Mr . Brown and the Illinois counsel, under his direction and his discretion, would be paid by Mr. Stansbury?

THE COURT: That's the case. Subject to a claim for reimbursement under the statute.

MR. ROSE: I'd want to hear from
Mr. Stansbury under oath that he's willing to undertake that expense. Not to talk out of school, but $I$ haven't had discussion with counsel and I didn't necessarily get the sense that that was going to be the case. THE COURT: All right. Well, Mr. Feaman can represent them. MR. FEAMAN: I am representing as an officer of the Court, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. MR. FEAMAN: My only concern is if there's -- basically Mr. Stansbury is funding this there's -- there has to be some type of, I don't want to use the word control, but real input into the process. THE COURT: Well, he's allowed to, like anyone else in cases like this, you could have conversations with Mr. Brown and his lawyer.

You can show them what documents there are. You can ask them to discuss things with them. And, you know, I mean they -- they obviously know he has an interest. And to the extent that they're comfortable I think it's appropriate they'll discuss these things with them.

MR. FEAMAN: On behalf of Mr. Stansbury, I would like assurances.

THE COURT: I'm not going to -- I have to keep the -- there's a line of demarcation $I$ don't want to cross up front.

MR. FEAMAN: And I'm not objecting that it's not Mr. Stansbury. I just want to make sure the person who --

THE COURT: The person who is appointed is going to advocate for the estate.

MR. FEAMAN: Right. Agree with that.
THE COURT: But let me tell you this, the reason I appoint a curator to do this is the curator is not advocating for Mr. Stansbury. He's advocating for the estate. There's times when the curator could say, after doing everything, $I$ don't think, for example, the estate has a bona fide interest. That may be
bad news for your side. But if that's what they conclude then that's what they conclude. If they conclude they do they will continue advocating. It's things we do as lawyers all the time. We go after cases with merit, and shy away from those we think don't have merit. MR. FEAMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: There's multilevel here. If someone says that the Bernstein Irrevocable Trust is the beneficiary but that it doesn't exist there may be an argument that could be made how then still as a result of that the estate should get the funds, that would be something that Mr. Brown and counsel could consider advocating. But it's all in good faith stuff.

MR. FEAMAN: Sure. I just want to make sure -THE COURT: You'll get copies of the bills. You'll be able to see what's that. If at anytime you think that Mr. Brown and the lawyer are, you know, going way beyond what you think they should, from an expense point of view, you can always come back to me.

MR. FEAMAN: I'm less concerned with the
expense, although it is important, more with being able to pick up the phone and speak to counsel in Chicago and say, hey, have you considered this, I have information that may help your case.

THE COURT: I'm not going to micromanage that part. Today if you want to call Mr . Brown for this hearing, for example, and say, Mr. Brown, this is what I think, what do you think, you're allowed to have a discussion on that. That happens all the time, doesn't it?

MR. BROWN: It does. It does with everybody in the case, emails and phone calls.

THE COURT: You guys email between each other like crazy now.

MR. BROWN: That's true. Your Honor, the only -- as far as keeping my time, if 1 kept my time at my rate as curator is Mr. Stansbury supposed to pay for that, or is that still payable by the estate?

THE COURT: Your time and the lawyer's
time are the only rate I approve --
MR. BROWN: Paid by Mr. Stansbury.
THE COURT: -- the hourly rate, I approve of 350 .

MR. BROWN: I also propose, it doesn't have to go on the order, it would seem to me, there's nothing wrong, once I retain a Chicago attorney, there's nothing wrong with Mr. Feaman calling that Chicago attorney and me telling the Chicago attorney don't get me on the phone --

THE COURT: I agree. There's no question. You're the conduit.

MR. BROWN: As far as the claim, I'll absolutely rely on Illinois counsel.

THE COURT: All right. I think this is pretty clear how it's going to be handled. Yes, sir.

MR. ROSE: A couple of minor concerns, I think Mr. Brown went too far. Mr. Stansbury would not pay for all the curator fees, only the curator fees directly related to the Illinois matter.

THE COURT: That's what he said. Separate times sheets, sure.

MR. ROSE: I'm concerned if they -- he's going to hire a Chicago lawyer, a Chicago lawyer is going to be expensive. That's what our main concern is --

THE COURT: Hold on. Mr. Brown --
MR. ROSE: He's a practical guy --
THE COURT: -- he's going to find a good
lawyer with a reasonable rate, and that's a little higher. He's not going to hire a \$1, 000-an-hour-guy .

MR. ROSE: But if he hires a lawyer and the bill is $\$ 12,000$ and Mr. Stansbury's counsel looks at it and says we don't think we should pay it, Mr. Brown is retaining the person on behalf of the estate, we need to have not a chance for them to complain about bills.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm not worried about that now. There's too much -- I'm not finding, you know -- I mean one -- part of this is what I think is the sincerity of Mr. Feaman's side here. And it's kind of a good thing that we have the ability to be able to use Mr. Stansbury's funds that way. They've made the pledge to do it. I don't think they're going to go back on their word.

MR. ROSE: I understand. I think
Mr. Stansbury should at least, under oath --
THE COURT: Your request is denied.
Mr. Feaman is an officer of the court. He
represents --
MR. ROSE: -- it would be enforceable as a judgment if he doesn't pay -- the estate would have a claim against Mr. Stansbury if he, for example, didn't pay some invoices and we got stuck paying the bill for a Chicago lawyer.

THE COURT: You want me to rule on that now? Your answer is no. You're real premature on that. Draft an order along the lines I mention.

What else for today?
MR. BROWN: Your Honor, I had two motions for instructions.

THE COURT: One had to do with this issue, right?

MR. BROWN: That one I basically just took a backseat to because of the administrator ad litem motion.

The other, Eliot Bernstein sends me a lot of emails with a lot of requests. I'm not saying it's a bad thing. But he asks me questions I don't necessarily know I can answer. For instance, he got the accounting by Tetra and Spallina and then sent me an email that I've attached to the motion. I don't know
if you have the motion for instructions.
THE COURT: I do.
MR. BROWN: That had 44 different questions, not including subparts, and asked that I hire a forensic accountant, an analyst and acquire account statements from a number of third-party institutions.

THE COURT: Is that the motion? I don't have the attachments. It says motion for instructions -- that's the life insurance one. Hold on.

MR. BROWN: It's not necessarily
important. Eliot is very thorough. But, again, the estate has limited assets. My view of what the curator should do with respect to the accounting is not take the lead on objecting to what Tetra and Spallina did, investigating the underpinnings of the accounting, that's up to -- we have a lot of beneficiaries here who are very, very passionate and interested in what's going on with the estate.

THE COURT: Stop. You don't have to go further. That position, that's the law. You don't do that. If there's an accounting,
there's a rule on objections, the parties object. They don't use you -- you don't work for them.

MR. BROWN: Okay.
THE COURT: You work for the court.
MR. BROWN: I'll try and craft an order that deals with that motion in that regard.

Also, there also was a motion, Eliot has concerns about the 2012 will and its validity. I think your ruling would be the same on that. I don't have a role in trying to contest that will --

THE COURT: Exactly. You're not an advocate. You don't investigate things that the parties may be interested in. They can do what they think they need to do based on the rules of procedure and statutes.

MR. BROWN: That's it. MR. ROSE: If I may address the privilege issue?

THE COURT: Okay. The privilege issue, okay.

MR. ROSE: May I approach?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. ROSE: I can file a copy of this.

This is the email in question. Without reading the email, if you look at who it is addressed to at the very top. Mr. Bernstein is saying, this is Ted, telling me he sent it to Eliot by mistake. Last night at 10:12 he got off an airplane and wanted to tell me things. It's to Eliot by accident. If you just read --

THE COURT: When you say to Eliot by accident, the only person this is sent to is Eliot.

MR. ROSE: Correct. He was trying to send it to me. If you look below the word analysis, the first word of the email is Alan.

THE COURT: So this was is supposed to go to you and it went to Eliot?

MR. ROSE: By mistake. And Mr. Bernstein has advised me this morning he sent it to 2,000 people already. He plans on publicizing it --

THE COURT: I'm sure he didn't do that
because if he wants to participate in the case he's obligated to have and comply with the rules of court.

MR. BERNSTEIN: Your Honor --
THE COURT: When you --
MR. BERNSTEIN: I was sent an email to me.

Like I do when I get a letter that has
threatening stuff to me I sent it to my friends who are lawyers. I sent it to a number of people. Actually, I got so busy sending it to people, because it scared me a little bit that it was very threatening to people, that by the time I was done my wife stopped me and said we got to go to court. All I know is my brother sent me an email that seems pretty threatening. It was addressed to me. I was the intended recipient.

THE COURT: Let me ask you, when the email
starts off Alan --
MR. ROSE: I get a million emails --
THE COURT: That say Alan?
MR. BERNSTEIN: That say whoever's name. THE COURT: Okay. All right. You know what, I don't buy anything you just told me.

MR. BERNSTEIN: I thought my brother was sending me a copy of an email --

THE COURT: Stop. Stop. Stop speaking.
I'm going to look at the rule for a second.
MR. BERNSTEIN: Okay.
MR. ROSE: It's 1.285.
THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BERNSTEIN: I haven't been prepared for this, so...

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BERNSTEIN: I haven't looked at the rules.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BERNSTEIN: I can show you several instances in my email of people sending me letters addressed to other people, several thousands of those.

THE COURT: So, all right. Everyone has to take a deep breath. This situation is done pursuant to Rule 1.285. So Mr. Rose, on your side, correct me if you think I'm wrong, Subsection A says, "When you" -- your client -"takes a position that there's been an inadvertent disclosure of privileged materials to another person" -- which is what you say happened, correct?

MR. ROSE: Correct, sir.
THE COURT: It says here, "In order to assert the privilege the party, person or entity shall, within 10 days of actually discovering the inadvertent disclosure, serve written notice of the assertion of privilege on
the party to whom the materials were disclosed. The notice shall specify with particularity" -etc. And then there's a procedure.

MR. ROSE: I did that last night. I emailed him last night.

THE COURT: I didn't know that. So you gave him the written notice. I assume he got it. Can I see a copy of the notice?

MR. ROSE: I'm trying to get a copy of the notice. Perhaps -- I'm not trying to have the whole argument heard today. I just --

THE COURT: The rule applies.
MR. ROSE: Right.
THE COURT: So once he gets notice, the rule applies. So the notice will have -- you sent it by email?

MR. ROSE: I have it here now. I do find it, sir. May I approach?

THE COURT: What's the time and date of the notice?

MR. ROSE: May 22, 2014 at 11:07 p.m. I said, "You received an email from Ted intended solely for me, and accidentally sent to you by mistake. The email was sent around 10:12 p.m. tonight. Please delete the email immediately
without reading it and confirm that deletion by email. The communication was attorney-client protected and you are not entitled to read or possess the email due to the accidental transmission. Thank you in advance. And if you fail to comply with this request we'll be forced to take corrective action with the court." Signed by me sent to the same email address that --

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So the rule says, to Eliot, he sent that to you, Rule 1.285, Subsection B tells you what you're supposed to do.

MR. BERNSTEIN: I haven't seen it yet.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BERNSTEIN: He's saying he sent it
after Ted's email. The last email I read was Ted's email. So I haven't seen it.

THE COURT: So open that email --
MR. BERNSTEIN: Okay.
THE COURT: Okay. And do what the rule says.

MR. BERNSTEIN: Don't send it to anybody else.

THE COURT: Well, okay, that, but it also
says some other things of what you're supposed to do. You're supposed to return or destroy it. That's one thing you're supposed to do. And you are to notify anyone else who you disclosed it to that they're to do the same thing and you're also to take reasonable steps to retrieve the materials disclosed -MR. BERNSTEIN: I'll do all that. THE COURT: And the only exception to this is if you want to challenge that assertion that you were provided an inadvertent privileged matter. And then the rule says what could happen and we can have litigation and spend a lot of money.

MR. BERNSTEIN: No. I'll do whatever it is -- whatever the law says, as always. THE COURT: There's nothing for me to do. MR. ROSE: I understand. I just want to make sure you --

MR. BERNSTEIN: Your Honor, it went out to a lot of people. Like I said, I have a broad base --

THE COURT: Take a look. When you leave the courthouse -MR. BERNSTEIN: Okay. I'll notify

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everybody though.
THE COURT: Go and take a look at the rule and just do what the rule says.

MR. ROSE: And it's not to be posted on social media. THE COURT: You see, I'm not allowed to have dialogue on that now. Other than signing the order, hearing over. Thank you.
(Whereupon the hearing is concluded at 10:00 a.m.)

CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER

I, JULIE ANDOLPHO, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript of the proceedings, consisting of pages numbered 1 through 54, inclusive, is a true and correct transcript of the proceedings taken by me before the Honorable MARTIN COLIN, on May 23, 2014.

I further certify that I am not a relative or employee or attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor a relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially interested, directly or indirectly, in this action.

The certification does not apply to any reproduction of the same by any means unless under direct control and/or direction or the reporter. Dated this 27 th day of May, 2014. Julie Andolpho

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